When thinking about the surge in Iraq, it's important to recall that the troop increase was but one of several factors that helped turn around the security situation in that country. Many of those factors are not present in Afghanistan -- certainly nothing like the Sons of Iraq program, where Sunni militias joined forces with the U.S. to battle foreign insurgents. At least, until recently: Dexter Filkins reports that an entire Afghan tribe of the same ethnic background as the Taliban, the Shinawari, have agreed to oppose the extremist movement in exchange for U.S. assistance that bypasses the central Afghan government.
The article is appropriately skeptical of whether this single tribe's decision can be replicated, but this case does demonstrate that the Taliban is as good at alienating Afghans as, well, we are -- attacks on development efforts in the tribe's territory are what turned the Shinawari against the Taliban. Exploiting the Taliban's offending behaviors is key to fighting the insurgency, and if these tribal elders really can help turn 400,000 Afghans to the U.S. side, that's a pretty big victory. At the same time, their promise to burn down the house of anyone harboring a Taliban insurgent doesn't exactly seem like proper counterinsurgency to me.
The main question is one of sustainability: One challenge faced by the SOI program was transitioning control and funding of the groups back to the central government. That would be even harder in Afghanistan because of the suspicion with which the Shinawari view the weak government in Kabul. If the U.S. goal is to build the government's capacity in order for it to prevent al-Qaeda from re-establishing its foothold in Afghanistan, setting up an independent power center specifically outside of the government may not be the best way to go. But in the short-term, this could pay serious dividends.
-- Tim Fernholz
