Gregg Carlstrom notes the two contradicting narratives on the capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, coming from the Washington Post and the New York Times, respectively. On the Post side, Baradar’s capture signals a monumental strategic shift on the Pakistani side, wherein they have finally decided to accept the threat the Taliban poses. The Times narrative is that Baradar’s capture was a coincidence. Spencer Ackerman, for his part, seems to think the Pakistani strategic shift is real, and a direct result of the Obama administration’s new approach.
Abubakar Siddique has been reporting on another theory that doesn’t necessarily contradict the notion of a strategic shift on Pakistan’s part, although it puts it in a different context. Siddique reports that Baradar’s capture was initially planned by the Afghan government as a “face-saving measure”:
A senior Afghan official with knowledge of Kabul’s reconciliation plans, however, tells RFE/RL on condition of anonymity that Baradar’s arrest was scripted. His detention, the official says, was intended to serve as a “face-saving” incident that would allow him to be brought to Kabul and turned into a central figure who could persuade a large part of the insurgency he once led into accepting reconciliation with the Afghan government.
Siddique’s source says that Baradar met with Afghan and Saudi officials last year and planned to come in. But the Pakistanis may have jumped the gun by scooping him up now, in an effort to make sure they have more influence on the reconciliation process.
Baradar coming in willingly would certainly explain the speed with which the U.S. seems to be reacting to the intelligence he’s providing–and concern over influencing the reconciliation process would also explain why Pakistan suddenly seems to be more cooperative. That doesn’t mean that they haven’t decided that turning completely on the Taliban is in their strategic interest, just that they are doing it on their own terms and in ways that might not necessarily benefit the reconciliation process in the long run.
— A. Serwer
