The Kagan and O'Hanlon silliness aside, the United States obviously has to do something to ensure that Pakistani nuclear weapons (and nuclear material) is secured in the event that the situation in Pakistan goes way far south. To that extent, thinking about lending some U.S. personnel to Pakistan for the specific task of maintaining the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal makes sense. It makes even more sense to think about lending advice and material assistance to Pakistan (which is pretty much what this article is about). It's also understandable why the Pakistanis may have withheld full cooperation with the United States. It simply makes no sense to place your entire nuclear arsenal at the disposal of a foreign power. The other problem of security involves deterrence. Deterrence theory tells us that the safest nuclear arsenal is one that is divided up between a number of different secure locations, such that no surprise attack can destroy the entire arsenal on the ground. Unfortunately, when the threat isn't nuclear attack so much as nuclear theft, the prescription is the exact opposite; having the arsenal divided across many locations is a recipe for disaster. As I understand it, the Pakistani arsenal leans towards the latter (secured in few places) rather than towards the former, which is a good thing. As for the Kagan/O'Hanlon nonsense, the idea of an occupation of a country of 160 million people is obviously silly, and their apparently intentional obtuseness regarding the political impact of a large American ground force in Pakistan is staggering. Such an operation would be neither wise nor possible even in the absence of Iraq, but it's worth noting that Iraq has foreclosed the option of pretty much any major ground initiative for the foreseeable (30 year, maybe) future. This maybe should have been a consideration back when O'Hanlon and Kagan thought this war would be a good idea, and when they decided that escalating it would be an even better one. --Robert Farley
