Paul Waldman's post about the uselessness of motives in evaluating politicians reminds me of a question a student asked me this week when assessing the Johnson administration. To paraphrase, my student said that his impression was that while LBJ may have signed two important civil rights bills, his motives for doing so were far from altruistic. My answer was that 1) this is right, but 2) I don't mean that as a criticism of LBJ.
Ronald Dworkin has an article defending the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in the New York Review of Books that offers an excellent primer on the relevant issues. There are two sections I'd recommend in particular. First, in Section II Dworkin does the most lucid job I've seen so far in explaining why the "activity/inactivity" distinction made by the challengers is so weak:
I've argued that the legal arguments against the Affordable Care Act are just libertarianism in a thin disguise—the arguments fundamentally make very little sense unless they're part of a broader argument about the unconstitutionality of the welfare state. Janice Rogers Brown, the ultra-reactionary appointed by George W. Bush to the prestigious D.C. Circuit Court of appeals, doesn't see any need for the disguise.
Orin Kerr outlines a five-part test for whether a decision can be called "judicial activism" as a means of assessing whether the label could be fairly applied to a decision striking down the Affordable Care Act. Roughly, the criteria are: 1) whether the decision was motivated by the policy preferences of judges; 2) whether it expands judicial power for future cases; 3) whether it was inconsistent with past precedents; 4) whether it struck down a "law or practice"; and 5) whether the decision was "wrong." On three of the first four criteria, Kerr essentially agrees that a decision striking down the ACA would be "activist." On points No. 3 and No.
Under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, searches and seizures must be "reasonable." Albert Florence was subjected to an invasive search—including an inspection of his genitals—after being detained following a routine traffic stop for an outstanding arrest warrant (that turned out to be invalid) before being moved to a correctional facility. The state had no evidence that he was carrying any dangerous contraband. Not only did it not have a warrant, not only did it not have the probable cause that would have been necessary for a warrant, it had no individualized suspicion at all. Florence had no reason to believe he would be arrested, and hence no reason to have weapons hidden in his body cavities. Surely such an intrusive search under these circumstances is "unreasonable," right?