Not withstanding the ongoing debate in the Obama administration over what to do in Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency strategy seems to have more support among non-conservative national security types than it might initially appear. Peter Bergen is a prominent example, but COIN seems to have some less noticed supporters as well.
Andrew Sullivan points to this interview with New America's Steve Coll, who says that it's "not implausible" that a COIN approach might work, although he says whether or not to send more troops is "the really hard question." (I hadn't heard Coll express outright that he thought COIN could work until recently -- but maybe I haven't paid enough attention.) Yesterday over at the AfPak Channel, Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman from the Center for American Progress warn that "progress in stabilizing Afghanistan and diminishing its insurgency ultimately requires governance reforms and institution building that neither troops nor Predator drones can provide."
Then there's Windy all-star Spencer Ackerman, who recently reported on the coalescing opposition on the left to escalation in Afghanistan. In the midst of demolishing poorly reasoned arguments for COIN, he shrugs, "I favor a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan because every other option appears worse."
Conservatives seem to naturally favor any strategic option that results in escalation (although many of them disapprove of COIN in principle because they dislike the idea of American troops going out of their way to prevent civilian casualties). But it's clear that it's not just conservatives who think COIN could work.
-- A. Serwer
