All of this speaks to the power of Gore's populism. It was the single-most effective Gore message tested. Even 67 percent of the "Bush swings"--the swings who voted for Bush--say it was an appealing message. You can argue that Gore's version of populism did not take him far enough, perhaps because it was not bold enough or because he was not the right messenger. But there is no evidence here that it hurt Gore in this election.

The absence of clear evidence in this survey for populism's lack of appeal is itself revealing. The DLC could have posed direct questions that would actually have tested its theories, such as, Were voters turned off by Gore's promise to "fight for people" over the special interests? Did they feel he was too anti-business? Were Gore's DLC commitments, like permanent normal trade relations for China, an electoral advantage? The questions apparently not asked in this survey are often more interesting than those that were.

2. Gore did not take full advantage of the Clinton administration's economic record. This is a much more plausible claim. However, there was no inherent reason that Gore could not have combined populist language with a prosperity message. In fact, the survey tested voter reaction to two similar prosperity messages--a DLC-sanctioned one that frames the choice as going forward versus going backward, and one that asks if we will enrich all families or only a few. The latter provides a revealing, and presumably unintentional, test of populism's appeal; this variant is more effective, both overall and with the Bush swing voters. The DLC's own survey reveals that prosperity versus populism is what Bill Clinton might have called a "false choice"--Gore could, and should, have embraced both.

And even if there is truth in this critique of Gore, where does this take us now? Now that Democrats are the out party, and with the economy slowing, the question of how much credit Democrats should claim for prosperity seems less than relevant.

3. Gore lost because he failed to capture the votes of highly educated "wired workers." Let's step back and see where Gore actually lost ground in 2000, compared with Clinton in 1996.

To review this record and conclude that Al Gore's biggest problem in this election was losing "wired workers" by 3 points is to substitute ideology for analysis. Clearly, Gore held the constituencies most attracted to the New Democrat message but lost the working class, especially men. And surely it cannot be the case that Gore's excessive populism--as opposed to, say, issues such as the environment, gun control, or Clinton's scandal--accounts for these patterns.

Perhaps the greatest shortcomings of the DLC's 2000 analysis are sins of omission--it completely misses the real story. Penn denies the reality of the adverse environment created by impeachment and Clinton's scandals. For a year, George W. Bush's best applause line--always--was his promise to restore "honor and dignity" to the White House. This was the fundamental raison d'être of Bush's campaign, yet the DLC survey fails to include it among the three Bush "themes" tested. Penn points to Clinton's 57 percent job approval rating, to argue the president was not a burden for Al Gore, while conveniently ignoring Clinton's abysmal 36 percent personal-favorability rating.

The DLC's own poll shows that voters who cared about personal character voted overwhelmingly for Bush and that those who cared about issues supported Gore. Is this of no consequence? Penn's analysis is also static, taking no account of Gore's rise and fall in the polls. We know that Gore lost his lead during the debates, while he was being attacked for his exaggerations and lack of integrity, not after his populist convention speech. Surely this is relevant. An analysis of the 2000 election that makes no mention of Gore's weaknesses as a candidate and denies the difficulties created by scandal is hard to take seriously.

The larger problem with asking "Why Gore Lost" as a starting point for developing Democratic strategy is that he didn't. Gore not only won the popular vote by 500,000 votes, but he probably won the electoral college as well. Penn holds up the 1996 election, in which Clinton received 49 percent of the vote, as the pinnacle of Democratic success. But Gore's 48 percent is characterized as failure. Why is the bar set higher for Gore, when he was not an incumbent president, he faced a much tougher opponent, and the strongest third-party candidate was on the left rather than the right?

Although Gore's popular-vote plurality is unimpressive, Democrats won the issue debate in this election decisively. Among people whose vote was based mainly on issues (62 percent of voters), Gore won in a landslide, 55 percent to 40 percent; those who cared about personal qualities went for Bush 62 percent to 35 percent. Furthermore, the key to the GOP's overall success in the 2000 election was its hidden agenda and obscuring of policy differences. In 1996 and 1998, the Republicans abandoned the agenda of 1994. In 2000 they went one step further and embraced the Democratic agenda--or at least its language and themes. Republicans ran as proponents of HMO reform, defenders of Social Security, supporters of prescription drug coverage for seniors, and friends of public education. Their hypocrisy constitutes more powerful evidence of the appeal of the traditional Democratic agenda than any poll could provide.

In short, this is not 1981. The Democratic Party faces challenges, but also great opportunities. It will not take advantage of these opportunities if it fails to understand the ways in which the political environment has improved and the real weaknesses of the right, or if it expends more energy looking for scapegoats than in moving forward.

Strategically, the single-most important challenge for the party is winning more votes among non-college white men. The labor movement--a quintessentially "old" Democrat institution--can speak with some authority on this topic. White male union members voted for Al Gore by a margin of 24 points, while Bush won by 24 points among all white men nationally. Non-college union men voted for Gore by 31 points, even as nationally Bush won the white non-college male vote by 29 points. Labor accomplished this despite the fact that white male union members are much more conservative than liberal, despite a massive National Rifle Association campaign to reach them, and despite Al Gore's embrace of free trade.

How did labor do it? With a strong populist message that focused on Bush's record of favoring the rich and special interests over working families, and by hitting him hard on his support for Social Security privatization--a position that the DLC would have the party take--and right-to-work laws. Labor overcame cultural conservatism by appealing to voters' pocketbooks and their self-interest as working people--a rather traditional Democratic approach.

Reasonable people can debate about the right way for Democrats to appeal to these voters, yet they must recognize labor's success for what it is: not a strained analysis of survey data, but real votes in the bank. If someone has better ideas for reaching white men and persuading them to support Democrats, they should come forward. But the unions' record deserves respect, and those who would take the Democratic Party in a different direction bear the burden of proof.

What are the issue positions the DLC believes the party should now embrace? Curiously, the survey omits much that would be helpful. Would supporting Medicare vouchers, Social Security privatization, or fast-track trade procedures make the party stronger? Would it especially help to reach the non-college men who abandoned the party in 2000? The DLC survey didn't ask these questions.

But evidence suggests that, in many cases, DLC positions would weaken rather than strengthen the party. The most important example, which President Bush is determined to make relevant, is Social Security privatization. While the idea of private accounts is popular in the abstract, surveys always reveal strong opposition to the benefit cuts required by privatization. A poll by AARP last year showed opposition at almost two-thirds. Moreover, this issue was put to the test in 2000--and Al Gore, not George W. Bush, was the beneficiary.

Fourteen percent of the electorate said Social Security was their top issue; they voted for Gore by 58 percent to 39 percent. As Jeffrey Bell and Frank Cannon argued in The Weekly Standard, Gore's Social Security assault at the campaign's conclusion caused much of the late shift to Gore in key battleground states. Seniors were the only age group among whom Gore (at 51 percent) outperformed Clinton (48 percent).

There is nothing Democrats could do that would damage their party more than supporting privatization of Social Security--except perhaps getting behind voucherization of Medicare.

Perhaps, then, the DLC's strategic genius lies in formulating "themes," rather than issues. But unified Republican control of the federal government poses very different strategic and tactical questions from those faced by the Clinton and Gore campaigns. The first challenge is to develop a persuasive critique of Republican policies and the Bush administration. That has not been, to say the least, a DLC strength. Penn's report actually criticizes Gore for drawing too many sharp distinctions. But this time around, it was the Republicans who sought to obscure differences and blur ideological lines. If anything, Democrats failed to draw lines clearly and sharply enough, especially on education.

In any case, Democrats are now the opposition party and must make the case for change. Traditional Democrats will charge that Republicans cater to corporate special interests at the expense of the environment and consumers, and to the wealthy rather than working families--and a lot of polling data shows that this criticism is powerful. The DLC rejects this critique, but where will the DLC find fault with the GOP? For not being sufficiently fiscally conservative? History provides no support for the proposition that an incumbent party can be defeated with "me too" politics. Even if Democrats set aside their moral and political commitments--to fight for social justice while defending social provision--and conduct a cold-blooded, utilitarian calculation of political advantage, the DLC appears to offer the party very little.

Traditional Democrats can, of course, make their own countervailing case against New Democratic politics. It was under the leadership of New Democrat Bill Clinton that the Dems lost a House majority they had held for 40 years. Under Clinton, Democratic governors almost qualified for a listing on the endangered species list and the party lost ground in many state legislatures. As William Schneider recently observed in The Atlantic Monthly, "In a variety of ways Clinton left the Democrats in the worst shape they have been in in more than fifty years." Even at the presidential level, the party has now nominated New Democrats in three successive elections and secured 43 percent, 49 percent, and 48 percent of the vote. Doesn't that suggest that New Democrats may not have all the answers?

Nevertheless, traditional Democrats should resist the urge to continue with an internecine battle that has now grown tedious as well as destructive. One thing we can say for sure: The party needs both traditional and New Democrats--and the constituencies they represent--to get where it wants to go. Without labor, African Americans, and the women's movement, the party would quite literally not exist. Without New Democrats and the voters they speak for, Democrats cannot build a durable majority. This is a time for what we might call Democratic bipartisanship.

We can identify many areas where traditional Democrats and New Democrats can come together, including commitment to fiscal responsibility and investment in education and training over huge tax cuts. Both groups can get behind private retirement accounts, outside of Social Security, as Clinton and Gore proposed. Even support for sensible labor and environmental standards in trade agreements provides important common ground.

In 1998, a New Democrat president was on the edge of the precipice, facing disaster. Then, union members, African Americans, and the rest of the party base came together to save his presidency. Now, a hostile administration is declaring war on the labor movement, environmentalists, and other core Democratic constituencies. The question today is will New Democrats stand with traditional Democrats, or will the finger-pointing continue? Will the DLC put as much energy into exposing George W. Bush's flaws as it has Al Gore's? Will it search for common ground with other Democrats, or only for wedge issues?

In times like these, the DLC must answer the old trade union question: Which side are you on?

Dems: Round Two
Will Marshall Responds

A key lesson of campaign 2000 is that political parties should learn from their successes. As the race began, the Democratic electoral models were the Clinton-Gore campaigns of 1992 and 1996. Bill Clinton, after all, was the first Democrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt to win a second White House term. The big mystery is why Al Gore abandoned the New Democratic strategy that had produced these victories--not to mention a record of prosperity, peace, and social progress that enjoyed wide public approval--in favor of a hackneyed populism and over-the-top appeals to interest groups.

Stan Greenberg and Robert Borosage blame Clinton for Gore's defeat. Yes, the Clinton scandals presented Gore with a problem. But let's not pretend that it was insoluble. Forthright condemnation of Clinton's personal behavior, coupled with fresh ideas for building on the economic and social reforms of the 1990s, would have perfectly mirrored the public's own ambivalence. Instead, Gore made the fatal mistake of distancing himself not only from Clinton but from the popular achievements he co-authored with Clinton--and that constituted the strongest rationale for his candidacy.

This decision deprived Gore of a grand narrative linking his campaign proposals to the political and governing innovations of the 1990s, such as restoring fiscal discipline, stimulating competition and new-economy growth, ending welfare and rewarding work, making government less bureaucratic and more accountable, and rebuilding functioning markets in poor urban and rural communities. Gore's election-year conversion to "fighting for you" populism reinforced public doubts about his authenticity; it also failed to awaken the supposedly dormant class grievances of the "forgotten majority" of working middle-class voters.

I agree with Greenberg and Borosage that Democrats should offer a spirited challenge to George W. Bush's brazen bid to drive the nation's political agenda rightward. New Democrats have vigorously opposed the Bush tax plan, the attempt to roll back environmental protections, the decision to withdraw from the Kyoto climate-change treaty, school vouchers, and the administration's impulse to disengage from global hot spots. At the same time, we don't think Democrats can succeed by simply defending old programs and underperforming public systems. That's why we're determined not just to oppose the Bush administration but to propose a progressive alternative that tackles the big challenges facing our society: equipping working Americans to succeed in the new economy, enabling low-income families to lift themselves out of poverty, investing more in public education while demanding accountability for student performance, achieving universal health coverage through nonbureaucratic means, harnessing market forces to combat climate change and other environment problems, and modernizing Social Security and Medicare. This is the agenda Al Gore should have run on--and won on--in 2000.

Handwringing about the 2000 election is useful only to the extent that it helps inform future strategy. Unfortunately, the essays by Will Marshall and Mark Penn not only revise history and distort data; they draw the wrong lessons and point in the wrong direction. Consider four key issues.

Values. The right's cultural war against Bill Clinton, amplified by his own missteps, weakened Democrats and Al Gore on values and trust and allowed Bush to rise on "restoring honor and dignity to the White House." The cultural assault was particularly effective among white non-college-educated voters. Penn and Marshall ignore this reality; they urge Democrats to abandon these voters and focus on the better-off. This is surely wrongheaded. Democrats should be the party that supports working- and middle-class families and their values. To forge an enduring reform majority, they must compete for the non-college-educated electorate.

Populism. Marshall and Penn rail against corporation bashing. But a populist formulation--making our prosperity enrich everyone--was the actual theme of Gore's campaign. And on themes and issues, Gore easily defeated Bush. Not surprisingly, critics of the Bush budget, including the Democratic Leadership Council, have found the populist argument their most effective theme in attacking Bush's plan.

Interest groups. Marshall and Penn decry Gore's focus on union households, racial minorities, and better-educated women. While Democrats should surely cast a wider net, they should not ignore the accomplishments of 2000--the enhanced majorities and mobilization of groups that together are a growing, not declining, force in America. Read your census.

Good times. Marshall and Penn fault Gore for blowing the "good times." But according to Penn's own survey data, voters thought Gore was more likely than Bush to "continue the prosperity." Disposable income was faltering in the year leading up to the election and fell in the quarter of the election. People, especially Penn's wired workers, were already feeling the financial pressure. Even in good times, most Americans were making modest gains at best and were looking for leaders who understood that. As the economy falters on Bush's watch, Democrats must rediscover their instinctive advocacy for increased living standards for average Americans.

Guy Molyneux Responds

Despite their substantial disagreements, New Democrats and traditional Democrats share important common ground. After all, George W. Bush means not only to rescind every one of Bill Clinton's accomplishments but also to repeal much of the New Deal and what remains of the Great Society. If Bush cannot unite the Democratic Party, it's hard to imagine what could.

The central task for Democrats is to develop a compelling critique of the Bush administration. This is a time to define party differences in ways that are salient to voters. That is harder than it sounds, because Bush cloaks his agenda in soothing, almost Democratic rhetoric--Gingrichism with a human face.

Let me propose a division of labor that will allow each Democratic camp to make a useful contribution while remaining true to its values and analysis. First, populists need to make the case that Bush is advancing the interests of big business and the wealthy at the expense of average working people. The administration's strategists, who seem to have a political tin ear in this regard, are helping out by making their slavish devotion to the corporate agenda so transparent. With his tax breaks for the wealthy, his repeal of the ergonomics standard, and his backsliding on carbon dioxide emissions, Bush leaves no doubt about whom he is fighting for.

The second component of the Democratic critique is less obvious, but just as important: Bush is pursuing a reactionary agenda that will take the nation backward rather than forward. Listen carefully to his speeches and note his frequent use of the word "reform." He is staking an aggressive claim to the reform mantle favored by the Democratic Leadership Council. But surely when Will Marshall talks about "reform-minded centrism," he means something very different. New Democrats should lay out a serious program for public investment that empowers Americans in the global economy--and expose Bush's reform agenda as a fraud.

If we all stick to our traditional roles, New Democrats will attack populists for their misguided "class warfare" charges, and populists will return fire. But what's the point of continuing this argument? Let's rewrite the script, agree to disagree, and focus on doing what we each do best. My own guess is that these two messages are more complementary than we often suppose.

Mark J. Penn Responds

Al Gore received 600,000 more votes than George W. Bush, principally in New York and California. Had Gore been able to distribute those votes in the Midwest and the border states of the South that Bill Clinton won in 1996, he would have coasted in the electoral college. There is no clearer evidence than this that Gore's handlers looked only at the overall polls and not at the critical swing voters in key states.

Populism is a message that accentuates divisions. But as Bill Clinton said, you can stand up for people without putting down others. That is a much more successful message than the one used in Gore's campaign.

As to the repeated claim that Gore did better with voters earning more than $100,000, the fact is that he did better with higher-income women but not with men, because choice and guns were in fact a positive issue with women up the economic ladder. That was not the case with men who vote on economic issues, where he did substantially worse. Had he used the prosperity message, not the populism message, he would have been able to win over the women who vote on social issues and the men who vote on economic ones.

Wired workers are 26 percent of the national workforce, and they are in every state. The use of old stereotypes of America is exactly the sort of analysis that misses important election dynamics. There were more than enough knowledge workers in Tennessee, Arkansas, Missouri, and West Virginia to have swung the election to Gore. Just as important, however, is the fact that Gore was perceived as being even further to the left than the Democratic Party itself--and that also hurt him in these states.

Al Gore could easily have distanced himself from the problems of 1998 without also distancing himself from the successful economic and other policies of Bill Clinton. It is true that he led after his convention, but it is also true that the only other time he led was after he showed loyalty to Clinton at the end of the impeachment trial. His failure to show loyalty afterward undermined his own character; and his failure to use the issue of prosperity properly becomes more evident with each passing day.