The coalition intervention in Libya appears to be going very well. The U.S. has handed off leadership of the no-fly zone and the maritime embargo (while retaining command of the "civilian protection" mission); U.S. allies are flying most of the missions. The Libyan rebels also seem to be capitalizing on the air campaign, making important strategic gains despite their small numbers:
Rebel forces Saturday took back one city from backers of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi and moved toward another in their biggest advance toward Tripoli since coalition forces began air strikes against the regime.
Their gains seven days into the U.S.-led air campaign came as President Obama faces bipartisan criticism of his Libya strategy, which he plans to address in a speech Monday night.
While Gadhafi is still in power, and the rebel gains may not last, the mission in Libya seems to be going fairly smoothly, even as Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted over the weekend that preventing a massacre in Libya was not an immediate U.S. security interest. I honestly hope this works, that it doesn't produce any of the adverse effects seen in other areas throughout the region, and that by supporting a popular uprising that blooms into a successful democratic government, Western powers draw some resonance out of the narrative that the West is at war with Islam.
Recent successes, however, shouldn't lull us into believing that this is all somehow almost over. Was there ever any question that Gadhafi's thugs and mercenaries would be able to defeat the combined military might of the U.S. and Europe? No. Remember how quickly the U.S. defeated the Iraqi army in 2003? Or how easily the Ethiopian Army defeated the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia? These quick military victories were not followed by peace and stability; they were followed by prolonged, bloody insurgencies. The ahem, "kinetic military action" phase of this was always going to be the easy part, and it's hardly over yet.
We still haven't even gotten to the hard part, which is filling a potential power vacuum caused by Gadhafi falling, or whatever the outcome ultimately is in Libya presuming it does lead to a change in leadership. The hard part will be governance, building civil institutions that can foster Libya's transition to a democratic society without being marred or destroyed by ongoing retributive bloodshed between rebels and loyalists. The most difficult part of the mission in Libya was always going to be the aftermath, and given our experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, we should be very concerned about how it's going to unfold.
