Confronted with such evil, U.S. citizens, politicians, and media have outdone each other with jingoistic calls for revenge. A New York Post columnist wants to "kill the bastards . . . flatten their cities." William Safire in The New York Times wants to "pulverize" them. U.S. Senator Zell Miller said "bomb the hell out of them . . . [i]f there's collateral damage, so be it. They certainly found our civilians to be expendable." Other, usually responsible voices, like National Public Radio host Juan Williams, have actually started to express sympathy for a nuclear attack aimed at putting a conclusive end to this risk (though Secretary of State Colin Powell, to his credit, has treated such comments dismissively). Of course, exactly whom the U.S. would annihilate remains unclear, as the most direct perpetrators sent themselves to their heavenly reward as part of the atrocity.
The calls for "something to be done" to punish the perpetrators are a natural and necessary follow-on to the initial shock and grief, as the entire nation passes to anger and rage. In the aftermath of the attack, America is desperately crying out for unity and concerted action. In hindsight, it is obvious how ineffective previous, reactive, counter-terrorism policies were. The legal concept of "res ipsa loquitor" (the thing speaks for itself) comes to mind. Responding to these emotional and strategic needs, the administration has now "declared war" against terrorism, with President Bush stating that this war will be the focus of his Presidency.
The Seductiveness of the War Metaphor
History has shown that calls to war in the face of a common enemy are, perhaps unfortunately, among the most effective ways of building unity and a sense of common action. A not inconsiderable side effect is that they help standing in the polls. (This observation is not meant to question the sincerity of the U.S. leaders, but only to note the incredible pressures on them to mollify the natural outrage, which risks hasty or ill-conceived action, or over-reaction.) Faced with unprecedented, frightening, and barely comprehensible malevolence, it was understandable to see moves toward bellicosity and embracing the flag. Also unsurprising was the rush of legislators to support the President by authorizing the broad use of force, doubling the $20 billion he requested, and moving to grant the federal government expanded police powers that risk infringing civil liberties. Another predictable but less well-intended effect has been the violence against U.S. Muslims and Arab-Americans.
As with the "wars" on poverty and drugs, the military metaphor can be a useful way to bring to the fight urgently needed enhanced focus, coordination between U.S. agencies as well as between U.S. agencies and their international counterparts, resources and new ideas (which in this case could include appropriate and limited use of the military). In other words, there is an important public relations benefit to employing the metaphor. But if the present "war on terrorism" is not to end up like the failed wars on poverty and drugs, the limits and perils of the military metaphor need to be recognized. Among the most important limits will be the need to preserve international public opinion in favor of the initiatives against this particularly international threat.
So far, it has been easy for nations to sign up at a general level for the new global initiative "against terrorism," given the now unmistakable magnitude and global nature of this new and more malevolent form of the traditional terrorist threat. The new variants include not only the suicidal use of airplanes, public transportation, or other instruments of daily life people have taken for granted, but also weapons of mass destruction with potential loss of innocent life on an even greater scale than that seen on September 11, 2001. There could be nuclear elimination of a city or entire region, or mass murder by poisons in local water supplies or (more likely, given the anti-bacterial chemicals in water) biological or chemical weapons delivered by air or other means. In fact, suggestions (e.g. Sprinzak, "Revisiting the Superterrorism Debate," Foreign Policy September/October 2001) that this is not "superterrorism" because "conventional means" were used miss the point: The lethal combination of airplanes and suicidal bombers here effectively created weapons of mass destruction, with consequences reportedly similar to detonation of a one kilo-ton nuclear weapon in New York.
The administration has thus had early success in beginning to stitch together a loose international coalition against the scourge. Yet for that coalition to survive and realize its potential, it will be necessarily to get solid international agreement on more precise objectives of the anti-terrorism effort, and especially the intended scope of military action as compared with political, economic, legal, and other counter-terrorism tools.
The Scope of Military Action
Thoughtful voices in the U.S. and abroad have already begun to make the distinction between indiscriminate and counterproductive revenge, on one hand, and more prudent and narrowly tailored defensive military action combined with other methods, on the other. Already, a number of the closest allies of the U.S. have joined Muslim countries in pointing out that any U.S. action must appear "just". A precipitous or overbroad attack would not only fail to capitalize on the moment of opportunity for unified action presented by this grave crisis, but would make matters worse by aggravating precisely the sentiments that provided the context for the attack, again dividing the world's response.
The context for the attack was a generalized and growing anti-American sentiment, in which the optimism of the immediate post-Cold War period was gradually being replaced by a newly polarized world. Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis (from his "Foreign Affairs" article, then his book on the subject) was highly criticized in the immediate years after its original publication in the mid-90s. But it's been gaining a resurgent appeal lately. (In a nutshell, the thesis was that in the post-Cold War world, lines of conflict would be drawn more along groups of countries sharing common cultures -- such as Confucianism, Islam, the West -- than along political or other lines.) As a frequent attendee of U.N. meetings from the early nineties to the present, I've noticed a palpable and growing anti-American sentiment, corresponding to the increasing concerns over globalization that resulted in the Seattle, Davos, and Genoa protests of the past couple of years. Huntington's thesis, however, always seemed to me to understate the rich diversity within, for example, the Islamic "civilization," or within "the West."
The U.S., perceived as a "hegemon" by itself and others, did little to address this growing anti-Americanism. The insensitivities occasionally displayed during the Clinton years went into high gear with the new Bush Administration. The latter explicitly voiced doubts about the value of the United Nations and multilateralism (except when it coincided with advancing narrow U.S. interests), and repudiated a number of multilateral treaties and initiatives ranging from the Kyoto accord on global warming, to those on small arms, anti-ballistic missiles, and biological weapons. In dealing with other countries, including allies, the U.S. often seemed to insist on dominating international initiatives, failing which it would repudiate them.
Clearly, continued emphasis on great power politics, or military methods like missile defense, won't address this new form of threat to international stability. Indeed, the recent attack demonstrates that old, "realpolitik" approaches centered on state power can be a liability as opposed to an asset, when (a) actions perceived as selfish, arrogant, or unilateral are prime motivating factors behind resentment, which shades at the margin into terrorist extremism, (b) the strategies of the new terrorists exploit vulnerabilities from excessive focus on state military power rather than shoring up defense more broadly, and (c) we all now exist in a networked world where power is more distributed, states (while still relevant actors) are less important, and non-state actors like corporations and less organized groups of individuals can have a great impact. This is a world in which, we now know, individuals, small groups, or global networks of terrorists can bring the world economy to a standstill.
The Limits of Military Action in This Case
So far, the seductiveness of the war metaphor has obscured fundamental questions regarding the precise strategic objectives, targets, and tactics in the overall battle. Those questions must be asked and answered if the international coalition is to hold together for a fight that is truly effective for the long-term, and not a short-term reprisal that, though perhaps cathartic, turns out to be divisive in the U.S. and abroad, fleeting, ineffective, or even counterproductive.
Objectives: A generous reading of the strategic objectives advanced so far would see not revenge, but three primary objectives, both laudable and ambitious, of legitimate self-defense and deterrence: first, stopping the specific elements of the terrorist network involved in this incident, which the evidence is apparently indicating is linked to Osama bin Laden; second, preventing future attacks by building (one hopes) a stronger, long-term, pro-active domestic and international framework to defend against and prevent future threats not just from this terrorist group, but also similar groups around the world; and finally, a new "zero tolerance" policy toward states sponsoring terrorism (some of whom we've previously tolerated for other foreign policy reasons).
Targets: Whether, beyond metaphor and public relations, "war" is really the best means of achieving these objectives may be seriously questioned. Considering the range of possible specific targets begins to further indicate the limits of the war metaphor. The most direct perpetrators cannot be targeted since they are already dead. In terms of less direct participants, there have been some arrests in the U.S., but suspicion has focused mainly on Osama bin Laden as the terrorist mastermind, and the Taliban as the first candidate for action under the new doctrine against harboring states. Plans seem underway to attack Afghanistan in an attempt to capture or "take out" bin Laden and, unless the Taliban surprises us all by turning him over, either directly or indirectly (e.g. by supporting the insurgents in the civil war) replacing the Taliban. The evidence against bin Laden in prior terrorist incidents was sufficient to result in a U.S. indictment for the prior embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, but the evidence against him in the current case has not yet been made public. Though he has repeatedly denied involvement in this incident through personal intermediaries as well as the Taliban, this is discounted since it is his usual modus operandi and would be an expected means of trying to avoid reprisal. Regarding the Taliban, there is yet no public evidence they (or any other state) provided any significant, positive assistance to the terrorists in connection with this attack.
It is currently unclear whether the U.S. intends to subject states to attack for past actions in support of terrorists, or whether these "harboring states" will themselves have a "safe harbor" if they stop supporting terrorists from this point forward. Some are speculating that the younger Bush administration may be using this situation to finally go after the prior Bush administration's nemesis, Saddam Hussein's Iraq. But again, though Iraq may have been involved in other incidents, no evidence has yet revealed a connection to this latest attack. There certainly doesn't seem to be the political will at present within the current coalition to re-open the Gulf War and declare war on Iraq. There is still less desire to open up a broad scale war against all the other states on the State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism (including Cuba, Syria, North Korea, Sudan, Libya, and Iran). In fact, an opportunity exists to work with Iran, which has supported the anti-Taliban insurgency.
The states are included as targets because state sponsorship remains a serious aspect of the problem, though an aspect that's been declining in importance over the last decade. A less appealing reason that states are referenced as targets is that they are easier to identify and hit than the more elusive individual terrorists and groups. Targeting the states, in other words, may again be aimed at achieving easy, symbolic public relations benefits and assuaging U.S. desires for revenge. But actions against the states may miss the real enemies, have adverse public relations and practical consequences on the emerging alliance, provoke escalated terrorist responses, and in short undermine the primary objective of combating terrorism.
The core targets here -- bin Laden and his lieutenants, the leaders of the second order affiliated groups, and the remaining individual and group terrorists in the network -- are not static or easily identifiable. They constitute a dynamic network of individuals, small groups, and non-state actors (supportive businesses and international financial networks) for whom bin Laden may, realistically, be more a symbol or facilitator than a "command and control" leader. The groups are fluid and active across states, moving (like international capital or multinational businesses) to the most hospitable temporary location. Suppress one and others pop up elsewhere. They are thus very unlike the typical state adversaries in military conflicts.
Tactics: At the level of tactics or methods, the limits and inherent perils of the war metaphor become even clearer. The "Powell Doctrine" regarding military action was aimed at avoiding another Vietnam by requiring, among other things, clear objectives, massive force (of which the half million troops in the Gulf War is the paradigm), and criteria by which you know when the war is won and how you will exit. Those criteria are of dubious applicability to the current situation in Afghanistan, and even less relevant to the global "war" on terrorism in general. There are aspects to this new foe of what experts have called an "asymmetrical threat," involving asymmetries not only of size and types of forces, but of unrestrained methods used by the terrorists. But here the asymmetries are even greater than previously contemplated, given such aspects as the multinational nature of this foe and its willingness to strive for ruthless impact on a truly unprecedented scale.
Attempting to respond with traditional methods such as bombing, cruise missiles, and significant numbers of ground troops just doesn't seem likely to be relevant for any of the objectives announced (unless the third objective of ending state support for terrorism actually involves military action against one or more significant states, which one hopes is a remote World War III scenario). In addition, the terrorists are unlikely, particularly given the loud warnings the U.S. has issued, to remain clustered in camps or large groups against which large-scale ground troops would have the best chance of being effective. Air strikes and relatively larger numbers of troops would be helpful if the U.S. undertakes to replace the Taliban, and would presumably be needed were the U.S. to occupy the country (an unattractive goal given the difficulties the Soviets had with the project, and the unintended consequences the U.S. itself has had when trying to replace governments, e.g. in Iran). Even if the objective is to replace the Taliban, the U.S. is more likely to do so by aiding the insurgents with ramped down air strikes and a less significant commitment of ground forces. Massive responses, again, like bombing the capital, Kabul, would clearly be overbroad and injudicious, and would thus provoke further polarization, add recruits to the terrorist cause, and alienate public opinion and the international allies needed in the fight.
Elite, special force, Delta-type commando teams would thus seem to offer one of the best alternatives for effective military action. This is true both in connection with the initial effort, e.g. against bin Laden in Afghanistan (if he's still there), and as a key tool once intelligence has provided confirmation of actual terrorist activity in other parts of the world. Even such small teams, however, have enormous tactical challenges in an inhospitable place like Afghanistan, as shown by our experience in Vietnam, and the British and Soviet experiences in Afghanistan, not to mention the more recent difficulties of the U.S. finding the Somali warlord Aidid. Mistakes in targeting (like the Clinton administration's attack on the pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan in 1998, which subsequently was determined to have had no link with terrorism after all) would set back the effort.
The Primary Limit to the Military Metaphor: Civilian Lives
An even more important limit to the war metaphor particularly relevant in this context is the indiscriminate nature of war, as contrasted with the small, distributed, embedded, global nature of this new enemy. International law accepts the blunt instrument of just war between states as a last resort when undertaken for national self-defense or collective security. In this case the U.S. is acting in self-defense, and has a good case for seeking U.N. Security Council approval for its planned use of force (though it will probably decide to rely only on the generic resolution against terrorism adopted the day after the attacks). States are the primary subjects of public international law, but as yet no state has been identified that truly played an active role here. Certainly no democratically elected state with the support and voice of its people. In fact, all governments of the world except Iraq, even Afghanistan's Taliban, at least formally condemned this attack, and their people have overwhelmingly been appalled and expressed sympathy. Pressure on states is necessary, but in light of the new power dynamics emerging, excessive focus on states may be a distraction from the essential sources of the terror and have a negative effect in the battle for international opinion -- a crucial part of this effort.
For the U.S. to take military actions that would risk significant "collateral damage" -- the euphemism for civilian deaths -- would not only be illegal and immoral, but would, again, only produce a serious backlash against the U.S., fracture any coalition established, create more terrorists and martyrs, and diminish rather than enhance overall security. This would be the case if U.S. actions killed innocent civilians from the wretched poor of already miserable Afghanistan. There is no evidence thus far that any Afghans were involved in the latest incidents attributed to bin Laden. There is a difference between remote risks of some collateral damage, and the predictable or intentional murder of civilians. The latter is clearly illegal (e.g. under the Geneva Conventions) and wrong. Such actions resemble those of the terrorists, and would play directly into the hands of the terrorists by tainting the military forces with the same brush. The U.S. administration's warnings of casualties were probably understood to refer to military casualties, but increased civilian deaths could also result from escalated reprisals in the wake of an overbroad attack. Unlike the hijackers, who were too blinded by the clouds of heavenly glory they expected to envelop them to have the empathy to imagine the pain their victims experienced, those battling terrorism must be hypersensitive to avoiding harm to civilians in any military action.
Many would say this is naïve, that war is hell and necessarily risks innocent lives. Listen to William Safire in The New York Times: "Lashing out on the basis of inadequate information is wrong, but in terror-wartime, waiting for absolute proof is dangerous." Or former U.S. secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who said on CNN that a war, ''does not necessarily mean that you have to strike back only at those that you know were the perpetrators of this thing.'' One hears increasing calls for application of a lower standard for military reprisal than exists vis-à-vis a judicial trial. These are now common views, and somewhat understandable in reaction to terror of this magnitude. But when the lives of civilians are involved, morality demands caution and a high degree of proof. Look more closely at this for a moment: is there not at least a tolerance for, if not a counseling of, terror in response to terror? Are policy makers really being so brave when they take the innocent lives of others? Or is the rhetoric of war, in leading us to contemplate the massive use of force for the first time to respond to a non-state enemy, leading us to overlook potentially greater human costs both abroad and at home? Israelis have for a long time known the insecurities that have resulted from lower standards and harsher methods.
The new doctrine against "states that harbor terrorists" is understandable and advisable in these times, but is only likely to increase security if it is carefully and narrowly interpreted and implemented (construed, for example, to require significant active support). Many states "harbor terrorists," not only including states like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Sudan, but also announced or unannounced nuclear powers like Pakistan and India. This is not to mention the terrorists (including those affiliated with bin Laden) active in the U.S. or in allies like the U.K., or Germany. The new doctrine would presumably not open up a state to attack from the world based on the mere presence of terrorists in the state. Attacking some of these states, or several of them at once, would truly risk World War III and perhaps biological or chemical attacks (since according to the CIA a number of the "rogue" nations have chemical and biological weapons), or even a global nuclear conflagration. Anything other than a narrow interpretation of this new doctrine would thus be counterproductive. It would also be eerily reminiscent of the statement of bin Laden himself in 1998, warning that he does "not differentiate between the military and civilians."
Similarly, acting in the haste of this crisis to repeal the U.S. Executive Order banning assassinations would be a counterproductive mistake that would diminish the national character and lower the nation to the level of the terrorists. The U.S. has an even greater interest in the international laws against such acts than do other states. The difficulties with a policy of extra-judicial killings include the serious risk of mistakenly killing the wrong person, as well as innocent civilians. Israelis and friends of Israel reiterate the theme that perhaps now there will be greater understanding of the Israeli plight, and resulting methods like the use of assassination. The palpable increase in heavy-handed methods in Israel, especially over the past year, was triggered by perceived duress -- the latest intifada. But has the increased use of oppressive tactics by Israel (including the 50 extra-judicial killings that have snuffed out a number of innocent lives including women and children) really enhanced security? Or has it, instead, created new rounds of martyrs, less and less public and diplomatic support even from previous friends of Israel, and a hardening of the resolve of its enemies?
There is already flexibility in the established interpretation of this order to allow for the death of a target in an otherwise self-defensive military action, as contemplated here, without sanctioning affirmative assassinations. Courts of law and due process are criticized as slow, cumbersome, and ineffective tools in the fight against terrorism. But relying on extra-legal methods jeopardizes the legitimacy and values that are key sources of power in the fight. Rather than undermining the rule of law by making greater use of assassinations, nations should support the rule of law by capturing and prosecuting the terrorists in courts of law. Those fighting terrorism must not adopt terrorist tactics. The importance of domestic and international public opinion in this fight underlines the need to continue to take the high road.
Beyond the Military Metaphor
The most critical element in achieving the broader objectives of fighting terrorism, although less dramatic than "war", will be more effective, global, networked intelligence and law enforcement, to fight this effective, global, networked enemy. Despite the failure of the intelligence community to prevent this particular tragedy, it has had a number of other successes (e.g. the Millennium strike averted in December '99), and remains our best hope for taking effective action to achieve the broader goals of incapacitating terrorist networks. The U.S. and the nations of the world need to generate better intelligence regarding the key nodes, power relationships, and vulnerabilities within terrorist networks, as a prerequisite to developing and implementing strategies for penetrating and weakening them from the inside (analogous to computer viruses), or severing nodes and connections from the outside. Such intelligence (e.g. from Pakistan) will be crucial both in the initial military strikes contemplated, as well as in the longer-term campaign against terrorism.
The current restrictions on "human intelligence" (covert penetration of terrorist groups) will probably be lifted. But there should be no illusions that this will be a panacea for the deficiencies of the intelligence system. Many in the CIA say that they are able to recruit those they need under current rules. And former CIA counter-terrorists have spoken persuasively of the extreme difficulties, and even the folly, of hoping to actually penetrate such long-standing, close, quasi-familial (blood-oath) or even actual familial terrorist groups (several of hijackers in this case, for example, were reportedly related). This has to be especially true now that the target groups will be more on guard than ever.
The additional tens of billions of dollars given by the U.S. Congress to the administration, including some funds dedicated to enhanced intelligence and law enforcement, will help. But merely throwing more money at the problem isn't the answer. There is an urgent need for greater understanding of the weak links and gaps within the current intelligence network that contributed to the failure to anticipate and prevent the attack. Only then will the U.S. and other nations be in a position to fix the major structural difficulties in the present system (e.g. lack of coordination and turf battles between domestic agencies, lack of coordination and adequate information sharing between domestic and global intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and lack of the latest integrated technology for rapid sharing of information).
Longer-term success against terrorist networks will require attacking the "power supply" (e.g. the shared beliefs and values), the infrastructure (e.g. the underlying resentments) and redundancies (e.g. the many backup nodes to bin Laden). The work most valuable in this longer campaign will probably consist more in quotidian investigative grunt work and crime fighting, rather than more striking military action.
It will also be important to strengthen domestic security infrastructures. Whether done under civilian auspices or under newly authorized domestic intelligence and/or military officials, such efforts must involve local law enforcement, city planners, architects, state, local, and other officials. The new initiatives must not encroach on fundamental liberties. Much of U.S. power derives from its singular diversity, its history of openness (including to immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers), and commitment to values such as tolerance, the rule of law (versus force), pluralism, democracy, and human rights at home and abroad. Closing borders and cracking down on immigrants or refugees, for example, would be an inappropriate overreaction. To echo the observations of many in the days following the attack, to diminish liberties in response to the terrorism would already be a victory for the terrorists.
No Agenda Except Irrational Hate?
Many, including members of the media and some so-called experts on terrorism, have asserted that terrorists like those in this case have no agenda, or only a negative, evil agenda of irrational hate. For example, writing in the Fall '98 issue of Foreign Policy, Ehud Sprinzak wrote that super-terrorism of this sort could only be undertaken by a "rare, extremist mindset completely devoid of political and moral considerations." Not true. It is essential to begin to try to understand the logic of these terrorists, before we can hope to defeat them.
Bin Laden and his associates may no longer be the "freedom fighters" that the U.S. termed them when training them to fight in Afghanistan. But until this latest incident they were considered heroes to a large and growing number of people. According to Yossef Bodansky, a student and biographer of bin Laden, he is currently one of the most popular personalities in the Muslim world, with more children being named "Osama" than any other name except that of the prophet Mohammed. One hopes and expects that the extremity of this gruesome act and the huge number of innocent civilians killed will forever discredit such terrorists in the eyes of most people (in addition to the massive loss of innocent life, the World Trade Center was of course not even a military or quasi-military target, as could be said of the Khobar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia, or the destroyer Cole). But the terrorists themselves, like most evildoers, view their acts as moral and good. They go even further and believe that they act out of religious duty in a jihad, or holy war. Their extreme commitment and audacity injects new and frightening elements into global terrorism: greater obliviousness to the public relations impact of their actions, and to the numbers of people killed.
Bin Laden explicitly rationalizes his fatwas (rulings) calling for a holy war against the U.S. in terms of self-defense. He believes the U.S. has been attacking Islam for years. His grievances (which are shared by many Muslims including those outside the Middle East, in Asia and Africa) include, perhaps first and foremost, the U.S. "occupation" of the Holy Land of Saudi Arabia and the alliance with those he perceives as corrupt and unrepresentative Saudi rulers ever since the Gulf War. Another issue, which has almost "litmus test" symbolic potency throughout the Arab world, is his solidarity with the Palestinians against the occupation of Jerusalem and Palestinian land and repressive actions by Israel. The U.S. alliance with and support of Israel enrages him, as does the U.S. bombing of Iraq and the harm to the Iraqi people from the sanctions against that regime. He also objects to the "theft" of Arab oil. While our policies in the Middle East have been at times sound and at times unsound, to deny the link between them and this attack, as some have done, is a fatuous and willing donning of blinders.
Beyond the Middle East and Muslims, however, bin Laden's appeal finds global resonance among poor people generally in characterizing the U.S. (and what are viewed as U.S. "client" institutions such as the IMF) as promulgating through globalization an immoral, materialistic, consumer culture that threatens traditional ways of life, and even the economic ability of individuals to survive. His participation in the successful fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan only further emboldened him and reinforced his beliefs that God is on his side.
His agenda, then, is for his own brand of intolerant, fundamentalist religion, and a dream of re-establishing a Great Islamic nation on the basis of that religion. He represents an even more extreme and militaristic version of the Taliban's repressive self-righteousness. His version paints all Americans with a broad brush and labels them Christian Crusaders in alliance with the Jews (conveniently overlooking the many Muslims and Arabs killed in the World Trade Center). His agenda, when merged with the secondary constituency of all those who perceive a new colonialism practiced by the U.S. and the developed world at the expense of the developing world, results in a formidable anti-U.S., anti-Western, anti-"North" grouping.
The attack was a thus a clarion call not only to extreme fundamentalist Muslims and the poor, but also to the many other states, groups, and individuals who object to U.S. or developed world power and want to balance or reduce it. Whether or not this call was broadly successful (and if the initial global public reaction is any indication, it appears to have been a gross miscalculation), the attack was intended to and did demonstrate the vulnerability of the U.S., the lone superpower and primary representative of the developed world. It was no coincidence that the main symbols of U.S. power, financial and military, were targeted. The attack was also intended to and did dramatically increase fear and uncertainty at a time when the global system can ill afford it.
As an advocate of extreme intolerance, bin Laden undoubtedly welcomes the possibility that governmental or private responses would diminish the domestic liberties that he finds so objectionable (including women's rights, religious freedom, freedom in dress and private sexual relations, and freedom to dissent from extreme views such as his). Yet the comments of Republican U.S. Senator Trent Lott quoted in The New York Times were sadly representative: "When you are at war, civil liberties are treated differently. We cannot let what happened yesterday happen in the future."
And bin Laden would welcome and perhaps intend to stimulate the harsh domestic and international reprisals against Arabs and Muslims that would create further conflict, polarization, and cycles of violence undermining stability. Unfortunately, such reprisals in the form of hate crimes are already occurring across the country. As noted above, calls for injudicious reprisals against entire populations abroad are also on the rise. Despite the natural desire to unleash righteous rage and massive power in reprisal for the attacks, the U.S. and its allies must strongly resist being manipulated into such actions.
Clash of Civilizations?
Does bin Laden's radical Islamic agenda against the West mean that Huntington's warning of a coming "clash of civilizations" was prescient after all? To hear President Bush's unfortunate choice of language about a "crusade" (with all the adverse historical and religious connotations that raises for Islam) one might think so. Short-term political "reasons of state" (to balance or attack stronger powers) and the need to appeal to domestic constituencies often feeds rhetoric which suggests such a clash. There are genuine and deep disputes regarding how globalization should proceed in order to be more inclusive and democratic. And as mentioned above, at least until this horrendous attack there was significant sympathy for bin Laden among many in the Muslim world.
Yet on closer analysis, on the most important issues the idea of a clash dissolves. It is inaccurate, divisive, and the exact opposite of the unifying imperative needed in this crisis. The vast majority of Muslims were appalled by the attack. Despite the growth of anti-Americanism over the past few years in response to the increased awareness of global consumerism and growing economic inequalities, the legacy from the last fifty years of unprecedented communication and travel is much larger consensus on the rule of law and on norms of international human rights in general, and on core principles like the right of innocent civilians to live in particular. Cultural differences certainly persist. But one need not revisit the debate on universalism versus cultural relativism to note that on such basic issues, Islam (like all the other major religions and ethical systems) views the murder of innocents as unequivocally wrong. Elementary evils like slavery, torture, murder, and terrorism are thus condemned everywhere, and not because of any "Western dominance." The outpouring of condolences and condemnation from states and people all over the world confirmed what has been learned of the basic commonality of human nature and human aspirations. The real clash is thus not between Islam and the West. It is between those who value life (and policies that promote and sustain life), and those -- like the terrorists in this case -- who would deny it.
Cross-border terrorism of this sort is an international problem that -- like the problems of drugs, disease, and the environment -- requires coordinated international information sharing and action. States from any region (including Europe, Russia, Latin America), faith (including Muslim countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, or those in Africa), and economic status (like China or India) are vulnerable to such out-of-bounds, surreptitious, invidious attack. The universal messages of support from other states, resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, and NATO/Russia, speak to that reality. Yet real coordination on terrorism has unfortunately thus far evaded the U.S. and the world. An urgent message from the attack is thus to reinvigorate authentic diplomacy, internationalism, and meaningful common action against these common problems.
To preserve the current coalition and its prospects for unifying the world to fight both terrorism and other pressing problems of global concern, and avoid inadvertently creating a clash of civilizations with the potential to destroy civilization, the U.S. must bear several principles in mind. First, this must not be a battle of the West versus Islam, but of the world against these extreme terrorists who have perverted the meaning of Islam. Diplomacy and public statements must at all times emphasize the truly common battle against terrorism, avoiding rhetoric ("Crusades," or even terms with historical baggage from colonialism like "Civilization") that in any way mistakenly suggests this is only about protecting the West, or that bin Laden is correct in characterizing this as a war between Islam and the West. Winston Churchill could in his "finest hour" speech speak of protecting "Christian civilization" from Hitler. Today, that would be inaccurate, inappropriate, and self-defeating, given the Islamic cloak in which these extremists have wrapped themselves, and the new demographic and religious diversity in the West since Churchill's speech. As the U.S. seems to recognize, meaningful participation of Muslim countries in the coalition is crucial to long-term success. Those Muslims who previously identified with bin Laden are particularly important potential allies, and deserve special attention to make the most of the new, unifying space that has opened up after this attack and rejuvenate ties binding us together in the face of these new threats.
Second, the style of diplomacy should be one of genuine (and not merely formal) multilateral consultation, versus the -- often arrogant -- imposition of the U.S. position that has stimulated such resentment even among allies. This will be required to get broad-based and authentic buy-in for the activities undertaken. Just as a military over-reaction would seriously backfire, so would giving in to the persistent unilateralist instincts lurking beneath some of the new multilateralist comments of the U.S. administration (such as the need to work together, but not in a way that would "constrain" U.S. action). To that end, it is encouraging that Secretary Powell and others have clarified that this campaign will involve not just military options, but also diplomatic, legal, financial, and other means. If there is to be a military action in Afghanistan, which one hopes is limited as suggested above, Russia (with bases near the Northern border in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), and Pakistan (to the South) will be important allies. Beyond the immediate military plans, however, it will be important to restore dialogue on such topics as the compliance protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as other topics that are important to the world and not just the U.S. The U.S. in its diplomacy must -- for the first time in years -- take off the superpower earmuffs and truly listen to the concerns of those who are increasingly alienated from a global system they find they can't participate in or even understand. The U.S. government, media, and public can no longer adhere to a splendid isolationism that neglects the critical links between foreign policy (including human rights and economic situations) abroad and domestic security at home.
Third, the U.S. and the developed world as a whole must then take seriously and build public support for the need to construct policies that attack terrorism at its roots by ameliorating the poverty that breeds such resentment and frustration. Only such listening, learning, and reaching out will help the U.S. and the international community seize the moment, stop and reverse the delusion of a prior polarization toward an artificial "clash of civilizations," and achieve a more inclusive order that responds to the most pressing needs of the people involved.
Finally, in managing the coalition, the U.S. will have to navigate the twin shoals of possible ineffective, watered down, lowest-common-denominator action, on the one hand, and the over-zealous misuse of the anti-terrorist coalition by some states for repression of domestic dissent, on the other.
The decisions taken in the next days, weeks, and months will dramatically impact the future role of the U.S. as well as prospects for international security and stability in general. The war metaphor has its uses, but just as clearly has its limits. True leadership resulting in effective coordinated action will best be able to mitigate the conditions that give rise to such terrorism and from the ashes of the destruction rebuild a more unified, peaceful, and secure world.
