Yomiuri Shimbun via AP Images
A voter casts a ballot in the presidential election in Tehran, Iran, June 18, 2021.
With the election of Ebrahim Raisi in Iran, many in Washington and U.S. media will be quick to caution the Biden administration about its ongoing attempts to revive the Iran nuclear deal. Raisi is a conservative aligned with the hard-line faction of Iran’s political spectrum and has a dismal human rights record. But what is missing from the discussion of Raisi, the future of the deal, and the prospects for U.S.-Iran relations is a consideration of the role the United States played in bringing about the current state of affairs.
In the short term, Raisi’s “election”—most competition was disqualified from running—is not likely to obstruct diplomacy surrounding the nuclear deal under way in Vienna. Raisi signaled his support for a return to the deal during Iran’s presidential debates and in his first press conference after the election. But over the horizon, under Raisi the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the deal is called, could become a ceiling to diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran, rather than a foundation to build on that could help address other sources of tension.
Over the past four years, President Trump’s Iran policy was centered on imposing stifling sanctions while ignoring diplomatic outreach. Not only was this “maximum pressure” campaign unnecessarily cruel in its impact on millions of ordinary Iranians, it also failed to attain its policy objective by prompting Iran to actually expand its civilian nuclear program. Many analysts noted that Trump’s approach would undermine Iran’s reformists and moderates, such as President Hassan Rouhani, who had staked their claim on engagement with the West, the JCPOA, and the economic relief it promised. These concerns were ignored by supporters of “maximum pressure,” who oppose any diplomacy with Iran, and actually wanted the election of a hard-liner like Raisi to use as an excuse to maintain heightened tensions and to keep Iran isolated.
Iranians themselves have fought against the rhetoric of the Islamic Republic’s hard-line voices.
But this policy not only tarnished the reputation of the U.S. globally, it also betrayed the will of the Iranian people who came out en masse in 2013—and again in 2017—to vote for Rouhani, with an optimistic outlook toward reform and sanctions relief. The majority of Iranian voters signaled they wanted a more open society and that elusive détente with the United States they had long hoped to see. Iranians themselves have fought against the rhetoric of the Islamic Republic’s hard-line voices who have long said the U.S. could not be trusted to make a durable deal. And so the U.S. under Trump disregarded reformist voices and handed the most conservative and hard-line elements in the country a victory by proving the U.S. could indeed not be trusted.
In fact, the Trump administration’s decision to renege on the deal and impose devastating economic sanctions on Iran is not the first time the U.S. has rejected Iranian attempts at détente in the history of these two states’ fraught relationship over the past 40 years.
In the late 1990s, Iranians went to the polls in droves to elect their first reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. Early in his presidency, Khatami displayed a new approach to the United States when he appeared on CNN and said American civilization was worthy of respect. Khatami advocated for a “dialogue of civilizations” and saw an opportunity for cooperation between the U.S. and Iran, such as combating the threat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush squandered this goodwill when he called Iran an “axis of evil.” The unnecessarily provocative speech shocked Iranians, who had played no role in the attacks—indeed, Iranians had quickly condemned them, and held a vigil for the victims.
Though “maximum pressure” was implemented by Trump, the Biden administration has been slow to reverse it. It has taken limited practical steps to rebuild trust or address the sanctions that President Biden himself recognized were impeding humanitarian goods in a pandemic. Biden’s election amid promises of restoring the nuclear deal heightened hopes for a quick return to the agreement. But by pursuing lengthy negotiations that extended well beyond the Iranian elections, Biden reinforced beliefs that participation in the elections would deliver little. Iranians were left to continue to struggle in a pandemic, growing more apathetic about their future.
Many of the same people who pushed the U.S. to quit the nuclear deal and sanction innocent Iranians into poverty—under the guise of a better deal and support for the Iranian people—will now use the election of Raisi as a reason to further isolate Iran. Stuck between a foreign power that is hell-bent on their submission and a government that is more concerned with solidifying its own hold on power than the well-being of its people, ordinary Iranians continue to suffer.
If resolving Middle East conflicts and ending “forever wars” is actually a priority for American policymakers, then Biden will have to work with Iran in order to achieve larger goals.
There is no question that Raisi is responsible for human rights abuses and his own repressive actions against Iranian society, or that Iranian officials tied to the status quo of the Islamic Republic have played a central role in the country’s current economic condition and the apathy of Iranian voters in the recent election. At the same time, there is no doubt that the U.S. has played a significant role in the economic strangulation of the Iranian people and their disillusionment.
The prospects for relations between Iran and the U.S. unfortunately look dim, another lost opportunity at the hands of the U.S. and its outdated foreign-policy approach. Whatever the U.S. position, Iran is a major regional power. If resolving Middle East conflicts and ending “forever wars” is actually a priority for American policymakers, then Biden will have to work with Iran in order to achieve larger goals. The 2015 nuclear deal is evidence that the two countries are not destined to be adversaries. There is another path. But as long as the U.S. chooses to instead implement policies that harden Iran’s position, it will be an adversary of our choosing.
The fact that it is a choice leaves some room for optimism. By recognizing its own mistakes, the United States should make a long-term bet on the Iranian people, who have shown time and again their desire for engagement and openness, and have made efforts toward rapprochement with the United States. By taking the pressure of sanctions and economic hardship off ordinary Iranians, the U.S. can allow them to breathe, organize, and find new strategies for advancing their aspirations.
