Jeffrey Goldberg's analysis of Hamas in The New York Times is very useful reading. In particular, it's important remember that unlike Fatah, Hamas is a religious movement, and thus rather less rational. Which is not to say they'll never become rational. History is littered with tamed extremists. "Death to Israel, but in the meantime, cross-border commerce with Israel!" is the sort of Eddie Izzard-style political slogan that emerges when revolutionaries get put in charge of the municipal waste system. And Hamas, like a lot of these groups, has its extremists, and it has its opportunists, and it has its poor kids who needed schooling and food, and it has its pragmatists, and at any given moment, some of these wings are ascendant and some of them are in decline. But all observers agree that flattening Gaza has pushed Hamas back onto its hardline haunches. I don't know what happens to Hamas in some alternative reality where they are elected, fight with Fatah, take power, and then Israel doesn't blockade Gaza and the U.S. doesn't cut off aid. Maybe everything is the same. Maybe it isn't. Maybe the 8 percent that wants to be a popular government more than an eschatological remnant becomes 17 percent. But in the reality we live in, the blockade and the aid cutoff ensured that Hamas would remain radical. Destroying their governmental infrastructure ensured that the guys who make missiles and not the guys who are trying to figure out agricultural policy will chair the floor at the next general meeting. And more than that, it ensured that the Palestinian population that suffers beneath Israel's blockade will be ripe for Hamas's theology of a better tomorrow, and a divine ally, and an eventual victory. The concrete appeal of cross-border commerce with Israel can only contend with the emotional resonance of death to Israel if the people of Gaza realize that they're benefiting from the former and getting nothing for the latter.One more point: Part of the theory behind isolating Hamas and harming Gazans is that nothing can be worse than Hamas. It is an Islamic terrorist organization bent on Israel's destruction. The exhausted populace will have no home other than Fatah. But at one point, Israel's policy was to isolate Fatah and harm the Palestinians that pledged allegiance to Arafat because nothing could be worse than a revolutionary terrorist outfit that killed civilians and helped coordinate the attacks of surrounding Arab governments on the Jewish state. But just as Hamas was worse than Fatah, there's much that can be worse than Hamas. And just as recognizing Fatah has transitioned from unimaginable to preferable, so too might Hamas's pragmatists eventually ascend, and seem rational in comparison to the Salafist maniacs who now nourish themselves on Palestinian desperation. WHAT COMES AFTER HAMAS?
Jeffrey Goldberg's analysis of Hamas in The New York Times is very useful reading. In particular, it's important remember that unlike Fatah, Hamas is a religious movement, and thus rather less rational. Which is not to say they'll never become rational. History is littered with tamed extremists. "Death to Israel, but in the meantime, cross-border commerce with Israel!" is the sort of Eddie Izzard-style political slogan that emerges when revolutionaries get put in charge of the municipal waste system. And Hamas, like a lot of these groups, has its extremists, and it has its opportunists, and it has its poor kids who needed schooling and food, and it has its pragmatists, and at any given moment, some of these wings are ascendant and some of them are in decline. But all observers agree that flattening Gaza has pushed Hamas back onto its hardline haunches. I don't know what happens to Hamas in some alternative reality where they are elected, fight with Fatah, take power, and then Israel doesn't blockade Gaza and the U.S. doesn't cut off aid. Maybe everything is the same. Maybe it isn't. Maybe the 8 percent that wants to be a popular government more than an eschatological remnant becomes 17 percent. But in the reality we live in, the blockade and the aid cutoff ensured that Hamas would remain radical. Destroying their governmental infrastructure ensured that the guys who make missiles and not the guys who are trying to figure out agricultural policy will chair the floor at the next general meeting. And more than that, it ensured that the Palestinian population that suffers beneath Israel's blockade will be ripe for Hamas's theology of a better tomorrow, and a divine ally, and an eventual victory. The concrete appeal of cross-border commerce with Israel can only contend with the emotional resonance of death to Israel if the people of Gaza realize that they're benefiting from the former and getting nothing for the latter.One more point: Part of the theory behind isolating Hamas and harming Gazans is that nothing can be worse than Hamas. It is an Islamic terrorist organization bent on Israel's destruction. The exhausted populace will have no home other than Fatah. But at one point, Israel's policy was to isolate Fatah and harm the Palestinians that pledged allegiance to Arafat because nothing could be worse than a revolutionary terrorist outfit that killed civilians and helped coordinate the attacks of surrounding Arab governments on the Jewish state. But just as Hamas was worse than Fatah, there's much that can be worse than Hamas. And just as recognizing Fatah has transitioned from unimaginable to preferable, so too might Hamas's pragmatists eventually ascend, and seem rational in comparison to the Salafist maniacs who now nourish themselves on Palestinian desperation. 
