Just as the pundits supported their personal, "imaginary war" in Iraq, they're supporting an imaginary era of bipartisan compromise and Bush administration seriousness now. Brad DeLong points out such an instance in Sebastian Mallaby's flight of fantasy on Social Security:
Sebastian Mallaby does not know whether or not the Bush administration's decision makers are more concerned with Social Security's solvency than with promoting an "ownership society": he does not know who the Bush administration's real decision makers are. Sebastian Mallaby does not know whether or not Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has the "heft to sideline ideologues": Paulson will certainly try, but O'Neill and Snow tried before him and failed. Sebastian Mallaby does not know whether the Bush administration will be willing to "make concessions" on economic policy issues like Social Security reform: the Bush administration probably does not know itself, yet.
Mallaby hopes that all of these will be the case. And he hopes that by confidently asserting that they are the case, he increases the likelihood that they will become the case. So he confidently asserts that they are the case while still clueless about whether what he is writing is right or wrong.
Use Occam's Razor: Two years ago, Bush was reelected with an apparent mandate and a pliant congressional majority. His first priority, it seemed, was Social Security. In that debate, he proved interested in nothing but private accounts, which had nothing to do with solvency. He never switched course. He never sat down with the Republican leadership and emerged with a solvency deal. And all of these oversights occurred while Bush stood at the height of his powers and with, essentially, full control over the legislative product. So why does Mallaby think that Bush will be more interested in a Democratic product focused on the financial issues Bush showed no interest in?
Because Sebastian Mallaby has dreamed up an entirely new, entirely imaginary Bush administration with imaginary administration officials and an imaginary approach to policy. And, just like all the pundits did with the Iraq War, he presents his imaginary world not as a hypothetical or a hope or a dream, but as cold, hard, fact.
Imagine that.
