There are a number of American political idiosyncracies at play here, but suffice it to say that it would be difficult for any president to refuse a troop request from his top general and because of Democratic Party superstition and village politics, it’s even harder for a Democratic president to do so. So while President Obama was right to say over the weekend that:

I’m not interested in just being in Afghanistan for the sake of being in Afghanistan or saving face or, in some way– you know, sending a message that America– is here for– for the duration. I think it’s important that we match strategy to resources.

What I’m not also gonna do, though, is put the resource question before the strategy question. Until I’m satisfied that we’ve got the right strategy I’m not gonna be sending some young man or woman over there- beyond what we already have.

The release of General Stanley McChrystal‘s confidential Afghanistan assessment, which asks for more troops, and says that “insurgent momentum” will have to be “reversed in the next 12 months” puts the President between a rock and a hard place. Having committed to getting the strategy right first, he will now face pressure to simply throw more resources at the problem–which is probably exactly what the leaker intended. That’s despite the significant problem posed by the disaster that was the Afghan election, which Spencer Ackerman writes, pointing to this Washington Post analysis, “have caused the administration to question whether it’s over-committing itself to Afghan governance.”

The principal game-changer, in the view of White House officials, was Afghanistan’s presidential election last month, which was compromised by fraud, much of it in support of President Hamid Karzai. Although the results have not been certified, he almost certainly will remain in office, but under a cloud of illegitimacy that could complicate U.S. efforts to promote good governance.

I’ve written over and over that this is the insurmountable problem for me–the one issue I haven’t heard the administration give a good answer to. Obviously they’re thinking very hard about it, but McChrystal writes in his assessment that “Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.” How does that work with a government seen as illegitimate?

In the report, McChrystal acknowledges that “Protecting the population is more than preventing insurgent violence
and intimidation. It also means that ISAF can no longer ignore or
tacitly accept abuse of power, corruption, or marginalization.”

— A. Serwer