If you'll recall, the Kurds, those country-less, independent ethnic freedom fighters of northern Iraq (and several other countries) were always tacit U.S. allies. They were the main beneficiaries of the pre-OIF no-fly zone and had their reputations deployed whenever people made the case for the war. Now that we're in charge in Iraq, the Kurds have been trying to establish their autonomy as best they can (especially by trying to seize the oil-rich city of Kirkuk). Anyways, they're not particularly happy with the way things have been going lately:
The Kurds want a loose federation, while [Prime Minister Nuri al] Maliki, playing on nationalist sentiments, is increasingly pushing for a strong central government.
Relations have deteriorated to the point that the Kurdish leadership has described Mr. Maliki as a new Saddam Hussein, recalling how Mr. Hussein ruthlessly crushed the Kurds in the 1980s. The borders of Iraqi Kurdistan were established as an internationally enforced security zone in 1991.
Awkward! This comes after the Iraqi Army began pushing out Kurdish units in Mosul, the other major city in Kurdistan, and replacing them with Shi'ite army units. Don't worry, though, the American general in command there has said he will not interfere in any fighting between the Kurds and the Iraqi army, although American troops apparently helped "contain" a stand-off in September between the two groups.
What's instructive here is that this conflict has little to do with security per se. Mosul has been more secure than it was last year -- a drop from forty insurgent attacks a day to nine or ten -- but there is still a potentially serious conflict based on the underlying concerns of traditional geopolitics, which is to say oil and land. No amount of troops in the region will prevent conflict over these resources (some diplomats might help the various Iraqi factions figure out who gets what without killing each other). But this is yet another example of how even improvements in the security situation that provide space for political reconciliation don't provide political reconciliation itself. It's not clear to me exactly what the best way is to solve this conflict. Beginning to withdraw American troops, though, might force both sides to spend more time worrying about insurgents and less time plotting against each other.
-- Tim Fernholz
