Michael Cohen, consistently one of the Afghan War's most persuasive and consistent skeptics, takes a look at the discrepancies between the rosy picture being painted in some accounts of the war and finds signs of civilian-military conflict:
As was the case last summer and fall during the presidential review on Afghanistan, the military is engaged in a public lobbying effort to ensure that President Barack Obama stays the course in the conflict. The first salvo in this public relations effort came October 17: "Top U.S. military and civilian officials in Afghanistan have begun to assert that they see concrete progress in the war against the Taliban," wrote Joshua Paltrow in the Washington Post. "Despite growing numbers of Taliban attacks and U.S. casualties, U.S. officials are building their case for why they are on the right track."
That report was followed by Carlotta Gall's front-page story in the New York Times asserting that the military was "routing" the Taliban in and around Kandahar. Gall quoted Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, the British commander of the NATO coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, optimistically remarking, "We now have the initiative. We have created momentum. It is everything put together in terms of the effort that has gone in over the last 18 months and it is undoubtedly having an impact."
Cohen argues persuasively that the empirical evidence of progress in Afghanistan is minimal, but that when the 2011 date comes along, military leadership and war supporters will use these overly optimistic assessments to bolster the case for staying. Cohen writes, "That doesn't mean anyone -- least of all the White House or the American people -- should confuse the military's assessment of the situation in Afghanistan with the truth."
I suspect we're in for a rehash of what happened toward the end of the war in Iraq, where evidence of progress or evidence of failure is still more reason to stay. If things are going well, then we need to stay to "finish the job." If things are going poorly, then we can't simply "cut and run." Heads they win; tails you lose.
What makes this more difficult is that while the military leadership has been a political force for some time -- look at the current detente over "don't ask, don't tell" if you want an example -- its credibility comes from being seen as an apolitical force. As it stands, people trust the military more than they trust their elected officials. Add to that the belief among political elites that Gen. David Petraeus is not just a good leader but a miracle worker, and the political difficulties of ensuring that the United States does not remain the caretaker of a corrupt Afghan government indefinitely become even more daunting.
When Obama replaced Gen. Stanley McChrystal with Petraeus -- an act Tom Ricks criticized because he said it implied the nation has only one competent general -- Bill Kristol said Obama "did the right thing." From Kristol's perspective, he did -- not only did that choice increase the possibility of a longer stay in Afghanistan, it made it difficult for Obama to fulfill his ultimate commitment to leaving.
