MORE WAZIRISTAN, FOR SOME REASON. To make my own belated contribution to the July 2007 TAPPED Waziristan Seminar, I think that my position would fall closest to Sam's. There's nothing particularly wrong with the idea of bribing certain tribes along the Pakistani-Afghan border to try to track down and destroy elements of Al Qaeda, allowing, as Matt notes, that it's easier to bribe someone with money than with a windmill. While Garance's point regarding the fact that we'd only be bribing already friendly elements should be taken seriously, carefully calibrated bribes can serve to either a) make someone more friendly, b) push the friendly to action, or c) render an unfriendly neutral. Moreover, while Al Qaeda has had great success in this area, we have to remember that it remains an alien force; like in Afghanistan before 9/11, and in Iraq today, there are obvious and exploitable tensions between Al Qaeda and whatever local protectors and allies it may have. For example, the occupation of the area by Al Qaeda has been accompanied by a wave of assassinations of tribal elites. Of course, Sam makes a good point by noting that the Afghan Model isn't just about bribing local "allies"; it also involves airpower, special forces, and a lot of coordinative effort on the part of the United States. Given that this war would be happening within the borders of a "friendly" country, some of those elements simply aren't available. On the other hand, the main effort here would be to tip the balance in a series of tribal conflicts that have raged since... well, whenever. The British never subdued this area (indeed, even during World War II, briefings on progress on the India Theater would begin with a report on the Northwestern tribal problem), and Pakistan hasn't even tried. No one intends to try to occupy this area, even briefly. The disasters that have befallen Bush administration military efforts have typically come in the occupation phase, following rather effective initial military campaigns. So, I don't think it's quite right to think of a program of assistance in the same terms as Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom, or even of the Ethiopian invasion and subsequent occupation of Somalia. See also Brian Ulrich. --Robert Farley
