The Monkey Cage

We are professors of political science.

Post-Election Report: Argentina

In our continuing series of election reports, we welcome political scientists Natalia C. Del Cogliano and Mariana L. Prats with the following post-election report on last week’s Argentinian elections:

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Redistributing Upwards

Most people think of social welfare policies as ones that aim to help people with low or moderate incomes, but the largest entitlements in what I call the Submerged State conglomeration of policies channeled through the tax code and subsidies to private organizations—benefit especially high income households. The three submerged policies that are most costly to the United States are the tax subsidies for employer-provided health and retirement benefits and the home mortgage interest deduction. Each of these three policies favors more affluent Americans, as seen in the figure below.

Gauging the Influence of Public Interest Groups

A Monkey Cage reader and long-time affiliate of Washington public interest groups asks: Do public interest groups influence policy decisions?  For an answer, I asked two political scientists who study interest groups: Dara Strolovich, the author of Affirmative Advocacy, and Matt Grossmann, the author of the forthcoming Not So Special Interests.  Here is their post:

Categorizing groups as representing the “public interest” is tricky.  Even among groups typically considered “public interest groups,” a few relatively large and well-established organizations account for the bulk of opportunities for influence, such as media appearances and committee testimony. And these groups may only represent the interests of their most advantaged constituencies, ignoring the issue concerns of disadvantaged subgroups of their constituencies. “Public interest groups,” in other words, represent small portions of the public.

The answer to the reader’s question depends even more on our standard for influence. If influence means changing the votes of legislators or whether bills are signed into law, interest groups appear to have little influence. Some studies of the influence of lobbying on congressional votes have found no influence and others have found substantial influence but only on a few specific votes. In general, it is hard for groups to bring about changes in the law.  Whoever favors the status quo over any change has a tremendous advantage. Political action committee (PAC) contributions show even less evidence of influence. PACs influence voting on only non-ideological issues. That said, even if they do not generally change legislators’ votes, interest groups do lead legislators to pay attention to issues that they might otherwise fail to address and they can influence the content of policy by drafting model legislation or regulations.

If we interpret policy influence more broadly, public interest groups may be able to compete better with business interests than is commonly assumed. Business and professional associations vastly outnumber public interest groups, but the public interest community has grown at a faster rate. Public interest groups represent 26% of major interest group participants in Washington.  And even though they spend much less money on lobbying than do corporate interests, such spending does not predict which side wins a lobbying debate. In fact, policy historians partially credit public interest groups with one-third of all significant domestic policy enactments since 1945.

What about when public interest groups face business groups in head-to-head competition?

What about the long term? Public interest policies are often weakened by future congresses or administrative agency decisions because more specialized interest groups fight reform over extended periods. Likewise policy changes may be ineffective; the NAACP’s efforts to use the courts to end segregation did not lead to more black schoolchildren attending integrated schools, in spite of the landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.

To apply this debate to a current example, think about the anti-tax pledge from Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform (ATR) signed by so many first-year members of Congress. Has ATR influenced policy? First, evaluating causality is hard: most of the people who signed the pledge already opposed tax increases and most votes against taxes are driven by ideology and partisanship, rather than adherence to the pledge. Second, the pledge generally favors the status quo and that comes with quite an advantage. Nevertheless, political science suggests that ATR could influence which issues Congress addresses and the terms of the tax reform debate in the media. ATR is unlikely to singlehandedly affect final votes on any legislation, but, in tandem with many other factors, it could change how the debate over tax policy develops. Many years from now, we might conclude that the group was part of an important movement that prevented tax increases, at least for a while.

When Can You Trust Polling about Ballot Measures?

In just over a week, Ohio voters will decide on Issue 2, a referendum on whether to keep a recently enacted law which “limits collective bargaining for public employees in the state.”  Recent polls show decidedly more public opposition to this law than support for it, with a 57-32 pro-repeal split in a Quinnipiac poll and a similar 56-36 split in a PPP poll.  But as Washington Post blogger

How Important is Turkey’s Support of the Free Syrian Army?

This week, the New York Times reported that Turkey has begun to actively support the Syrian Free Army by providing shelter in a camp guarded by the Turkish military. From the Times:

Turkey is hosting an armed opposition group waging an insurgency against the government of President Bashar al-Assad, providing shelter to the commander and dozens of members of the group, the Free Syrian Army, and allowing them to orchestrate attacks across the border from inside a camp guarded by the Turkish military.

Seif Gadhafi and the International Criminal Court

Monkey Cage readers Emily Ritter of the University of Alabama and Scott Wolford of the University of Texas-Austin send along the following:

News emerged yesterday that Seif al-Islam Gadhafi has been in “indirect” contact with the International Criminal Court over the terms of a possible surrender, seeking a guarantee that he wouldn’t be sent back to Libya in the event he’s found innocent. With no independent force to arrest suspects, the ICC relies primarily on others to arrest suspects and hand them over to the court for trial—-an inefficient process at best and one that often leaves suspects at large, presumably continuing their pattern of crimes against humanity. In a paper forthcoming at the Journal of Theoretical Politics, we argue that an international criminal tribunal like the ICC could improve its ability to bring suspects to trial if it were to bargain with suspects directly rather than waiting for their capture. Though both parties—-the ICC Prosecutor and a Gadhafi intermediary—-pose this as a matter of “clarification,” we think it’s useful to think about these talks in terms of bargaining and what it can mean both for the ICC and for the crimes it proposes to deter.

We argue that courts lacking the ability to arrest suspects, like the ICC, can facilitate the surrender of their suspects by bargaining directly with them, altering charges or punishments or even the terms of surrender. In doing so, the court can bring suspects to trial without waiting for states or forces with uncertain resolve to capture and surrender them, increasing the number of cases they can try by tailoring the terms of surrender to a fugitive’s prospects for remaining at large. One could argue that, by seeking terms better than remaining at large—-which seems to involve taking shelter with a nomadic tribe, accompanying mercenaries to Zimbabwe, and running a permanent risk of violent death or capture—-the younger Gadhafi is trying to win just such an assurance from the ICC: jail time or, should he prove his innocence, a return to a country other than Libya. Of course, the ICC can be a better option for suspects than the relatively poor outcome of death under a collapsed regime, but only if the ICC represents a better prospect than any outside option, such as asylum. In this case, the effective refusals from Mali and Niger to harbor him limit his outside options, leading Gadhafi to turn to the ICC for the next best option—-a fair trial. We argue that, even with exile a possibility, as it may be here, some kind of pre-arrest bargaining can bring suspects to justice more easily. Gadhafi is attempting to offer his surrender in exchange for assurance that “he would receive a fair trial and that he could be helped to find a new country of residence if he were acquitted or after completing a prison sentence,” and the ICC is working with him to secure that surrender. Without these exchanges, the suspect would likely prefer to remain at large in the hopes of avoiding capture.

(Notably, others have argued that international punishment can represent a post-exit fate worth clinging to office or even dying to avoid.  Our theory assumes only that the accused compares the value of his fate at the ICC’s bench (which can be light to severe, depending on the bargain) to the value of his fate at large (which can theoretically range from swimming in a pool of gold in exile or a risk of death).)

In that sense, the ICC might view this as an opportunity to raise its profile and increase its institutional stature by prosecuting a high-profile suspect and bringing an otherwise costly period of Seif al-Islam remaining a fugitive to a quicker end. However, our paper also identifies that the benefits of pre-arrest bargaining may also come at a cost: if leaders expect that they can negotiate marginally better deals for themselves prior to surrender (which, in this case, may mean living out one’s twilight years in a country where one isn’t likely to be prosecuted again or killed), then they’ll also be marginally more willing to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity in the first place.

So, as the world debates the best approach to dealing with the remnants of the Gadhafi regime, it’s important to keep this tradeoff in mind: war criminals can be enticed to surrender by making the terms of their prosecution better than remaining at large—-enabling prosecution and preventing whatever mischief Seif al-Islam might otherwise engage in as a fugitive—-but granting leniency may undermine deterrence in future cases if the ICC appears too willing to bargain with its suspects.

Sigh. Drew Westen. Again.

The New York Times devotes additional column inches to the opinions of Drew Westen.  Last time, that didn’t work out so well.  How about this time?

Westen:

Because of their attitude toward authority and hierarchy, Republicans in Congress are more likely to follow their leaders… Democrats on the other hand react so strongly against taking “marching orders” that they can scarcely stay on message even if their political lives depend on it (which they often do).

Free Trade II: Free Trade and Intellectual Property

On the more particular topic of free trade agreements, Matthew Yglesias posts today on how US free trade agreements aren’t so much about free trade any more.

The trade deal was supposed to be a political vehicle for overcoming special interest politics, but it’s really just become another venue for interest group politics. … The pharmaceutical industry has a lot of clout in the U.S., because we’re a major pharma producer. Most foreign countries aren’t like that, so they’re only willing to pay relatively low amounts for drugs. Since the marginal cost of producing pills is low, drug companies generally agree to sell at these low prices. But now pharma can leverage its political clout into the United States into turning the USTR’s office into an extension of its lobbying operations.

Free Trade I: Does Free Trade Help Workers’ Rights?

Layna Mosley, at UNC, argues yes in today’s New York Times.

Research I conducted over the last several years with the political scientists Brian Greenhill and Aseem Prakash suggests that trade with developed nations helps developing countries expand labor rights themselves. Why? International trade gives producers incentives to meet the standards of their export markets. When developing nations export more to countries with better labor standards, their labor rights laws and practices tend to improve. Our findings, which are based on newly collected measures of labor rights around the world, demonstrate a “California effect” on workers’ rights, in which exporting nations are influenced by the labor rights conditions that prevail in their main trading partners. … Our research demonstrates that when a developing country with low labor standards trades with higher-standards countries like the United States and those in Europe, it comes under influences from the market itself that improve its labor standards. And this has a greater impact on developing nations than including labor conditions in trade agreements.

This Week in Political Science

RETIREMENT. This week the New York Times reported that Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), who caucuses with the Democrats, has been speaking with previous contender Linda McMahon, a Republican campaigning for her party’s nomination for Lieberman’s seat, drawing the ire of many establishment Democrats.  Lieberman’s retirement and that of other members of Congress this year raises this question: how does the replacement of incumbents (and particularly moderates) by new members affect the polarization of the parties in Congress?  University of Texas political scientist Sean Theriault finds (ungated) that the replacement of moderates by more ideologically extreme members has driven polarization:

As southern Democrats, the bulk of whom were in the middle third of the ideological continuum, died, lost, retired or otherwise vacated their seat, they have been, for the most part, replaced by conservative Republicans. Quite simply, when extremists replaced moderates, the ideological middle disappeared and the parties diverged.

The Supercommittee and Secrecy: A Good Thing?

With the Supercommittee back in the news (see here and here, for example) after weeks of secrecy, it seems a good time to ask the question of whether all this secrecy is good for policy making. After all, it seems antithetical to traditional notions of openness and transparency in government, things we often seek to encourage in other countries.

Political scientist Jordan Tama, however, makes the opposite argument. Writing in the NY Times last week, Tama argues that:

Greater openness by the panel, officially known as the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, would actually be harmful to the public interest. Private meetings are essential to give the committee’s six Republicans and six Democrats the freedom to step away from party orthodoxies, conduct serious negotiations and search for common ground, rather than engage in political posturing….

History reveals the importance of extensive private talks for members of a bipartisan group to get to know one another and pursue compromises. Eleven of the 18 members of President Obama’s fiscal commission endorsed a $4 trillion deficit reduction package, but only after months of private deliberations. When the panel did hold public hearings, they resulted in partisan grandstanding about fiscal stimulus and health care reform.

Private deliberation can also help ensure legislative follow-up. In 1981, a crisis in Social Security financing prompted President Ronald Reagan to appoint a 15-member commission led by Alan Greenspan (then an economic consultant) and including seven members of Congress. The panel achieved a breakthrough at a three-day retreat in Alexandria, Va., during which commissioners agreed on the amount of revenue needed to keep Social Security solvent and began discussing proposals to meet the shortfall through benefit cuts and tax increases.

Later, a subgroup of five members negotiated the details with House Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill Jr. and the Reagan administration in numerous private meetings in lawmakers’ offices, at the home of the White House chief of staff, James A. Baker III, and at the presidential guesthouse. Congress enacted the resulting compromise in 1983…..

In an age when elected officials rarely deliberate across party lines, private discussions should be welcomed, rather than attacked. This is all the more true considering that the fundamental task before the committee is not to establish facts, but to find a political sweet spot. The committee’s success remains a long shot in our age of extreme ideological polarization, but its secrecy gives it a glimmer of hope.

Special World Series Edition of Graphiti: Win Probabilities from Game 6

In the “picture is worth a thousand words” department, the following graph shows the probability that each team will win at each moment of the game:

Of course, this picture is pretty good too:

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