In about twenty-five years, Europe has moved from having one mildly crazy Albanian countries to having two independent Albanian states, one of which is part of NATO, and having three others (Macedonia, Greece, and Montenegro) with substantial Albanian minorities. The Albanian diaspora, its influence evident in the 1999 Kosovo War and a number of Balkan issues since, has also grown in size and importance. Why the sudden growth in all things Albanian? Doug Muir does some investigating:
A generation back, the typical Albanian family had six or eight kids. Today they're down to two or three, and falling. Basically they're following the same track as their Balkan neighbors, just a generation or two behind. But that generation makes a huge difference. Here's a list of TFRs (Total Fertility Rate, expected number of children per woman) for the Albanians and their neighbors:
Albania — 2.37
Montenegro — 1.83
Serbia — 1.75
Macedonia — 1.56
Greece — 1.56
Bulgaria — 1.39
The difference is actually bigger than these numbers suggest, because of the phenomenon of “demographic inertia”: Albanian communities have younger populations, with more young women in their peak child-bearing years. So, while all of Albania's neighbors have aging and declining populations, the number of Albanians continues to grow. The growth is slowing, and will probably flatten out to zero in another fifteen or twenty years. But in the meantime, the relative number of Albanians will continue to grow.
One lesson is that, while demography is not destiny, it can be politically relevant. The map of the Balkans is being redrawn, in no small part because of changes driven by the increase in Albanian population. Kosovo made a lot more sense at 82% Albanian than it did at the 68% Albanian of two generations ago.
--Robert Farley