I meant to make this point a full 24 hours ago, but it's worth saying another word or two about Obama's apparent comfort with talking up the virtue of restraint in American foreign policy. For Obama to tell a New York Times columnist that "part of our capacity to lead is linked to our capacity to show restraint” is actually quite meaningful. Not because it's such a novel sentiment -- the theory that American power is enhanced by our willingness to exercise it cautiously has an old pedigree, and aside from the Bush years, is actually quite influential in American foreign policy making -- but because the objective constraints facing the next president will, in large part, force a relatively similar foreign policy no matter who enters office. That's not to deny the existence of any differences, but it's harder to imagine a violently variant set of policy priorities from one to the next. What can change from leader to leader, however, is how they frame foreign policy. What is defined as foreign policy. In recent years, Democrats have largely bought into an essentially militaristic approach to international affairs. "Foreign policy" is largely another way to say "war policy." It is not foreign aid, or global warming compacts, or trade, or the assiduous improvement of multilateral institutions. It is war, and toughness. That's why, in part, humanitarian calamities that can theoretically be solved through the deployment of troops (like Darfur) attract so much more attention than those that can be eased through the deployment of resources (like malaria). But this is bad ground for progressivism. If the essential question on foreign affairs is how easily voters can imagine you at war, leaders who emphasize belligerence, rather than cooperation, will be in demand. The willingness of the nominee to explicitly argue the opposite case -- that belligerence weakens us, restraint strengthens us, and that foreign policy is far more than readiness for a fight -- is going to be critical, not necessarily to the immediate shape of their agendas will take, but for the shape of the country's approach to international issues in coming years. If the way in which we discuss foreign policy transforms to emphasize elements not only other than war, but often contradicted by war, there won't be quite the same underlying consensus for future belligerent leaders to tap into.
