Fred asks, "Maybe you could write a column refuting the claim that Obama said the surge would not work." First you'd need to define "work," as if "work" means create the space for enduring political reconciliation, then it hasn't done that. That aside, it's worth continually reminding folks that the argument in 2005 was not over the Surge or nuthin'. It was over whether we should pursue the Surge or a strategy modeled after the Iraq Study Group recommendations that married a phased withdrawal to a regional diplomatic effort. In answering the question of whether the Surge "worked," you have to ask whether this reality is superior to an alternative reality in which the ISG recommendations were implemented. In that reality, the Anbar Awakening still happens, and Sadr still tries to get his militias under control in order to increase his political legitimacy, and Baghdad is still ethnically cleansed and thus less of a powder keg. The difference is that there are fewer American troops, but more constructive engagement with Syria, Iran, and other international players. It's a strategy based on diplomacy and efforts towards political reconciliation rather than a strategy based on troop density. So would it have proven superior? I don't know. I'm not an Iraq expert. But that's the relevant question. 2005 was a turning point in Iraq. The largest factors in the reduction in violence -- as Petraeus, Crocker, and anyone else will tell you -- were organic Iraqi initiatives. Meanwhile, American military strategy was going to change, and radically. Which means the correct comparison is with the path not taken, which is to say, the ISG recommendations.
