Democrats’ Power in the Lame-Duck Session

In the new Congress, which takes office next January 3, the Democrats will have at least 54 (potentially 56) seats in the House and between 250 and 260 in the Senate, with several still undecided. This will give Democrats new leverage to contain President Trump on multiple fronts. But due to the blue wave and the magnitude of the repudiation, Democrats will gain new power in the lame-duck session of Congress as well.

That session of the old Congress convenes next week. Before the Christmas adjournment, Congress will have just 20 legislative days to accomplish a great deal of work that the parties and the White House have deadlocked on, even before the election blowout further weakened Trump’s influence.

Trump’s ability to frighten Democrats came to an end on Tuesday. But his alliance with Vladimir Putin, his failed Iran strategy, which cost control of Congress, and Pete Hegseth’s combination of swagger and incompetence have alienated many Republicans.

Here’s one critical example: In September, Congress overwhelmingly passed Russia sanctions legislation. It infuriated Republican defense hawks that less than a month after signing the measure named for the late Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Trump waived the new sanctions.

Former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) recently wrote an op-ed piece in The Wall Street Journal warning that “Senate Republicans oppose retreat and appeasement and favor a strong defense. They support Ukraine. They support NATO. They understand Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are enemies. And they want the president to work with Congress to restore American primacy.”

McConnell himself is a lame duck on his last legs, but in this case, he speaks for many other Republicans. He added that passing any part of Trump’s agenda when Congress returns “will require working with Republicans who know the difference between the good guys and the bad guys. Ending the obeisance to Mr. Putin may be table stakes for the end-of-year legislation.”

AT THE HEART OF THE DEMOCRATS’ NEW LEVERAGE is the power of the purse, a power reserved to Congress in Article I of the Constitution. Even more than the new House Speaker, who is likely to be Hakeem Jeffries of New York, the most important Democrat will be Rosa DeLauro (D-CT), who becomes chair of the House Appropriations Committee in the new Congress. Appropriations is where much of the action will happen. Unlike Jeffries, DeLauro is both a resolute progressive and a shrewd tactician. (Full disclosure: Her husband Stan Greenberg sits on the Prospect’s board.)

So far this year, Congress has not yet passed any of the usual 12 appropriations bills. The current continuing resolution (CR) expires on December 11. If there is no CR, the government shuts down.

Since the Democrats will have a lot more power in the next Congress, they will only agree to a brief CR, House sources tell me, probably for just two or three months at most. The fact that Trump needs the CR to keep many of his projects going gives the Democrats a fair amount of power, even in the lame-duck session.

Another signature issue is miliary spending, a proxy issue for Trump’s failed war and its knock-on economic effects. The Pentagon made a $1.5 trillion spending request for fiscal year 2027, an unprecedented 44 percent increase over the previous year. The measure has more than trivial Republican opposition. In fact, there is about zero chance that Congress will pass Trump’s full $1.5 trillion National Defense Authorization Act.

For 65 straight years, the NDAA has passed Congress on a bipartisan basis. But this year, the NDAA barely passed the House, where more Republicans voted against it than Democrats voted for it, and it did not clear the Senate at all. The $1.5 trillion plan, in addition to replenishing depleted weaponry, directs billions toward Trump’s outlandish personal projects, including a “Golden Dome” missile defense shield and a fleet of battleships named after him.

At the heart of the Pentagon’s demand is an $87.6 billion supplemental appropriation requested last June to finance the Iran war and replenish depleted weapons systems (it also includes some aid for farmers). But in a move not cleared with top GOP lawmakers, the administration split the total defense budget into two measures: $1.15 trillion that includes several of those wish-list items, and a more urgent $350 billion.

Neither may get approved absent an agreement to wind down the Iran war. Some defense-minded Republicans who are appalled by Trump’s foreign policy may well vote with Democrats to condition funding on ending the war and a change in Russia-Ukraine policy.

Trump has not been one for negotiating with Congress, but in order to provide for normal military operations, he needs Congress to at least pass some defense spending. Combined with Republican opposition to Trump, which may only grow after Tuesday’s shellacking, this gives Democrats a working majority from the minority.

All of this prefigures the actions of the next Congress, where Democrats will have the majority and thus a great deal more power to legislate, conduct investigative and oversight hearings, restore impounded or diverted funds, embarrass Republicans by passing popular legislation, set an agenda for 2028, and perhaps to impeach.

An early test in the lame-duck session is the likely impeachment of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. As soon as that session convenes, on or shortly after November 9, Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) plans to force a vote on his impeachment resolution.

In September, House Speaker Mike Johnson recessed the House early to delay that vote. Since then, Republicans have grown even more annoyed at Hegseth’s antics. Even before Democrats become the House majority after January 3, enough Republicans may join Democrats in the lame-duck session for the resolution to pass.

An impeachment of Hegseth would do double duty as investigation of the bizarre conduct of the Iran war, which would further embarrass Trump. The president may well decide to cut Hegseth loose, both to avoid that investigation and to find a handy scapegoat for the failed war.