The narrative goes something like this: On June 19th, Hamas and Israel successfully reached agreement on a ceasefire in Cairo. More or less, that ceasefire held for six months, at which point it was to be renegotiated. Hamas inexplicably refused and launched dozens of missiles, provoking an Israeli response. And now we're here. The terms of the ceasefire, and the disputes that led to is dissolution, aren't getting much attention. But they're important for understanding the current conflict. And that's the first point: There were terms. According to interviews given to the International Crisis Group, the agreement looked something like this:
- Both sides cease all military action by 6am on June 19th.
- The duration of the ceasefire is six months.
- 72 hours after the ceasefire begins, the Israeli blockade will be eased to allow more goods through (Hamas said the agreed-upon number was 30 percent).
- 10 days after that, all crossings between Gaza and Israel would be opened, and Israel would lift the ban on all goods except those used in the construction of projectiles and explosives.
- After three weeks, negotiations on a prisoner exchange would commence, as would negotiations on opening the crossing between Egypt and Hamas (which Israel believed was being used for arms smuggling).
- There would be later negotiations to expand the ceasefire to the West Bank.
Neither party proved satisfied in the aftermath. Hamas was angry that Israel continued military operations, though at a decreased pace, and never opened the crossings. Israel was angry that Hamas either did not, or could not, fully end all mortar fire, though it did fall sharply. The two sides disagreed on prisoner exchange. Israel didn't end the ban on goods, though it did, at times, let more commerce through. Israel refused to extend the ceasefire to the West Bank. As June 19th approached, both sides expressed interest in renegotiating the ceasefire, but only if they could fully achieve their goals. Hamas said, publicly, that given the choice between "starvation and fighting," they would choose fighting. The judged that ordinary Gazans were turning on the organization and moving towards more hardline elements because Hamas's compromises hadn't brought concrete gains. War, at least, would elevate their standing in the Arab world, quiet their political competitors, and dramatize Gaza's intense plight. As a Hamas spokesperson argued, "We didn’t really have a choice. It was either die slowly because of the blockade or more quickly due to confrontation. Israel was telling us, 'accept the blockade that is killing you'. Despite all the suffering, this aggression put an end to a more painful situation. Now, the whole world is seeing that Palestinians are being killed. Before, people would die and no one would take note." According to the ICG, the ceasefire really dissolved when Israel blew up a tunnel in Hamas's territory (they said it would be used for kidnappings) and Hamas responded with rockets. Military build-up ensued on both sides. None of this has much bearing on the wisdom of Israel's actions. But presenting Hamas's rockets and Israel's attack on Gaza as if they are a discrete set of events, rather than presenting them in context of the blockade and the kidnappings and the attacks and the terms of the ceasefire and the conditions in Gaza and Israel's fear of arms smuggling, obscures too much.
