WHAT WE DIDN'T DO. Rob, in your piece defending the Afghanistan war, you imply that the massive support the U.S. enjoyed both in that moment and for that mission could've been used to achieve a variety of other goals: Iran, for instance, approached us in the days following, anxious to follow up on their cooperation with a Grand Bargain that would derail their nuclear program in response for security guarantees, better relations, and possible incentives from America. That about right? And given that our decapitation of the Taliban made us look strong (while our failed occupation in Iraq made us look weak), we could've bargained from a position of power and intimidation. In some ways, it's always seemed to me that the least forgivable aspects of the Iraq war aren't about the war itself, but the extraordinary moment and opportunities we sacrificed to pursue it. Update: Iran's overtures, I'm reminded, where in the Spring of 2003, so after we'd entered Iraq. The groundwork, as Gareth Porter explains in his definitive article on the subject, was laid by the cooperation during the Afghanistan conflict (which the Bushies declined to use to open negotiations towards Iran), but the actual overture was nevertheless a few months after we invaded Iraq.
--Ezra Klein
