Lessons of 2000
By Mark J. Penn
As George W. Bush's first 100 days in office come to a close, theelection of 2000 suggests several lessons if Democrats expect to recaptureCongress in the short term and the White House in the long term. To win broadsupport, Democrats need an inclusive message that emphasizes growth andprosperity while relying on a smaller but more activist government.
In a postelection poll conducted by Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates forthe Democratic Leadership Council on November 11 and 12, 2000, we examined thelessons of the election by surveying 1,200 Americans who voted in thepresidential election. While Al Gore won on the individual issues of thecampaign, he lost on the broader meta-themes of the election. Overall, he wonvoters who cared about the issues by a margin of 52 percent to 34 percent.Particularly, he won voters most concerned about education, health care, theeconomy, preserving Social Security, Medicare, and the environment. But George W.Bush's central messages of smaller government and of "changing the tone inWashington" allowed him to overcome his deficiency on the issues and positionhimself closer to the center rhetorically.
Bill Clinton's New Democratic coalition succeeded by combining a vision ofsmaller government with one of greater government activism. Here Gore's messagefell apart and Bush successfully captured the issue of the right role forgovernment in the twenty-first century. Consequently, Gore rendered himselfvulnerable to attacks that portrayed him as an old-style, big-government liberalà la Michael Dukakis--the very image that effectively brought down Dukakis in hispresidential race against George H.W. Bush. So while Gore won on the issues, helost on the governing philosophy necessary to implement important programs likeprescription drugs, reforming Social Security, and improving education.
Progress, Prosperity, and the Clinton Record
Only sporadically did Al Gore talk about progress, prosperity,and the Clinton administration's achievements on the economy. But despite hisresistance to it, this message was his biggest potential asset in his election.Sir Isaac Newton once said that he was able to achieve so much because he "stoodon the shoulders of giants." Al Gore stood on the greatest Democraticachievements since Franklin D. Roosevelt--and yet failed to use them sufficientlyin his campaign. Of those who voted for Gore, 34 percent cited progress andprosperity as the top reason. But a larger proportion of Bush supporters, 41percent, named smaller and better government as their prime reason for choosingthe Republicans' candidate. If Gore had used progress and prosperity consistentlyrather than sporadically, he would have had a much clearer message and would havecaptured more of the voters who said they believed that the country was on theright track. Gore took 60 percent of "right track" voters; Clinton in 1996 took69 percent of right-track voters.
Of those who said they were better off in 2000 than they had been eight yearsearlier--a traditional gauge for determining whether to support the party inpower--Gore won a healthy but unremarkable 62 percent. Of those who said that theeconomy was headed in the right direction, he captured only half. So Gore failedboth to sell himself as the only candidate who could prolong the nation'sprosperity and to portray George W. Bush and his tax-cut plan as a clear andpresent danger to the robust economy. This point is even more salient now thatBush is threatening our well-being by sticking blindly to his two-year-oldtax-cut proposal while offering no real leadership on the economy.
Many pundits claim that "Clinton fatigue" was a key factor that cost Al Gore thepresidency. But the postelection polls showed little evidence of such aphenomenon. Immediately following the election, President Clinton enjoyed a solidfavorability rating of 57 percent in the Gallup poll. Clinton's job approvalimmediately before election day was among the highest of any president in thelast 20 years--higher even than before his re-election in 1996.
Indeed, even 34 percent of Bush voters approved of Clinton's job performance and20 percent approved of Clinton personally. Of the late-breaking Bush swingvoters, 35 percent approved of Clinton personally. This is strong evidence thatusing Clinton more often in terms of record and out on the hustings as thecampaign wound down could have pushed Gore over the top. The early breakers wereanti-Clinton; the late breakers had enough pro-Clinton voters in the mix to makethe difference in the election.
Gore's Populism
Instead of running as a new-economy Democrat, Al Gore used anold-style populism that limited his appeal rather than expanded it. His messagedistanced him from swing voters who could have provided the margin of victory.Gore narrowly won the popular vote with this message by piling up large wins instates like California, where extra votes didn't matter, while the old-stylemessage sent him tumbling backward in key border states, his home state ofTennessee, and the electoral college. His liberal positions on social issues, hiseconomic populism, and his association with big government combined to turn whatshould have been a substantial win into a draw. Had Gore combined his positionsof conscience on social issues with a more modern vision of the role ofgovernment, he would have carried a larger percentage of upwardly mobile,socially tolerant suburban men--and won the election.
While Bush emphasized themes that sounded inclusive and bipartisan, Goresounded divisive. In his populist rhetoric, Gore became the fighter who would pitthe good versus the bad, the people versus the powerful, the poor versus therich, and the Democrats versus the Republicans. His populism and his emphasis onhimself as a fighter came at the expense of maximizing his advantage on theissues. While this theme was effective with some voters, it hit a wall withothers. President Clinton stood for bridging partisanship with progress; Gorestood for winning the good fight, regardless of its divisiveness. So those in themiddle who had voted for Clinton turned their backs on Gore. While many suburbanwomen evidently wanted someone who would fight for them, many men wanted apresident who stood more for freedom instead. While 55 percent of those makingunder $15,000 strongly supported the populist message, this dropped to 32 percentof those earning $15,000 to $30,000, an audience that should have been much morereceptive to this message.
Since taking office in 1992, Bill Clinton repeatedly referred to the NewDemocratic mantra of opportunity for all, responsibility from all, and acommunity of all. This message, on its face, consistently scored higher than the"people versus the powerful" message. And this gap was critical in 2000 among theswing groups that decided the election. Among independents, those earning $30,000to $50,000 annually, those earning $50,000 to $75,000, and those who made uptheir mind for Bush in the last month, the "opportunity for all" message polledat least seven points higher than the people-versus-the-powerful message. In anelection decided by handfuls of votes, the difference between these two messagesand campaign philosophies could have meant the difference between garnering 48percent of the vote versus 52 percent.
While the vice president did realize that he had to reach the prize ofthe 1996 election--the much ballyhooed soccer moms--he missed the new target ofthe twenty-first century: the wired workers. Al Gore particularly failed to reachthe voters who broke for Bush in the last month--primarily middle-class, whitesuburban males, many of whom had voted for Clinton in the past. While Gore didwell with better-educated, higher-income, pro-choice white women, he performeddismally among these upscale white men. They comprised 20 percent of thelate-deciding voters, a group who broke against Gore 29 percent to 57 percent inour poll. These people voted for Bush because they were attracted to his messageof smaller government and greater economic freedom. They were turned off bypopulism. In the next election, Democrats need to "own" the new economy and standfor policies that will help all Americans succeed in our technology-basedsociety.
Clinton had managed to stand for saving Social Security and Medicare withoutbeing saddled with the onus of big government. But Al Gore left voters with theimpression that while he would protect government programs, a vote for him wouldmean a return to the era of big government. Gore led by 36 points on theattribute "is for big government." This association played a significant role inlimiting Gore's success. One of his constant refrains, and a key part of hismessage, was that Bush was beholden to the special interests. Despite this, Gorewas seen by a five-point margin as more captive of special interests than Bush.
As president, Bush needs not just to provide a general framework for his viewsbut to put forward policy prescriptions. Thus far many of his policies have beento roll back popular environmental and workplace protections put in place by theClinton administration. Here Bush is vulnerable, because voters in fact preferthe policies of Gore and the Democrats.
While Al Gore did not capture a majority in the 2000 election, neither did GeorgeW. Bush. The vital center is up for grabs in 2002. This crucial core of theelectorate is looking neither for a return to big government nor a return tofend-for-yourself policies. Most voters are still looking for fiscallyresponsible progress on major issues of the day like the availability of healthcare, and for policies that reflect a smaller but more active government,leadership on the economy, and a prosperity agenda. If the Democrats canconvincingly offer that message, they will be the majority party.
Back to the Future with the DLC
By Guy Molyneux
The analysis of the 2000 election offered by the DemocraticLeadership Council inevitably brings to mind Yogi Berra's great expression "It'sdéjà vu all over again." For the past eight years, the DLC has steppedforward eagerly to take credit for every Democratic success, and just as eagerlyto blame other Democrats for any setbacks. Whenever Bill Clinton was up in thepolls, he was being a New Democrat; when he was down, it was because he wasn'tenough of a New Democrat. Mark Penn's analysis of the post-election survey heconducted on behalf of the DLC, unfortunately, largely continues the traditionof tautology masquerading as analysis.
If this sounds unfair, ask yourself this question: If Theresa LePore had notinvented her butterfly ballot and Gore were now president, wouldn't the DLC beexplaining "Why Gore Won" instead of "Why Gore Lost"? And wouldn't every one ofus bet our life savings that the DLC's answer would be "because he was a NewDemocrat"?
My own view is that "Why did Gore lose?" is exactly the wrong question forDemocrats to ask today. First, it takes us back down the road of recriminationsand assignment of blame that has always served to divide and thus weaken theDemocratic Party. Second, and even more important, it asks us to look backwardwhen what we need to do is look forward. The right question is "How can Democratswin?" And both traditional Democrats and New Democrats have relevant, practicalinsights to offer, but only through honest and serious discussion.
That said, having a clear understanding of the 2000 election is essential. Wewon't chart our course effectively if we don't know where our point of departureis. Mark Penn looks at the election and reaches three main conclusions. None areterribly helpful in providing a road map for Democrats.
1. Gore's populism limited his appeal rather than expanded it. The soleevidence for this central DLC claim is that "only" 70 percent of voters in thesurvey were attracted to a populist message. That's a pretty thin reed on whichto hang this audacious interpretation. Consider other relevant evidence on thispoint.
All of this speaks to the power of Gore's populism. It was the single-mosteffective Gore message tested. Even 67 percent of the "Bush swings"--the swingswho voted for Bush--say it was an appealing message. You can argue that Gore'sversion of populism did not take him far enough, perhaps because it was not boldenough or because he was not the right messenger. But there is no evidence herethat it hurt Gore in this election.
The absence of clear evidence in this survey for populism's lack of appeal isitself revealing. The DLC could have posed direct questions that would actuallyhave tested its theories, such as, Were voters turned off by Gore's promise to"fight for people" over the special interests? Did they feel he was tooanti-business? Were Gore's DLC commitments, like permanent normal trade relationsfor China, an electoral advantage? The questions apparently not asked inthis survey are often more interesting than those that were.
2. Gore did not take full advantage of the Clinton administration's economicrecord. This is a much more plausible claim. However, there was no inherentreason that Gore could not have combined populist language with a prosperity message. In fact, the survey tested voter reaction to two similar prosperitymessages--a DLC-sanctioned one that frames the choice as going forward versusgoing backward, and one that asks if we will enrich all families or only a few.The latter provides a revealing, and presumably unintentional, test of populism'sappeal; this variant is more effective, both overall and with the Bush swingvoters. The DLC's own survey reveals that prosperity versus populism is what BillClinton might have called a "false choice"--Gore could, and should, have embracedboth.
And even if there is truth in this critique of Gore, where does this take us now?Now that Democrats are the out party, and with the economy slowing, the questionof how much credit Democrats should claim for prosperity seems less thanrelevant.
3. Gore lost because he failed to capture the votes of highly educated "wiredworkers." Let's step back and see where Gore actually lost ground in 2000,compared with Clinton in 1996.
To review this record and conclude that Al Gore's biggest problem in thiselection was losing "wired workers" by 3 points is to substitute ideology foranalysis. Clearly, Gore held the constituencies most attracted to the NewDemocrat message but lost the working class, especially men. And surely it cannotbe the case that Gore's excessive populism--as opposed to, say, issues such asthe environment, gun control, or Clinton's scandal--accounts for these patterns.
Perhaps the greatest shortcomings of the DLC's 2000 analysis are sinsof omission--it completely misses the real story. Penn denies the reality of theadverse environment created by impeachment and Clinton's scandals. For a year,George W. Bush's best applause line--always--was his promise to restore "honorand dignity" to the White House. This was the fundamental raison d'être of Bush'scampaign, yet the DLC survey fails to include it among the three Bush "themes"tested. Penn points to Clinton's 57 percent job approval rating, to argue thepresident was not a burden for Al Gore, while conveniently ignoring Clinton'sabysmal 36 percent personal-favorability rating.
The DLC's own poll shows that voters who cared about personal character votedoverwhelmingly for Bush and that those who cared about issues supported Gore. Isthis of no consequence? Penn's analysis is also static, taking no account ofGore's rise and fall in the polls. We know that Gore lost his lead during thedebates, while he was being attacked for his exaggerations and lack of integrity,not after his populist convention speech. Surely this is relevant. Ananalysis of the 2000 election that makes no mention of Gore's weaknesses as acandidate and denies the difficulties created by scandal is hard to takeseriously.
The larger problem with asking "Why Gore Lost" as a starting point for developingDemocratic strategy is that he didn't. Gore not only won the popular vote by500,000 votes, but he probably won the electoral college as well. Penn holds upthe 1996 election, in which Clinton received 49 percent of the vote, as thepinnacle of Democratic success. But Gore's 48 percent is characterized asfailure. Why is the bar set higher for Gore, when he was not an incumbentpresident, he faced a much tougher opponent, and the strongest third-partycandidate was on the left rather than the right?
Although Gore's popular-vote plurality is unimpressive, Democrats won the issuedebate in this election decisively. Among people whose vote was based mainly onissues (62 percent of voters), Gore won in a landslide, 55 percent to 40 percent;those who cared about personal qualities went for Bush 62 percent to 35 percent.Furthermore, the key to the GOP's overall success in the 2000 election was itshidden agenda and obscuring of policy differences. In 1996 and 1998, theRepublicans abandoned the agenda of 1994. In 2000 they went one step further andembraced the Democratic agenda--or at least its language and themes. Republicansran as proponents of HMO reform, defenders of Social Security, supporters ofprescription drug coverage for seniors, and friends of public education. Theirhypocrisy constitutes more powerful evidence of the appeal of the traditionalDemocratic agenda than any poll could provide.
In short, this is not 1981. The Democratic Party faces challenges, but alsogreat opportunities. It will not take advantage of these opportunities if itfails to understand the ways in which the political environment has improved andthe real weaknesses of the right, or if it expends more energy looking forscapegoats than in moving forward.
Strategically, the single-most important challenge for the party is winning morevotes among non-college white men. The labor movement--a quintessentially "old"Democrat institution--can speak with some authority on this topic. White maleunion members voted for Al Gore by a margin of 24 points, while Bush won by 24points among all white men nationally. Non-college union men voted for Gore by 31points, even as nationally Bush won the white non-college male vote by 29 points.Labor accomplished this despite the fact that white male union members are muchmore conservative than liberal, despite a massive National Rifle Associationcampaign to reach them, and despite Al Gore's embrace of free trade.
How did labor do it? With a strong populist message that focused on Bush's recordof favoring the rich and special interests over working families, and by hittinghim hard on his support for Social Security privatization--a position that theDLC would have the party take--and right-to-work laws. Labor overcame culturalconservatism by appealing to voters' pocketbooks and their self-interest asworking people--a rather traditional Democratic approach.
Reasonable people can debate about the right way for Democrats to appeal to thesevoters, yet they must recognize labor's success for what it is: not a strainedanalysis of survey data, but real votes in the bank. If someone has better ideasfor reaching white men and persuading them to support Democrats, they should comeforward. But the unions' record deserves respect, and those who would take theDemocratic Party in a different direction bear the burden of proof.
What are the issue positions the DLC believes the party should now embrace?Curiously, the survey omits much that would be helpful. Would supporting Medicarevouchers, Social Security privatization, or fast-track trade procedures make theparty stronger? Would it especially help to reach the non-college men whoabandoned the party in 2000? The DLC survey didn't ask these questions.
But evidence suggests that, in many cases, DLC positions would weaken rather thanstrengthen the party. The most important example, which President Bush isdetermined to make relevant, is Social Security privatization. While the idea ofprivate accounts is popular in the abstract, surveys always reveal strongopposition to the benefit cuts required by privatization. A poll by AARP lastyear showed opposition at almost two-thirds. Moreover, this issue was put to thetest in 2000--and Al Gore, not George W. Bush, was the beneficiary.
Fourteen percent of the electorate said Social Security was their top issue; theyvoted for Gore by 58 percent to 39 percent. As Jeffrey Bell and Frank Cannonargued in The Weekly Standard, Gore's Social Security assault at thecampaign's conclusion caused much of the late shift to Gore in key battlegroundstates. Seniors were the only age group among whom Gore (at 51 percent)outperformed Clinton (48 percent).
There is nothing Democrats could do that would damage their party more thansupporting privatization of Social Security--except perhaps getting behindvoucherization of Medicare.
Perhaps, then, the DLC's strategic genius lies in formulating"themes," rather than issues. But unified Republican control of the federalgovernment poses very different strategic and tactical questions from those facedby the Clinton and Gore campaigns. The first challenge is to develop apersuasive critique of Republican policies and the Bush administration. That hasnot been, to say the least, a DLC strength. Penn's report actually criticizesGore for drawing too many sharp distinctions. But this time around, it was theRepublicans who sought to obscure differences and blur ideological lines. Ifanything, Democrats failed to draw lines clearly and sharply enough, especiallyon education.
In any case, Democrats are now the opposition party and must make the case forchange. Traditional Democrats will charge that Republicans cater to corporatespecial interests at the expense of the environment and consumers, and to thewealthy rather than working families--and a lot of polling data shows that thiscriticism is powerful. The DLC rejects this critique, but where will the DLC findfault with the GOP? For not being sufficiently fiscally conservative? Historyprovides no support for the proposition that an incumbent party can be defeatedwith "me too" politics. Even if Democrats set aside their moral and politicalcommitments--to fight for social justice while defending social provision--andconduct a cold-blooded, utilitarian calculation of political advantage, the DLCappears to offer the party very little.
Traditional Democrats can, of course, make their own countervailing case againstNew Democratic politics. It was under the leadership of New Democrat Bill Clintonthat the Dems lost a House majority they had held for 40 years. Under Clinton,Democratic governors almost qualified for a listing on the endangered specieslist and the party lost ground in many state legislatures. As William Schneiderrecently observed in The Atlantic Monthly, "In a variety of ways Clintonleft the Democrats in the worst shape they have been in in more than fiftyyears." Even at the presidential level, the party has now nominated New Democratsin three successive elections and secured 43 percent, 49 percent, and 48 percentof the vote. Doesn't that suggest that New Democrats may not have all theanswers?
Nevertheless, traditional Democrats should resist the urge to continue with aninternecine battle that has now grown tedious as well as destructive. One thingwe can say for sure: The party needs both traditional and New Democrats--and theconstituencies they represent--to get where it wants to go. Without labor,African Americans, and the women's movement, the party would quite literally notexist. Without New Democrats and the voters they speak for, Democrats cannotbuild a durable majority. This is a time for what we might call Democraticbipartisanship.
We can identify many areas where traditional Democrats and New Democrats can cometogether, including commitment to fiscal responsibility and investment ineducation and training over huge tax cuts. Both groups can get behind privateretirement accounts, outside of Social Security, as Clinton and Goreproposed. Even support for sensible labor and environmental standards in tradeagreements provides important common ground.
In 1998, a New Democrat president was on the edge of the precipice, facingdisaster. Then, union members, African Americans, and the rest of the party basecame together to save his presidency. Now, a hostile administration is declaringwar on the labor movement, environmentalists, and other core Democraticconstituencies. The question today is will New Democrats stand with traditionalDemocrats, or will the finger-pointing continue? Will the DLC put as much energyinto exposing George W. Bush's flaws as it has Al Gore's? Will it search forcommon ground with other Democrats, or only for wedge issues?
In times like these, the DLC must answer the old trade union question:Which side are you on?
Dems: Round Two
Will Marshall Responds
A key lesson of campaign 2000 is that political parties should learnfrom their successes. As the race began, the Democratic electoral models were theClinton-Gore campaigns of 1992 and 1996. Bill Clinton, after all, was the firstDemocrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt to win a second White House term. The bigmystery is why Al Gore abandoned the New Democratic strategy that had producedthese victories--not to mention a record of prosperity, peace, and socialprogress that enjoyed wide public approval--in favor of a hackneyed populism andover-the-top appeals to interest groups.
Stan Greenberg and Robert Borosage blame Clinton for Gore's defeat. Yes, theClinton scandals presented Gore with a problem. But let's not pretend that it wasinsoluble. Forthright condemnation of Clinton's personal behavior, coupled withfresh ideas for building on the economic and social reforms of the 1990s, wouldhave perfectly mirrored the public's own ambivalence. Instead, Gore made thefatal mistake of distancing himself not only from Clinton but from the popularachievements he co-authored with Clinton--and that constituted the strongestrationale for his candidacy.
This decision deprived Gore of a grand narrative linking his campaign proposalsto the political and governing innovations of the 1990s, such as restoring fiscaldiscipline, stimulating competition and new-economy growth, ending welfare andrewarding work, making government less bureaucratic and more accountable, andrebuilding functioning markets in poor urban and rural communities. Gore'selection-year conversion to "fighting for you" populism reinforced public doubtsabout his authenticity; it also failed to awaken the supposedly dormant classgrievances of the "forgotten majority" of working middle-class voters.
I agree with Greenberg and Borosage that Democrats should offer a spiritedchallenge to George W. Bush's brazen bid to drive the nation's political agendarightward. New Democrats have vigorously opposed the Bush tax plan, the attemptto roll back environmental protections, the decision to withdraw from the Kyotoclimate-change treaty, school vouchers, and the administration's impulse todisengage from global hot spots. At the same time, we don't think Democrats cansucceed by simply defending old programs and underperforming public systems.That's why we're determined not just to oppose the Bush administration but topropose a progressive alternative that tackles the big challenges facing oursociety: equipping working Americans to succeed in the new economy, enablinglow-income families to lift themselves out of poverty, investing more in publiceducation while demanding accountability for student performance, achievinguniversal health coverage through nonbureaucratic means, harnessing market forcesto combat climate change and other environment problems, and modernizingSocial Security and Medicare. This is the agenda Al Gore should have run on--andwon on--in 2000.
Robert L. Borosage and Stanley B. Greenberg RespondHandwringing about the 2000 election is useful only to the extentthat it helps inform future strategy. Unfortunately, the essays by Will Marshalland Mark Penn not only revise history and distort data; they draw the wronglessons and point in the wrong direction. Consider four key issues.
Values. The right's cultural war against Bill Clinton, amplified by his ownmissteps, weakened Democrats and Al Gore on values and trust and allowed Bush torise on "restoring honor and dignity to the White House." The cultural assaultwas particularly effective among white non-college-educated voters. Penn andMarshall ignore this reality; they urge Democrats to abandon these voters andfocus on the better-off. This is surely wrongheaded. Democrats should be theparty that supports working- and middle-class families and their values. To forgean enduring reform majority, they must compete for the non-college-educatedelectorate.
Populism. Marshall and Penn rail against corporation bashing. But a populistformulation--making our prosperity enrich everyone--was the actual theme ofGore's campaign. And on themes and issues, Gore easily defeated Bush. Notsurprisingly, critics of the Bush budget, including the Democratic LeadershipCouncil, have found the populist argument their most effective theme in attackingBush's plan.
Interest groups. Marshall and Penn decry Gore's focus on union households,racial minorities, and better-educated women. While Democrats should surely casta wider net, they should not ignore the accomplishments of 2000--the enhancedmajorities and mobilization of groups that together are a growing, not declining,force in America. Read your census.
Good times. Marshall and Penn fault Gore for blowing the "good times." Butaccording to Penn's own survey data, voters thought Gore was more likely thanBush to "continue the prosperity." Disposable income was faltering in the yearleading up to the election and fell in the quarter of the election. People,especially Penn's wired workers, were already feeling the financial pressure.Even in good times, most Americans were making modest gains at best and werelooking for leaders who understood that. As the economy falters on Bush's watch,Democrats must rediscover their instinctive advocacy for increased livingstandards for average Americans.
Guy Molyneux Responds
Despite their substantial disagreements, New Democrats andtraditional Democrats share important common ground. After all, George W. Bushmeans not only to rescind every one of Bill Clinton's accomplishments but also torepeal much of the New Deal and what remains of the Great Society. If Bush cannotunite the Democratic Party, it's hard to imagine what could.
The central task for Democrats is to develop a compelling critique of the Bushadministration. This is a time to define party differences in ways that aresalient to voters. That is harder than it sounds, because Bush cloaks his agendain soothing, almost Democratic rhetoric--Gingrichism with a human face.
Let me propose a division of labor that will allow each Democratic camp to make auseful contribution while remaining true to its values and analysis. First,populists need to make the case that Bush is advancing the interests of bigbusiness and the wealthy at the expense of average working people. Theadministration's strategists, who seem to have a political tin ear in thisregard, are helping out by making their slavish devotion to the corporate agendaso transparent. With his tax breaks for the wealthy, his repeal of the ergonomicsstandard, and his backsliding on carbon dioxide emissions, Bush leaves no doubtabout whom he is fighting for.
The second component of the Democratic critique is less obvious, but just asimportant: Bush is pursuing a reactionary agenda that will take the nationbackward rather than forward. Listen carefully to his speeches and note hisfrequent use of the word "reform." He is staking an aggressive claim to thereform mantle favored by the Democratic Leadership Council. But surely when WillMarshall talks about "reform-minded centrism," he means something very different.New Democrats should lay out a serious program for public investment thatempowers Americans in the global economy--and expose Bush's reform agenda as afraud.
If we all stick to our traditional roles, New Democrats will attack populists fortheir misguided "class warfare" charges, and populists will return fire. Butwhat's the point of continuing this argument? Let's rewrite the script, agree todisagree, and focus on doing what we each do best. My own guess is that these twomessages are more complementary than we often suppose.
Mark J. Penn Responds
Al Gore received 600,000 more votes than George W. Bush,principally in New York and California. Had Gore been able to distribute thosevotes in the Midwest and the border states of the South that Bill Clinton won in1996, he would have coasted in the electoral college. There is no clearerevidence than this that Gore's handlers looked only at the overall polls and notat the critical swing voters in key states.
Populism is a message that accentuates divisions. But as Bill Clinton said,you can stand up for people without putting down others. That is a much moresuccessful message than the one used in Gore's campaign.
As to the repeated claim that Gore did better with voters earning more than$100,000, the fact is that he did better with higher-income women but not withmen, because choice and guns were in fact a positive issue with women up theeconomic ladder. That was not the case with men who vote on economic issues,where he did substantially worse. Had he used the prosperity message, not thepopulism message, he would have been able to win over the women who vote onsocial issues and the men who vote on economic ones.
Wired workers are 26 percent of the national workforce, and they are in everystate. The use of old stereotypes of America is exactly the sort of analysis thatmisses important election dynamics. There were more than enough knowledge workersin Tennessee, Arkansas, Missouri, and West Virginia to have swung the election toGore. Just as important, however, is the fact that Gore was perceived as beingeven further to the left than the Democratic Party itself--and that also hurt himin these states.
Al Gore could easily have distanced himself from the problems of 1998 withoutalso distancing himself from the successful economic and other policies of BillClinton. It is true that he led after his convention, but it is also true thatthe only other time he led was after he showed loyalty to Clinton at the endof the impeachment trial. His failure to show loyalty afterward undermined hisown character; and his failure to use the issue of prosperity properly becomesmore evident with each passing day.
