As the national mood in India shifts from shock to rage, options on all sides are quickly becoming constrained. Unfortunately, the initial aftermath of the attack in Mumbai makes it likely that the goals of the terrorists -- destabilizing India and strengthening extremists in Pakistan -- will have some success. To what extent is still unclear, but the dirty secret of terrorism is that sometimes it works. Unless all parties in this conflict take careful steps to avoid drastic escalation, this may be one of those times.
While facts continue to trickle in, there is a growing consensus on the basics of the operation, in which at least 10 perpetrators killed nearly 200 civilians at several high-profile locations in Mumbai: The attack appears to have originated in Pakistan and was facilitated by some part of that nation's intelligence agency -- the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) -- and/or Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist group with ties to elements of Pakistan's military and intelligence communities. These elements are particularly active in Kashmir, a disputed territory over which India and Pakistan have fought several declared wars, and both groups have a history of militant action within and beyond official Pakistani government control. The most plausible scenario is that Pakistan helped to create groups that are now beyond the control of its civilian government and that continue to have support from sources within the Pakistani security apparatus.
In recent years, India has demonstrated significant restraint in response to Islamist attacks, but such moderation will be harder to practice this time. India's government lacks the political strength to ignore the attack, even if it wanted to -- if it failed to respond with force, it would almost certainly collapse, and a more hard-line nationalist government would take its place. Previous restraint has come from the recognition that Pakistan's government does not fully control the military or the ISI, but that distinction will no longer carry the day. This attack is qualitatively different than recent operations, more brazen, more personal, and, crucially, with a surviving attacker who has allegedly linked the planning and training directly to Pakistan. When the dust has settled, when the final costs are tallied, India will look to retaliate.
It is not clear exactly what India will do, but its response to the 2001 attack on its Parliament may be a model. Following that assault, India demanded Pakistan extradite suspected terrorists and quickly massed troops in Kashmir, running provocative military exercises. This created a serious crisis within Pakistan, which correspondingly raised its forces' alert status and refused to hand over the suspects. After months of stalemate, in May and June the situation escalated once again: Fighting in Kashmir killed dozens, India expelled Pakistan's ambassador, and an Indian unmanned aerial vehicle was shot down in Pakistan. Only intensive diplomacy from the U.K. and U.S., reacting to the threat of nuclear escalation, reduced the tensions, but even that was gradual -- a cease-fire was not signed until 2003.
This time, India will again demand that Pakistan take steps to assert control over the ISI and be transparent about that process, among other things. When Pakistan is neither willing nor able to accede to these demands, India may once again move troops to the border to intimidate Pakistan and mollify the Indian populace, and skirmishes in Kashmir are likely given the region's history as a flashpoint.
Pakistan will then have a problem on its hands. Its civilian government is extremely weak and lacks full control over the military, so the military itself has the ability to escalate the situation if it so chooses. In these initial days after the attacks, the Pakistani government is riding a wave of nationalist sentiment, and politically it has an incentive to exploit, rather than defuse, these feelings. Rather than letting the military solely benefit from this growing nationalism, the government seems willing to become more aggressive to court greater approval. Meanwhile, sectarian violence within India is likely to occur at some point, and, while Hindus massively outnumber Muslims in the country, it could be very bloody on both sides.
The U.S., of course, will become quickly and deeply involved. Secretary Condoleezza Rice has already been dispatched to India, and she will ask its government for restraint. India will respond, rightly, that there's no assurance that the attack was an isolated incident -- perhaps more are planned, and if no part of Pakistan's government, civilian or military, could or would stop this one, why should the next time be any different? Given recent reports that not all the terrorists involved in the Mumbai attack have been captured or killed and that more credible threats have been made since the attack, this is a legitimate concern. And while the U.S. will counsel moderation, there is precious little we can offer India that would prevent the government from falling in the wake of inaction.
As tensions escalate and its demands remain unmet, India will be in a tenuous position. It will be in a war posture, having made demands of Pakistan on which Pakistani leaders can't possibly deliver. It will likely face sectarian violence in its own territory or in Kashmir. And its citizens will continue to demand military action against Pakistan. The U.S. will have few cards to play, knowing full well that pushing too hard on either government could cause it to be replaced by more hard-line leadership. Meanwhile, Pakistan will be moving its troops from west to east, freeing militants on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border from any restrictions those troops imposed, hurting U.S. counterterrorism interests just as India and Pakistan reach an impasse, and as the U.S. government is in transition.
Not exactly an ideal scenario for global security. In 2001, the crucial event to break the stalemate was then-President Musharraf of Pakistan promising to end militant activity in India. That, however, was a credible promise, as Musharraf had control over the military; today, any such pledge will ring hollow.
The Mumbai terrorists have put India and Pakistan on a collision course that will be difficult to alter -- just as they must have hoped. The situation on each side of the India/Pakistan conflict is such that hard-liners will likely benefit in the wake of the attacks, and while cooler heads may prevail, it will take deft diplomacy and negotiations from all parties to cool the passions on both sides. Full war remains unlikely -- much less a nuclear war -- simply because the costs would be so obviously ruinous on both sides. But firefights are likely to break out, diplomats may be expelled or recalled, and hard-liners will gain power on both sides. The U.S. should take an immediate mediation role, along the lines of the intensive diplomacy of 2002. A comprehensive policy for the region, rather than the ad-hoc and counterproductive approach of recent years, is also vital over the long term. In the short term, however, simply avoiding catastrophe would be a win.
