What better way to celebrate the return of the war on terrorism after the brief interlude of the "global struggle against violent extremism" than by gazing once again at America's all-too-literal war in Iraq.
Polling released this weekend on the Newsweek Web site shows that 61 percent of the population is unhappy with our current strategy in Iraq, and that half the country either thinks troops should be brought home right away (12 percent) or within a year (38 percent). Another 12 percent say they're willing to give the venture another two years, but no more.
The people are, simply put, correct. The alternative strategy, reiterated by Bill Kristol in the current Weekly Standard, that we should "stay the course in Iraq, do what it takes, and win" ignores the basic reality that our country lacks the capacity to sustain an indefinite large-scale deployment in Iraq. The U.S. Army -- already relying on "stop-loss" orders, Individual Ready Reserve call-ups, and lowered recruiting standards to fill out its personnel roster -- stands no realistic chance of meeting its recruiting needs this year. Official word from the Pentagon puts the blame for this on an improving economic situation.
No doubt, this does play a role. Nevertheless, there can be no question that the war in Iraq is the main cause. The Navy and the Air Force, after all, need to recruit in the same labor market as does the Army, but these services, relatively unburdened by Iraq, are still finding the people they need. What's more, the economy, while certainly better than it was one or two years ago, is not generating an especially tight labor situation by historical standards. A military that can't sustain itself through a period of mediocre economic performance is the very definition of a military that can't sustain itself, and that's what we've got.
While conservatives bask in denial about this reality, hawkish Democrats have begun to unite themselves behind a proposal to expand the Army's authorized force level by 100,000. The thought here is a not-unreasonable one, but fails to get at the underlying issue. The Army can't find enough people to meet its current targets, so simply raising the targets will achieve nothing absent a broader change in approach.
Given the realities of the situation, the question is not whether to leave Iraq but when and under what circumstances. By the Standard standard that we should not leave Iraq until we are done "defeating the terrorists," we are simply bound to lose. We do not face some finite number of insurgents in Iraq who can be killed one by one until the war is over. Rather, the continuing American military presence in Iraq inspires, over time, new members of that country's Sunni Arab community -- and the broader Sunni community around the world -- to take up arms against us. Rather than, as the hawkish cliché has it, "taking the fight to the enemy," we have essentially chosen to fight the enemy on some of the least-favorable terrain imaginable. It's a place where the apocalyptic forces of global jihad find allies driven by a more banal nationalism; a place where America stands alone, without the support of our allies in the democratic world; and, most of all, a place where our actions take place under a dense cloud of suspicion driven by the war's dubious origins. If we stay the course "as long as it takes," we will simply find ourselves, some years down the road, forced to withdraw in a humiliating and destructive manner.
Far better to take advantage of the forthcoming promulgation of a new constitution for Iraq and then schedule a withdrawal on our own terms. Such a withdrawal would be pegged not to an "arbitrary timetable" but to the perfectly objective one governing Iraq's political process.
This would not only provide us peace with honor but also with the best chance for securing a decent outcome in Iraq. Setting an end date would allay Iraqi fears of an indefinite occupation and allow us to secure more cooperation in the short term, give moderate Sunnis the opportunity they need to join the political process and separate themselves from the jihadists, and focus the minds of Iraq's political elites on the urgent need to resolve the issues underlying sectarian tensions. Defeating every last insurgent in Iraq is not a realistic goal. But fortunately for us, neither is the insurgency's goal of renewed Sunni hegemony a realistic one. A clear plan to bring the troops home would allow us to begin focusing on the kind of support for the new regime -- political, diplomatic, financial, logistical, and intelligence -- that can be provided over the long term, and that would allow a wise Iraqi government to eventually stabilize the entire country. Meanwhile, we can work on rebuilding our armed forces and reconfiguring them for the 21st-century security landscape.
The alternative would feel better in the short term for those of us who don't actually need to do the work, but would produce only further indecisive fighting and an eventual breakdown in our position. Leading figures have been reluctant to speak these hard truths for fear of the political consequences, but polls show the American people are prepared to accept reality.
Matthew Yglesias is a Prospect staff writer.
