Over at Foreign Policy's great new collection of expert blogs, one Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel, makes the argument in favor of "security contractors," or, if we're not using euphemisms, mercenaries. While pointing out that many contractors do not actively act in a force protection role outside of military bases, he also excuses those who do while violating, well, all kinds of laws:
Blackwater (and its cousins Triple Canopy, DynCorp, and Aegis) together employ about 2,000 armed personnel. These constitute the groups that go outside the wire and have caused the widely publicized incidents. Their numbers are small enough that they could be replaced, in the near term, by military and, in the longer term, by State Department security specialists.
There are good policy reasons for doing this. But it would be no panacea.
Blackwater and other outfits like it are highly professional. Blackwater, for example, prides itself on never having lost a principal. Replacing them with ordinary grunts won't do -- only the best will be adequate. Private security contractors are less expensive than government employees with their massive benefits, large infrastructure, and need for a rotation base. So costs would go up. (Hint to budgeters -- many of these costs can be hidden to make the cost of conversion look less expensive.)
Finally, the bodyguard mentality won't go away with the security company contracts; it must be changed from the top. Behind the highly publicized incidents were not "rogue mercenaries" but professionals dedicated to the mission -- protecting the principal at all costs. "At all costs" means just that; costs to the locals, to the broader counterinsurgency effort, and to relations with the host government are irrelevant. For a bodyguard, this is the only measure of effectiveness, and it won't go away just because the bodyguard works for the government.
Judging from all kinds of reportage, I would have to disagree with the description of Blackwater as "highly professional" -- it seems they flout their rules of engagement at will:
Participants in a contentious Baghdad security operation this month have told American investigators that during the operation at least one guard continued firing on civilians while colleagues urgently called for a cease-fire. At least one guard apparently also drew a weapon on a fellow guard who did not stop shooting, an American official said.
A number of Iraqi civilians, including a mother and infant, died in this incident. As Cancian points out, it's not hard to imagine any group of bodyguards, military or para-military, finding themselves in a situation where something as horrific as this happens while trying to protect their principal. But that's why we have the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which delivers consequences for soldiers who disobey orders and violate rules of engagement. Blackwater guards just walk away (some of have been indicted in the U.S. but don't look likely to be punished anytime soon.) The kind of military discipline that these contractors follow is quite a bit different from what the actual military employs; I doubt Cancian would have allowed anyone in a unit under his command to bootleg supplies for their own enrichment, fire indiscriminately at civilians or loot occupied areas. Not to mention that if the U.S. barred private contractors from working in these areas, Blackwater wouldn't be breaking officials who embezzled reconstruction money out of Iraqi jails.
Cancian's point is that, for a bodyguard, protection is the first priority, and may result in other costs no matter who is doing the job. I'd argue that military units would be more effective at the task than mercenaries. But here's the bigger problem: Acting to protect someone without thinking of the consequences, and thereby undermining the overall mission of counter-insurgency, has the effect of making it more difficult to protect the principal. Having a hard time protecting officials from insurgents? It's probably not a great idea to encourage the insurgency with your actions.
-- Tim Fernholz
