Getting Welfare Right

Recently I was invited to be the token liberal at a major national
conference of conservative foundations. The invitation was to debate Bill
Kristol, The Weekly Standard editor, TV pundit, and conservative grand
strategist, as the after-dinner entertainment. Presumably, conservative donors
wished to view the face of the enemy, close up. The better I did, the deeper they
would dig into their ample pockets.

The dinner was held at one of New York's most elegant hotels, the Pierre. The
sponsors put me up at the nearby Hotel Roosevelt, a spartan midtown hostelry one
cut above fleabag. I gamely accepted this lesser billeting not as demeaning
confirmation of the right's two-class vision for society, but as recognition of my
esteem for FDR. But I digress.

The debate itself was good fun, but the real treat was the before-dinner
event: a panel discussion of four presidents of major right-wing research
factories, titled, "Philanthropy, Think Tanks, and the Importance of Ideas." The
heads of the Heritage Foundation and the Cato, Manhattan, and American Enterprise
institutes were there to tell their patrons what political gains a billion
dollars had bought. This session I would have paid to attend.

The panel was chaired by none other than Roger Hertog, a mega-rich
center-right philanthropist and new part-owner of The New Republic
recently profiled in these pages as exemplar of a new kind of "velvet
conservatism." But there was nothing velvet about the discussion that followed.
Most foundations, Hertog began, spend their money on brick-and-mortar
institutions -- museums, hospitals, symphonies, universities. These are all fine,
Hertog continued, but the four panelists have achieved something far more
consequential. They have changed the course of American politics, and they "only"
cost, collectively, $70 million dollars a year. "You get huge leverage for your
dollars," Hertog affirmed. The panelists smiled.

The first to present was Ed Crane, head of the Cato Institute.
Crane complimented his patrons in the audience for recognizing that these battles
of ideas take two or three decades. Cato has been pushing Social Security
privatization since 1979, Crane noted. Cato allies such as the Federalist Society
labored long years in the wilderness before they became powerful enough to
literally pick the Bush's administration's federal judges.

Edwin Feulner of the Heritage Foundation emphasized his institution's
strategic planning in building a conservative movement. He emphasized "the four
M's": mission, money, management, and marketing. Heritage places hundreds of
op-eds, all devoted to reinforcing the conservative message. On the money front,
Feulner raises millions not just from conservative foundations, but from
corporations and individuals. Like the Republican Party, the conservative think
tanks use big money to raise small money. Heritage, for instance, gets
contributions from 200,000 small donors.

Christopher DeMuth, president of the American Enterprise Institute, spoke of
how the right-wing think tanks had reframed national debate by investing in and
then promoting idea-mongers for the long term. The right has been investing in
Robert Bork's challenge to antitrust since the 1970s. By the 1990s, his
contention that antitrust enforcement often backfires had become conventional
wisdom. Charles Murray's claim that welfare actually caused poverty was widely
viewed as an outrage when Murray's 1985 book, Losing Ground, was first
published. Though Murray's arithmetic was dubious and his timing backward
(poverty came first), the message had a willing audience. The right-wing publicity
machine turned the obscure Murray into a policy celebrity. Soon, said DeMuth,
Democrats as well as Republicans were saying that Murray was right. Investment in
ideas and ideological marketing changed the course of politics.

"There are three lessons," DeMuth told the conservative benefactors in the
audience. "First, things take time. It takes at least 10 years for a radical new
idea to emerge from obscurity." DeMuth pointed to school vouchers and Social
Security privatization as still incomplete revolutions. But his funders got it,
and were with him for the long haul.

"Second," DeMuth added. "Unintended consequences are not enough." For years, a
staple of conservative ideology has been the claim that liberal social
engineering backfires: Welfare makes people poorer, antitrust enforcement retards
competition, safety regulations make people behave more carelessly, etc. "But
nobody claims EPA makes the environment worse," DeMuth cautioned. So the
conservative movement also needs affirmative ideas. It needs better ways,
conservative ways, to achieve popular social goals.

"Third, all fundamental changes are bipartisan when they happen," DeMuth
concluded. So the right makes great efforts to co-opt New Democrats. Right-wing
think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies make sure
their ventures include (safely conservative) Democrats. The bipartisan CSIS
National Commission on Social Security Reform had no official standing, but with
high-profile Democrats as well as Republicans it successfully masqueraded as a
bona fide national commission, and received extensive press coverage.

The final panelist, Larry Mone of the Manhattan Institute, spoke of the
importance of targeting opinion-elites. The Manhattan Institute underwrote
Charles Murray's work, but the institute focuses mainly on New York City, as a
lab to advance policies such as school vouchers and getting tough on crime. Mone
claims credit for Mayor Rudy Giuliani's embrace of the George Kelling-James Q.
Wilson "Broken Windows" thesis -- that a crackdown on minor lifestyle crimes would
also reduce major crimes.

The Manhattan Institute is especially nimble at co-opting liberals, who are
regularly invited to its events both as foils and potential converts. How much
money, Mone pressed me, would conservatives need to put into city schools for
liberals to support vouchers?

The Philanthropy Roundtable, which sponsored the conference, also likes to
include a few token liberals. One observed that liberal funders would never speak
a language of movement building. "We promote policies piecemeal," he said, "but
we don't think of it as building a progressive movement."

What was impressively revealed here was precisely the right's movement
consciousness. When I was young, the people who spoke of "the movement" and who
used "radical" as an affirmative word were progressive. The movement, at first,
referred to the civil-rights movement; by the mid-1960s, it referred to a
generalized movement for social justice. "Movement people" boycotted nonunion
grapes, worked on voter registration, opposed the war in Vietnam.

Today, one hears the phrase "movement conservatism." The right's think tanks
and philanthropists alike understand that the enterprise is -- above
all -- political. IRS rules for foundations and research institutes don't allow
them to be partisan or primarily legislative, but don't mind if they are
ideological or politically strategic. Heritage, which pushed the envelope about
as far as one prudently can, got an extensive IRS audit in the 1990s, which
Heritage claimed was politically motivated. Eventually, the IRS relented. The
nonprofit right is also perfectly willing to use the Republican party as its
vehicle, and let the lawyers worry about how to do it legally.

By contrast, mainstream foundations have a tradition of emphasizing research
and reform. Often, the social-change goals are impeccably liberal -- empower the
poor, clean up the environment, improve the welfare of children -- but the
political dimension leaves many senior foundation executives uneasy. My tablemate
was right: You would never hear senior officers of big mainstream foundations
talking about building a movement. The enterprise is rather understood as
philanthropic. If you research and model good policy, social change will somehow
occur. This tradition harkens back to the Progressive Era conceit that social
problems have technical solutions. By some alchemy, the research findings will
lead to policy reforms through a messy political process whose ignition is
somebody else's affair.

This propensity is also reinforced by the composition of mainstream foundation
boards, which tend to be patrician and corporate. Activist grantees need to shade
their purpose to reassure even liberal program officers, who find themselves
looking over their shoulders at their presidents, who in turn must answer to
their boards. It is anomalous, after all, that large private fortunes should be
looked upon to underwrite progressive politics. On the right, by contrast, the
advocates, strategists, and funders march to the same tune.

Lately, liberal funders have been more willing to acknowledge that their
enterprise is necessarily political, and to underwrite core progressive
infrastructure for the long term. The progressive counterparts of the big
right-wing strategy groups -- such as the Economic Policy Institute, the Center for
Law and Social Policy, or the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities -- no longer
have to justify their existence de novo each time they apply for a grant.
But the gold standard of grants -- long-term general-operating support -- is still
hard to find on the liberal side, and the institutions that the big foundations
support are far smaller and less numerous than their conservative counterparts to
begin with.

Of course, intellectual energy and political energy feed on each
other. And it has been a while since a progressive idea, per se, transformed
politics. A generation ago, activists in the streets were energized by books such
as Betty Friedan's The Feminist Mystique, Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, Ralph
Nader's Unsafe at Any Speed, and Mike Harrington's The Other America. These in
turn transformed national policy. Earlier in the century, progressive
foundation-sponsored reports, from the Flexner Report on medical education to
Gunnar Myrdal's groundbreaking work on racial relations, An American
led to changes in the national discussion and, eventually, policy.

Still, it was breathtaking to see the policy strategists of the other
side preen for the edification of their steadfast funders -- the culmination of a
25-year strategic alliance between organized business, ideological conservatism,
advocacy research, and the Republican Party. Hertog was right: $70 million a year
is chump change to the American elite, but invested strategically in the battle
of ideas, it yields a bountiful political harvest. On our side, though strategic
foundation support would be most welcome, it may be that we need to rekindle the
politics first.

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