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A year or so ago, John Judis wrote a piece about the two foreign policy McCain's: One the unreconstructed neoconservative of the post-Iraq era, and the other the cautious and humble realist of the late-80s and early-90s. The neoconservative was in control now, Judis concluded, but there was no reason to believe that that situation would hold for very long.This week, Judis gives up the ghost:
based on McCain's actions over the last two years and conversations I've had with those close to him, I have concluded that this is wishful thinking. McCain continues to rely on the same neoconservative advisers; he still thinks U.S. foreign policy should focus on transforming rogue states and autocracies into democracies that live under the shadow of American power; and he no longer tells credulous reporters that he consults Scowcroft.That is not to say McCain's views are static. He has, for example, rethought the tactics of the Iraq war. But he continues to believe that Baghdad can become "a strong stable democratic ally" and "a strong ally against an aggressive and radical Iran" (this despite Iraq's pro-Iranian Shia majority). McCain may no longer believe that the United States can single-handedly overthrow undemocratic governments, but he now wants to change enemy regimes via a "League of Democracies" that would pointedly exclude states like Russia. Indeed, McCain, known in the Senate for his quickness to anger, has displayed a growing tendency to personalize foreign policy, seemingly basing his approach to Moscow on his hostility toward Vladimir Putin. If John McCain's foreign policy is changing, it is only becoming more combustible, not less.The rest of the piece details how McCain's uncommon hatred for Putin has led him to adopt a recklessly aggressive stance towards Russia, and the implications that could have for American foreign policy. It's scary stuff, and an important point. Folks talk a lot about how McCain doesn't know much about domestic policy, but the broader point is that the guy isn't much of a policy thinker at all. Just as he doesn't have a constant domestic policy, he's not had a constant foreign policy, either. He really likes some folks, like Petraeus, hates others, like Rumsfeld, and basically navigates the world through a couple thematic understandings of human behavior (the importance of courage, self-sacrifice, service, etc) and his personal opinions on powerful actors. That's not a particularly comforting or reliable foreign policy approach.
