The IMF and The Asian Flu

he International Monetary Fund has displayed its awesome power in recent
months in assuming the central role in the unfolding Asian financial crisis.
Since July, the IMF has organized financial bailouts totaling more than $100
billion of public funds in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. Yet the IMF is
almost unknown to the American people. Its vague public image—carefully tended
by the institution itself—is something like the cartoon in a recent Time
magazine profile: The IMF, garbed as Superman, sweeps low over the earth,
extinguishing financial blazes. But a careful examination of the actual record
shows that the IMF, loyal to financial orthodoxy and mindful of creditors to the
neglect of debtor countries, often pours oil on the flames.

Consider the IMF's recent actions in Asia. Asia's current crisis has all the
ingredients of a financial panic made in the private sector. Asian banks are
large debtors to foreign banks, and a large part of the debt is very short-term.
Despite sound "fundamentals" in Asia—such as budget surpluses, high saving
rates, low inflation, and export-oriented industries—foreign creditors began to
withdraw money from Asia last spring because of growing concerns about currency
overvaluation, bank scandals, and weak real estate markets.

These concerns multiplied in midyear when Thailand devalued the baht.
Suddenly, international banks became wary of extending new loans in Asia as the
old loans fell due. The banks were becoming a bit worried about Asia's long-term
prospects, which still looked rather good, but were much more worried about what
the other investors were doing. Each investor understood that Thailand,
Indonesia, and Korea would be pushed into outright default if enough creditors
pulled the plug on new loans. In the end, each creditor started to rush for the
doors precisely because the other creditors were doing the same thing.

n this kind of shaky situation, the role of public policy is to help
the markets escape a self-fulfilling stampede. Six months ago, the appropriate
steps for senior finance officials in the United States, Japan, and Europe would
have been to try to slow the flight of the creditors. The major banks should
have been brought together in mid-1997 to underscore their collective interest
in avoiding a self-defeating panic (such discussions in fact began only at the
end of December 1997, once the panic was already in full swing). At the same
time, the key central banks led by the Federal Reserve might have extended some
credit lines to their Asian counterparts, without great public fanfare and
without adding to the market anxieties.

Instead, the IMF arrived in Thailand in July filled with ostentatious
declarations that all was wrong and that fundamental and immediate surgery was
needed. (Ironically, the ink was not even dry on the IMF's 1997 annual report,
which gave Thailand and its neighbors high marks on economic management!) The
IMF deepened the sense of panic not only because of its dire public
pronouncements but also because its proposed medicine— high interest rates,
budget cuts, and immediate bank closures—convinced the markets that Asia indeed
was about to enter a severe contraction (as had happened earlier in Argentina,
Bulgaria, and Mexico). Instead of dousing the fire, the IMF in effect screamed
fire in the theater. The scene was repeated in Indonesia in November and Korea
in December. By then, the panic had spread to virtually all of East Asia.

Even though the original fire could well have been contained, the ensuing
panic has proved devastating. In Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, stock and
currency markets plummeted after the IMF entered the scene, and this despite the
enormous bailout loans to these countries. Asia's own banks have stopped making
loans in response to the IMF's insistence on closing "weak" banks. The local
banks could read the warnings. They started to call in their own loans to build
up cash reserves, since otherwise the IMF might insist on their own closure. In
the end, the IMF programs could well cause Asia much more harm than benefit.
Asian governments will borrow tens of billions of dollars to enable their banks
to pay off foreign creditors, but the internal economies may well collapse. The
Asian governments will get stuck with debts owed to the IMF and foreign
governments, and the economies will contract sharply, while the foreign
creditors will escape unscathed.

The IMF has provided a benchmark for judging its effectiveness in Asia. In
the August program for Thailand, the IMF projected Thai growth of 3.5 percent
for 1998. In the November Indonesia program, the IMF projected 1998 growth of 3
percent. And most recently in Korea, the IMF is targeting growth of 2.5 percent.
These projections almost surely will fail just as the IMF's projections failed
in Argentina, Bulgaria, and Mexico (more on this below). All three Asian
countries are likely to suffer extreme contractions next year at the hands of
the IMF's policy-induced credit crunch. Industrial production in Thailand was
down 8 percent in November compared with a year earlier. A wave of bankruptcies
is sweeping Korea, and a massive rise in unemployment seems set to hit all three
of the economies. Most private forecasters are projecting outright declines in
gross domestic product (GDP) next year, a sharp change indeed for economies that

have grown at more than 6 percent per year for a decade or more. If history is a
guide, the IMF will simply ignore its own faulty forecasts for the Asian
program, rather than asking what went wrong.

Subscribe to The American Prospect


The Asian story is hardly unique. In most of the developing world the IMF is
not a figure that swoops in for a quick rescue. On the contrary, for perhaps
half of the developing world outside of China and India, the IMF is an all-too-constant
presence, almost a surrogate government in financial matters. Not
unlike the days when the British Empire placed senior officials directly into
the Egyptian and Ottoman finance ministries, the IMF is insinuated into the
inner sanctums of nearly 75 developing-country governments around the world—countries
with a combined population of some 1.4 billion. These governments
rarely move without consulting the IMF staff, and when they do, they risk their
lifelines to capital markets, foreign aid, and international respectability.
Newspaper headlines in these countries herald the comings and goings of IMF

The IMF's power rests on three bases. Most importantly, the IMF is the
instrument by which the U.S. Treasury intervenes in developing countries. When
the United States took the initiative in bailing out Mexico in 1994 and Korea in
1997, it turned to the IMF as the institution that could provide the cover, the
staff, and the bucks to do the job. Second, many developing countries genuinely
welcome the chance to sign a "contract" with the world community, represented by
the IMF, in which good economic policies are rewarded with emergency loans.
Third, and much more dangerous, IMF power also flows from the institution's
carefully constructed image of infallibility. The IMF gets its way in the
developing world because to disagree publicly with the IMF is viewed in the
international community as rejecting financial rectitude itself.

n dozens of cases each year in which developing-country governments
manifestly do not agree with IMF prescriptions, they are terrified to murmur any
opposition. To do so immediately brands the government as "lacking seriousness"
in economic management. The new President elect of Korea spent the first day
following his election victory genuflecting to the IMF. Already the
international financial press is judging Korea on whether or not it adheres to
the IMF "medicine," without even asking whether the medicine is sensibly
prescribed. From the point of view of the U.S. government, the IMF's aura of
infallibility is obviously a convenient myth. Pesky developing countries are
kept in line with little effort, and U.S. policymakers are confident that the
IMF will do their bidding in any event. In fact, since the IMF has economic
programs in some 75 countries, and since the U.S. Treasury carefully tracks a
mere handful of these at any one time, the IMF staff is really running the show
in most of the developing world with almost no supervision from the United
States or anyone else. IMF autonomy is especially real in the poorest countries
of the world, for which the Treasury and U.S. financial community have little
time or interest.

No doubt the IMF is a convenient instrument of U.S. financial diplomacy in
the high-profile cases. For a small amount of U.S. appropriations every few
years, the United States gains effective control (shared to some extent with the
European Union and Japan) over a large pool of money that can be lent to
developing countries without congressional meddling. Since the IMF pools
resources from all the member countries, the United States's own contribution is
multiplied severalfold, and the U.S. influence inside the organization is all
out of proportion to the U.S. contribution. Moreover, when the IMF loans money
to governments, the loans are nearly risk free, since most governments recognize
that their entire international standing rests on a timely repayment of those
loans even if that means default to other creditors, extreme internal recession,
or sales of valuable domestic assets.

The immense authority of a secretive international institution may be cozy
for senior U.S. policymakers, but it can be deeply troubling for developing
countries that live under IMF programs. The IMF claims that these fears are
overblown: After all, its economic programs are voluntary—the IMF cannot impose
a program on an unwilling government. This voluntarism is a matter of semantics,
however. When the most powerful governments of the world inform a poor
developing country that it must agree with the IMF or else lose access to
foreign aid, the goodwill of major governments, the chances for debt
restructuring, and the confidence of private markets (which are encouraged by
the G-7 to use IMF agreements as focal points for their own bargaining), the
notion of voluntarism is a bit stretched.

The IMF also argues that it is a true international organization, jointly
governed by developing and developed countries. True, the IMF is a voluntary
association of member governments, now 182 in number. And true, it is governed
by an executive board that represents the finance ministries of all of the
member countries. But in fact, the executive board is largely a rubber-stamp
institution of the U.S. Treasury and the major finance ministries of Europe and
Japan, and the IMF senior staff itself. Voting is weighted by financial
contribution (the so-called quota), so that the United States, the European
Union, and Japan combined have a comfortable majority. Moreover, the quota
allocations are set to preserve the voting clout of the developed countries.
India and China have smaller votes than the Netherlands, for example, despite
economies that are roughly four and ten times larger in purchasing-power terms
(and populations, of course, that are more than 60 times larger). The board is
also extremely weak in its operational oversight of the IMF staff: It almost
never looks beyond IMF staff reports, and almost never seeks independent
information or independent follow-up evaluations. Moreover, since IMF program
documents are automatically confidential, the public has almost no ability to
weigh in on IMF decisions.


The great power of a secretive international bureaucracy would be troubling
enough to believers in limited government and public accountability. The problem
is worse. The IMF's mask of infallibility hides a record of mediocrity
punctuated by some truly costly blunders. Of course, these blunders almost never
come to public light. When an internal IMF review criticized the IMF's role in
Mexico in 1993 and 1994, it was quickly hushed up and never made public. In most
cases, critical reviews are never put to paper. When anything goes wrong in an
IMF-country program, it is easy enough to blame the government of that country
for failing to abide by the (secret) words of wisdom of IMF staff.

As an economic advisor to many developing-country governments, I have had a
rare opportunity to witness IMF operations at close range. Let me mention a few

In 1985, Bolivia faced a 24,000 percent hyperinflation, a 30 percent drop in
living standards, and a catastrophic rise in poverty, reflecting a generation of
mismanagement by dictatorships, over-indebtedness, and the collapse of tin
exports. When a new democratically elected government came into office in 1985
and bravely carried out a dramatic stabilization program, the IMF nearly
torpedoed the government's successful efforts by demanding a resumption of
payments on a mountain of bad debts inherited from past military governments.
Luckily, Bolivia fought this one—in this case it had almost nothing to lose. The
United States backed the Bolivians, in part as a reward for Bolivia's economic
reforms and its cooperation with U.S. antidrug policy. As a result, Bolivia
pioneered debt relief two years before it became official IMF policy. And though
the IMF had initially opposed the whole approach, Bolivia's success was later
trumpeted as an IMF success story.

In 1989, postcommunist Poland desperately needed a fund to stabilize the
exchange rate. A stabilization fund is a pool of money that allows the central
bank to intervene in currency markets to prevent damaging speculative swings in
its exchange rate. The idea of a stabilization fund was a novelty; the IMF
didn't warm up to the idea until six years later when such funds finally became
part of IMF policies. The IMF mission to Poland dismissed the idea of a
stabilization fund. Fortunately, the Poles were able to lobby the United States
directly (thank goodness for Chicago voters), the zloty stabilization fund was
established without the IMF's initiative, and Poland succeeded in breaking the
hyperinflation. Again, Poland's success was later championed as an IMF success

In 1992, Estonia wanted to break out of the disastrous hyperinflation that
gripped the 15 successor states of the Soviet Union. The IMF's brief was both
ludicrous and explicit: Try to keep all of the successor states joined in a
common ruble currency, which would be managed from 15 capitals, with 15
coordinated IMF programs. The vision was preposterous: Any introductory
economics student would have figured out that with 15 independent central banks
all issuing credit in a shared currency, the outcome would be continuing
hyperinflation. The Estonians told the IMF that they would introduce their own
currency with or without the IMF support. The IMF relented in Estonia, and the
Estonians became the first stable post-Soviet economy. Not only was Estonia
paraded as an IMF success story, but the hapless other 14 successor states—which
experienced a full year more of hyperinflation under the IMF's flawed policy—were
castigated by the fund for their errant ways.

In Bulgaria in 1996, the IMF praised the government for its continuing
reforms, and signed a new agreement with the Bulgarian government for a one-year
loan. The program forecast a zero growth rate in 1996 and 2.5 percent for 1997.
The IMF recognized that there was a budding banking crisis but neither the IMF
nor the Bulgarian government really knew how to handle it. In a ham-handed way,
the IMF and the government decided to take "tough" action, including the
announcement of sudden bank closures. Depositors panicked; the rest of the banks
collapsed, and the flight from the currency produced a hyperinflation. Defying
IMF predictions, in 1996 GDP collapsed by 10.9 percent (in fact, this represents
a staggering fall of around 20 percent in the second half of 1996). Of course, the IMF blamed the entire mishap on the government. Ironically, the IMF has
entered Asia with the same ill-prepared calls for immediate bank closures.

Bulgaria is one of three recent IMF cases that resemble the Asian financial
crisis. The other two are Mexico and Argentina in 1995. These second two IMF
interventions are often viewed as great IMF success stories, but a closer look
is disquieting. In Mexico in 1994, as in East Asia in 1997, foreign creditors
turned abruptly from euphoria to flight. The outflow of funds started moderately
in April 1994; it became a stampede in December 1994, following the devaluation
of the Mexican peso. Like Asia, Mexico was basically a solvent, creditworthy
country hit by a panicked withdrawal of foreign funds. And like today's crisis
countries in Asia, Mexico had so much short-term debt that the sudden withdrawal
of confidence threatened to push Mexico into default.

The United States and the IMF led a bailout operation in early 1995. The IMF
was assigned the task of designing the "macroeconomic framework"—the set of
monetary, interest rate, exchange rate, and fiscal policy targets—to accompany
the bailout loan to Mexico. The IMF didn't really understand the Mexican crisis,
and treated it incorrectly as a typical case of a profligate government rather
than crisis in the private capital markets. The IMF called for a lot of monetary
and fiscal stringency that unnecessarily added to the contractionary effects of
the creditor panic. In setting up the program, the IMF forecast a Mexican growth
rate of 1.5 percent in 1995. The actual outcome was -6.1 percent. This whopping
prediction error of 7.6 percentage points within the year was never explained,
and apparently did not lead the IMF to reconsider its strategy in Mexico or in
similar countries.

Three months after the Mexico shock, Argentina felt the tidal wave of
investor panic. Once again, the IMF was thrust into a case of banking crisis
made in the private sector rather than the government sector. Once again, the
IMF resorted to its tried-and-true tactics: budget cuts, interest rate
increases, a credit squeeze. And once again, the IMF left a benchmark for
judging its own work. As of April 1995, the IMF projected Argentine GDP growth
of 2 percent to 3 percent in 1995. The actual outcome was -4.6 percent, again a
miss of around 7 percent of GDP within the very year of the program.

The list of questionable judgments can be extended into many other areas.
Just to name a few:

  • The IMF rejected the idea of debt
    relief for seven years after the outbreak of the developing-country debt crisis
    in 1982. Official IMF policy insisted that no relief was needed. When the U.S.
    Treasury finally shifted position in April 1989, the IMF suddenly swung around.
    There was, apparently, no follow-up review of why the decision on debt relief
    had been so long delayed, and at what cost.

  • While many high-profile countries
    have received debt relief after 1989, many of the poorest of the poor have
    continued to languish. The recent IMF-World Bank initiative on debt relief for
    Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) was long delayed, and is exceedingly
    limited in scope and lacking in urgency.

  • The IMF has missed the boat in the
    former Soviet Union, failing to help countries to institute separate national
    currencies until after they had been ravaged by hyperinflation, and generally
    failing to address the linkages between corruption, disastrous tax systems, poor
    public management, and ongoing macroeconomic turmoil.

  • The IMF rejected stabilization
    funds for Russia and other transition economies when they could have been
    useful. It finally adopted the policy of supporting such funds in 1995. Again,
    there was no external review of past decisions.


It is high time that we take the IMF seriously—seriously enough to hold it
accountable for its actions, its failed forecasts, and the details of the
"advice" that it imposes on the developing world. The IMF will be with us for
the foreseeable future. The name of the game is reform, not elimination of the
institution. Public bureaucracies need to be tamed by transparency, disclosure,
oversight, and where possible, competition. Before Congress delivers more money
to the institution, the IMF should be held accountable to the same standards of
good governance that it sanctimoniously preaches for others.

First, all IMF program documents should be made public, and thereby open to
public debate and critical scrutiny. Even with $100 billion of taxpayers' money
on the line, the programs in Asia were not made public by the IMF (in fact,
Korea made the main loan agreement public a couple of weeks after signing, while
the Thailand and Indonesia documents remain confidential). In some cases, a
delay of a few weeks or even months might be understandable, when market-sensitive
information must be withheld. The current system of a 30-year embargo
of program documents is preposterous. In addition, the IMF archives should be
opened so that scholars and market participants can better understand what the
IMF has done and failed to do in the past. What really happened in Russia,
Mexico, and Argentina? How did the IMF decide on its strategy for the
developing-country debt crises?

Second, the executive board should start doing its job of overseeing the
staff, rather than simply rubber-stamping the staff's programs. A properly
functioning executive board, perhaps with voting weights adjusted to reflect
economic realities, would realize that there is more information, informed
opinion, and ideas around than are found within the fund itself. With issues as
complex and challenging as the debt crisis, postcommunist market transition, the
Asian currency crisis, or the failures of economic growth in Africa, the
executive board should take the lead in canvassing outside opinion and testing
the IMF staff's recommendations and approaches. The executive board should also
take the minimal step of formalizing a process of external review and evaluation
of past programs. The World Bank introduced external evaluations as a result of
strong pressures from environmental groups aghast at the environmental
mismanagement of World Bank projects. By many accounts, the process has added
integrity and discipline to World Bank programs.

Finally, and most importantly, it is time to end the IMF's artificial
monopoly on policymaking in the developing world. The IMF complains frequently
that member governments don't feel proper "ownership" of the programs that they
sign with the IMF, and therefore that these governments fail to implement them
adequately. The subtext is clear: "Ownership" is simply a buzzword meaning
happier compliance with the directives from Washington. It is time for real
ownership in the developing world. This will come when programs are designed by
member governments, with the help rather than the command of the IMF, thereby
making it far more likely that programs will be tailored to the specific and
complex circumstances of the particular countries. Some of the favorite nostrums
of the IMF and the U.S. government—such as insisting that countries open their
capital markets to global markets even before adequate banking supervision is in
place—will fall by the wayside as the realities of local circumstances are
brought to the fore. Better advice from the start will save us the headaches—and
the tens of billions of dollars—that expensive bailout operations cost.

As democracies gain strength in Latin America, Africa, postcommunist Europe,
and developing Asia, we should expect and rejoice in the moral authority and
political legitimacy of elected leaders to chart the economic course for their
nations. The G-7 and the IMF itself should give these new democracies the space
to act. The IMF's advice might prove useful—even welcome—if it becomes part of a
true collaboration between rich and poor nations in search of common global

You need to be logged in to comment.
(If there's one thing we know about comment trolls, it's that they're lazy)