AP Photo/Sebastian Scheiner, File
Benjamin Netanyahu speaks American. From the start of his public career, his accent has convinced many people that he also gets America. No one has acted more convinced of this than the Israeli prime minister himself.
If anyone still needs proof that this is a misconception, this week should provide it. Senator Barbara Mikulski's announcement Wednesday that she'll support the Iran deal provided the 34th votes that Barack Obama needs in the Senate-and marked the defeat of Netanyahu's ill-considered campaign in the American political arena against the agreement. Just because he has the accent doesn't mean he has the acumen.
While we wait to see if President Obama lines up enough senators to filibuster a resolution against the Iran deal, here are some lessons from this fight:
No stratagem: Forget the convoluted theories about how Netanyahu expected to lose but intends to game defeat for political advantage. He fought because he expected to stop the deal, which was a mistake, and because he thought that sinking the agreement would be good for Israel, which is a bigger mistake.
This isn't rational. Netanyahu's preference has been a military strike, but even his close circle of political partners balked at that, according to Ehud Barak, who spent several years as Netanyahu's defense minister. It's not rational to prefer an offensive that might slow the Iranian arms program for two or three years and reject an agreement because, in your view, it will "only" delay the program 10 or 15 years.
Nor is it rational to be the leader of Israel, a country known to possess a serious nuclear arsenal, yet compare yourself to the Jews who faced Nazi Germany. That self-description fits an irrational hope of doing history over again and making it come out different-akin to what happens in the film Inglourious Basterds: We'll fight the Nazis and this time we'll win. I absolutely am not saying this to mock Netanyahu or anyone swept up in his rhetoric. Such thinking is a tragically natural response to an unbearable past. But it's a very bad guide for policy.
America without blue states: Netanyahu's imagined America is one in which Mitt Romney was sure to win in 2012, as can be seen from the prime minister's behavior back then. Like the Republicans to whom he is close, he treats Obama's presidency as a historical glitch. Like many Jewish Republicans, he expects American Jews to place Israel at the top of their voting priorities, to agree with his policies, and to wake up at last to the need to vote Republican. After all, that's how the American Jews he knows best see things. To these misreadings, add his irrepressible impulse to jump into American politics.
The consequence is that Netanyahu has done more than anyone else to identify Israel-that is, the Israel shaped by his policies-with the Republican Party. Nancy Pelosi's bitter, brilliant reproach after his speech to Congress last March was the clearest possible warning that his alliance with the GOP against Obama would free, or push, Democrats to break with him. He ignored the warning.
Fury in the family: In the Iran fight, Netanyahu has created a bitter split between the American Jews he understands and the ones he doesn't get. To be fair, he has had a great deal of help from AIPAC and from leaders of Jewish organizations who, utterly unnecessarily, dove into the battle on Netanyahu's side.
Despite the pain, this may not be an entirely negative development. AIPAC has demonstrated the limits of its leverage. Along with other Jewish organizations that came out against the deal, it has shown that it speaks for only a minority of American Jews, not all of them. In media coverage, the Iran battle has upgraded the status of J Street-the pro-Israel, pro-peace lobby, which supports the Iran deal-to an equal of AIPAC. Each represents part of American Jewry. J Street has less cash but appears to be more effective.
In the best case, this could lead to a further opening up of the debate among American Jews about the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It might convince Democratic politicians that they can say out loud that to be pro-Israel is to oppose endless occupation. If this happens, we can thank Netanyahu.
How not to dicker: In late July and for most August, Netanyahu could have negotiated with Obama on a compensation package for Israel, and offered in return to stop fighting the deal. Instead, he threw away the bargaining chip.
Actually, he could still make such an offer, though it would be worth somewhat less. Obama wants the 41 Senate votes for a filibuster. As I write, the number of senators in favor has risen to 37. Simply by going silent, Netanyahu could make it easier to get the next four.
Ah, but that's not Netanyahu. Making a toast to the Jewish New Year at the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem Thursday, the prime minister insisted that "the overwhelming majority of the American people" agree with him. Those aren't the words of someone trying to cut his losses. Like a compulsive gambler in one of Sheldon Adelson's casinos, he can't stop.
Even so, there will be a generous compensation package. Obama has already promised that. But the administration should take note of Netanyahu's weaker position. It can refuse to provide weapons that have no purpose but to attack Iran. It can refuse to keep providing diplomatic cover in the United Nations for Netanyahu's rejection of Palestinian statehood. Protecting Netanyahu's policies in the occupied territories doesn't contribute anything to Israel's long-term security; the opposite is the case.
Can this relationship be repaired? Yes, but probably not by much as long as Netanyahu is prime minister. His insistence on continuing the lost fight against the Iran deal shows how little concern he has for undoing the damage. His Republican friends are still convincing him that America is with him against that pretender in the White House. And in the end, the only dialect of American that Netanyahu speaks is Republican.
Correction: An earlier version of this article stated that "Simply by going silent, Netanyahu could make it easier to get the next five," referring to the number of Senators still needed for Democrats to filibuster the Republican resolution against the Iran deal. The number is in fact four.
