When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir? -- John Maynard Keynes. Via Paul Waldman, Eric Black has dove deep into the memory hole, all the way back to last August, when George W. Bush theoretically learned of the conclusions in the new National Intelligence Estimate. It was right about then, Black reports, that Bush's rhetoric on Iran underwent a subtle shift. He ceased hyping Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear bomb, and began warning of their desire to acquire the "knowledge," "know-how," and "ability" to build a weapon. To those of us listening, there was no evident difference between statements emphasizing the Iranians' quest for nuclear knowledge and their pursuit of nuclear bombs -- particularly given the context of Bush's statements, a long history of decrying Iran's desire for a weapon. But, as it turns out, there was a difference -- Bush had received information that undermined his argument, and rather than change his argument, he used the intelligence to begin misleading the American people in ever more artful and hard-to-detect ways. When the facts changed, he changed his rhetoric. It's about as good a microcosm of his presidency as you'll find, actually.
