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NOT SO DIFFERENT. Robert Farley noted below that the army brass still hates counterinsurgency tactics. They only thing they may hate more, in fact, is what are nebulously termed "stability operations." This includes post-conflict activities like establishing security, fostering civil society, and transitioning to local governance. In other words, just about everything we got wrong in Iraq, and just about everything that helps prevent insurgencies from popping up in the first place. The Department of Defense has traditionally had little in the way of separate plans for stability operations, instead relying on combat operation plans. In December of 2005, President Bush ordered the top brass to come up with a better way of getting ready for stability operations. It was a laudable move, because they have happened every 18 to 24 months since the end of the Cold War.So how have the DoD's planners prepared for the inevitable stability operations of the future? Not so well, according to the General Accounting Office. In a just-released May 31 report to Congress, the GAO found that the DoD has made "limited progress in two key areas -- identifying needed capabilities, and developing measures of effectiveness." Better planning has been hindered by a defense policy that leaves it up to individual geographic commands to come up with planning ideas:
Policy officials envisioned that the geographic combatant commands would conduct theater-specific, scenario-driven assessments of forces and capabilities required for contingencies through DOD's planning process. They also expected that the geographic commands would compare the planned requirements for stability operations with the current available forces and military capabilities, and propose remedies for eliminating the gaps.Not surprisingly, this uncharacteristically Zen-like technique of planning by not planning has had mixed results: "At the three combatant commands that we visited, we found that the identification of stability operations requirements was occurring in a fragmented manner." Confusion between commands and branches has been worsened by the fact that the military doesn't even have a single definition for stability operations.Things got worse when the GAO looked into how well the military was working with the other agencies that are crucial for stability operations -- the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Justice. These other agencies can't look at Defense plans unless Robert Gates gives the go-ahead, because "it is the department's policy not to share DOD contingency plans with agencies or offices outside of DOD unless directed to do so by the Secretary of Defense, who determines if they have a need to know."The DoD responded to the GAO report by conceding many of its points -- and then denied that stability operations are even that different from warfare because "Stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations capabilities are not so different from other DoD capabilities that they require a new or separate methodology." I think I've heard this one before.--Matt Sledge
