With the leaking of General Stanley McChrystal's strategic review, today's Afghanistan discussion has been focused almost entirely on his request for more resources and troops. But that's not what McChrystal and his team think:"Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or 'doubling down' on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate."That's true in a larger sense, as well: As both Marc Lynch and Ezra point out, McChrystal and his team asking for more troops was inevitable; similarly, observers of Afghanistan policy have been prepared for a polemic in favor of a counterinsurgency strategy for months. But the question that concerns most people about Afghanistan isn't answered in this document, which is a blueprint for how the U.S. could defeat the multi-party insurgency in Afghanistan. Rather, the fundamental question is whether the U.S. ought to be spending the resources necessary to defeat this multi-party insurgency. And ultimately, that's a question for Barack Obama and Congress.Within the confines of this assessment from McChrystal, though, it's still unclear if this conflict can be won. The report does not specify how many additional American troops would be required -- at a hearing last week, counterinsurgency expert Jon Nagl said that very rough estimate would be 600,000 counterinsurgents; right now, the International Security Assistance Force comprises some 60,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan and 35,000 or so from our NATO allies. What the report does say is that gaining the initiative in the next 12 months will be decisive -- or else the U.S. "risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible." This, in turn, depends on simultaneously rolling out a fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy and rebuilding the legitimacy of the Afghan government. The report says,
ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare. These intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture. ... The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have givcen Afghans littel reason to support their government.This report was delivered nearly a month ago. Even if the president decides to convince Congress to authorize more troops and money for Afghanistan, and he succeeds, that won't happen for months and months. When you combine that time line with the tremendous legitimacy complications presented by the recent elections in Afghanistan, it's very difficult to imagine McChrystal turning around one, much less both, of those two dynamics in only eleven months. But "gaining the initiative" is a nebulous term itself, and I wonder how you know when that happens.
-- Tim Fernholz
