Lebanese-American scholar Fouad Ajami, who contributes to the Wall Street Journal opinion pages and consults with the Bush administration on Middle East affairs, originally became known for his dense essay collection The Dream Palace of the Arabs. In it, he harshly criticized his fellow Arabs for their predilection for failed ideologies like Arab nationalism and for unyielding, unrealistic stances regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. President Bush recently bestowed a National Humanities Medal on Ajami, who was a fervent advocate of the Iraq War.
There is indeed much to criticize in contemporary Arab politics and society, and Ajami has often put his finger on the region's ills. Diagnosing the ailment, however, is not the same as prescribing the cure. President Bush and his dwindling supporters in the media suffer from their own delusions in the region -- principally that Arabs want and are ready to create liberal democracies that will support American foreign policy goals for the region. The hapless Charles Krauthammer unwittingly admitted this when he wrote on Friday: "We are trying to bring democracy to Iraq in particular because a pro-Western government enjoying legitimacy and popular support would have been the most enduring means of securing our interests there."
Well, yes -- and winning $1 million in the lottery would have been the best way of paying off my college loans. What Bush and Krauthammer don't seem to realize, despite the evidence in Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, and now Bahrain, where Islamists just cleaned up in the largely symbolic parliamentary contests, is that elected governments in the Middle East will neither be pro-American nor liberal.
Until recently, Lebanon proved the exception to this regional pattern. Its pro-Western majority was elected in response to the assassination of popular former Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who led Lebanon's rebuilding efforts following its civil war. The summer war between Israel and Hezbollah, however, exposed Fouad Seniora's government as powerless to defend its territory, while the charismatic Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah became the darling of the Arab world. The Bush administration failed to convince most Lebanese that its policy of giving Israel more time to bomb their country was in their interest. Now seeking power commensurate with its military prowess and the true demographic weight of the Shi'a community that forms its base, Hezbollah quit the cabinet and has begun holding demonstrations that threaten to bring down the government. (For now, the majority coalition of Sunnis, Christians, and Druze is holding firm.)
The war's repercussions extend beyond Lebanon's short borders. During the war, Muqtada al-Sadr embarrassed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki by promising to send Iraqi mujahideen to fight the Israelis. There's dispute about what kind of relationships al-Sadr has in Lebanon, but it's clear that Hezbollah inspired Iraqi Shi'a to take a more radical line. The surging Sadr is riding a tide of Shi'ite anger at Sunni insurgents and the American occupation that has failed to stop them. Events came to a head last Wednesday when al-Sadr's bloc "suspended participation" in parliament to protest al-Maliki's emergency meeting with Bush in Amman. Shortly thereafter, the meeting was mysteriously pushed back to Thursday.
Faced with hostile leaks from within his administration and from the sieve-like Iraq Study Group that have built public support for at least a vague "pullback" of American forces, Bush has proclaimed his intention to support the sinking al-Maliki to the bitter end. The United States is now responsible for propping up three extremely weak leaders in the Middle East, counting Mahmoud Abbas in Palestine and Seniora in Lebanon. All three are threatened by burgeoning or possible civil wars, as an alarmed Jordan's King Abdullah helpfully pointed out to ABC News. To make matters worse, the Saudis are likely to intervene to protect Iraqi Sunnis if the Americans abandon them to a vengeful Shi'a.
This is usually the part of the column where the pundit proposes a magical solution that will never be tested. Unfortunately, I don't have any encouraging answers. Regarding Iraq, talking to Syria or Iran or both, which the British favor and the Iraq Study Group will recommend against stubborn opposition from the Cheney camp, is worth a try. It may have even stood a real chance of succeeding two or three years ago, but with an ignominious U.S. withdrawal now in sight, Damascus and Tehran will demand a price that we and our Israeli allies are unwilling to pay. Why negotiate when they can win outright? (In a 2005 piece for Foreign Affairs, Ajami prematurely declared a potential deal with Syria "in shambles.")
Instead of reaching out to the bad guys, the Bush administration is resorting to a familiar strategy: asking our "good guys" -- Sunni autocrats like Hosni Mubarak and the two King Abdullahs -- for their help with the Sunni population of Iraq. In exchange, we will pressure Israel to talk peace with Abbas. Going through our Arab allies is exactly the approach taken before the Iraq War, and it will fail for the same reasons: neither Olmert nor Bush is sincere in a desire for a negotiated solution, and the weak Abbas can't deliver one in any case.
As for Iraq itself -- I'm afraid it's beyond help. Even Ajami appears to realize this now. He admits in his new book that, outside Kurdistan, "America has rolled history's dice." Unfortunately, those dice are coming up snake eyes.
Blake Hounshell is web editor of ForeignPolicy.com.
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