NEW WAR, JUST LIKE THE OLD WAR (BUT WITH LESS TROOPS). This post of David Frum's asking whether Rumsfeld was actually wrong about some of his ideas reminds of a point I've been meaning to make: Rumsfeld's initial attempts to reform the defense procurement process and create a lighter, faster, more adaptable force were right. Many of the ideas, in fact, had been around since Gary Hart's bipartisan Military Reform Caucus, and some were directly adapted from those reports. Unfortunately, those ideas relied on a new conception of American power: One that eschewed occupation. A smaller, lighter fighting force could intervene quickly and nimbly -- but it couldn't occupy a country. And, if you go back to the Bush administration's rhetoric before we invaded Iraq, it's clear they didn't think it'd have to occupy the country. Instead, the military would swoop in, decapitate Hussein, unshackle a grateful populace, and wander out after the newly liberalized democracy threw them a fine parade. That, obviously, didn't happen. And so whether Rumsfeld was right about procurement issues and weapon systems is less important than whether he accurately understood the conflict he was involving his troops in. He tried to deploy his new military under an old strategy -- one that was built for an overwhelming number of troops operating under a long deployments. It's clear now that Rumsfeld's transformation wasn't a hardnosed look at new realities, but a fantastical perspective that exaggerated American power and ignored the realities of warfare and occupation. That failure far outweighs any fresh thinking he brought to the procurement process.
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Ezra Klein
