With all of the comparisons between the Afghanistan Surge and Surge Classic: Iraq, it seems time to remember some basic facts about the Iraq case, and what it was designed to do. The idea was to provide security in order to create an opening for political reconciliation among the country's various stakeholders. That political reconciliation has only begun to come recently, long after the surge was over and, one might argue, had a good deal to do with the American insistence on a withdrawal date. There is also the question of other factors that contributed to the lessening of violence in Iraq. Last summer, the Prospect asked 10 experts to analyze the surge, and not one said that the increase in troops was the single or even central factor in Iraq's improving situation -- factors ranging from the Al Anbar Awakening, Iraq's ethnic cleansing, and Moqtadr al-Sadr's decision to stand-down his militia all played an important role. Today also brings us Brian Katulis's report of a discussion with former Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Al-Rubaie, disputing the narrative about the surge, and even this New York Times analysis, though superficial and missing some key elements, explains some of the problems in those comparisons. If anything, the takeaway is that without a number of supporting dynamics, any troop surge is something of a gamble. The more you know about the surge in Iraq, the more concerned you should be about the surge in Afghanistan. It's just not clear that any of the other dynamics in Iraq are present in Afghanistan, and even the most successful techniques of urban counterinsurgency in Iraq, like using concrete barriers to control traffic flow, probably won't work in rural Afghanistan. That doesn't mean that sending 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan won't significantly change the dynamics of that conflict, especially with the broader focus on training Afghan troops rather than doing counterinsurgency ourselves, but it does mean that comparing this decision to the surge in Iraq probably isn't the smartest approach. Which is why it worries me when the Obama administration does just that...-- Tim Fernholz
