Should the United States, for reasons of military necessity or basic fairness, return to an idea it abandoned 30 years ago after Vietnam -- a military draft?
This idea has become more popular, or at least more frequently discussed, as the open-ended mission in Iraq has required more service from our active-duty forces, the National Guard, and the Reserves than most would consider reasonable. Rep. Charles Rangel and Sen. Fritz Hollings -- both Democrats -- introduced a bill in January 2003 that would restore military conscription. Vietnam veteran and Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel expressed interest in the idea as well and mused that we may have to "ask all of our citizens to bear some responsibility and pay some price."
But despite the need to increase the size of our military to carry out our responsibilities in Iraq and elsewhere, the draft is not the answer. A 21st-century draft, no matter how well-intentioned, would almost certainly reduce the quality and performance of our armed forces. There are scenarios that could lead us back to conscription -- but only if we fail badly in policy terms and "break" the all-volunteer force by overusing it.
Indeed, this latter problem is serious enough that the draft debate is well warranted, if for no other reason than to clarify the stakes at hand. Over-deployment is especially severe for the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps. (The Navy and Air Force actually have a lighter load these days than before the invasion of Iraq, since they no longer maintain the no-fly-zones there.) The typical active-duty U.S. Army soldier or Marine in a deployable unit could literally spend the majority of the next three to four years abroad. In 2004 alone, 26 of the Army's 33 main combat brigades in the active force will deploy abroad at some point; over the course of 2003 and 2004 together, it appears probable that all of them will be deployed.
Based on current and projected trends, the typical reservist is likely to be deployed for another twelve months over the next three to four years. All 15 of the Army National Guard's enhanced separate brigades, for example, are to have been deployed at some point by 2006.
An even greater problem is with units that have to be mobilized more than once. To date, some 40,000 reservists have been involuntarily mobilized more than once since September 11 -- not an enormously high number, but one that is continually growing. The overall pace of Army overseas deployments is more than twice what it was during the 1990s, when over-deployment was frequently blamed for shortfalls in recruiting and retention. Although there is no acute recruiting or retention crisis as of yet, we could be living on borrowed time.
But rather than a draft, the Bush administration should significantly expand the active-duty Army and Marine Corps so that we don't have to keep sending the same personnel back to Iraq (and Afghanistan, South Korea, and elsewhere). Instead, it has made only modest tweaks, adding about 30,000 troops to the armed forces (raising the active-duty total by just 2 percent), despite the inordinate strains on military personnel. Again, if we do not make such an adjustment, or if recruiting becomes more difficult, we could within a short time -- even two or three years -- be forced to a draft as the only way to maintain a military with challenging overseas missions from the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan to Korea to the Balkans.
A strategy of enlarging the current professional military is preferable to a draft, however. Today's U.S. armed forces are of the highest quality in their history, as can be seen in the militarily impressive victories of the last few American military conflicts. (Even in situations such as Iraq, where post-invasion difficulties have been legion, this reflects less on the quality of our forces than on the planning and the politics of the broader mission.) I mean no disrespect to previous generations of draftees; it is simply that we have achieved new standards of excellence. This is true not only in high technology, but also in the caliber and experience and skill of military personnel.
The modern American soldier, Marine, airman, airwoman, or sailor is remarkable. He or she typically has more than a half-decade of military experience, a high school degree and some college experience, and a strong commitment to the military and the country. By contrast, personnel in modern conscription regimes usually serve just 10 to 24 months, a period that includes both training and actual deployment. We have in fact been trying to wean as many of our European allies as possible away from the draft because we (along with the Brits and most of NATO's other elite forces) recognize that professionals make much better troops.Proponents of a draft often raise concerns beyond purely military issues. They say it is
unfair that so many in our country can casually endure wars without sacrifice, or that a draft is necessary to bind our broader society to our servicemen and women. While there are merits to some of these arguments, they don't amount to a convincing case for national conscription. In brief, it is true that we owe an enormous debt to our men and women under arms, and that we can never repay those who give their lives or their health. But it is also true that many people from many ethnic groups and walks of life choose the military of their own free will to serve their country, learn important skills, and gain a greater sense of purpose in life. We already have many different faces of America in the armed forces.
Then there's the matter of money. It is perhaps not widely known, but nonetheless true, that overall compensation in the military is typically somewhat better than what the private sector pays most people of similar age, skill, and educational achievement. People do not join the military to get rich -- but they are not underpaid, either (especially when one factors in pensions and other fringe benefits), nor do they sacrifice a good career track once they leave the service.
Some of the other common arguments against the current all-professional military similarly hold little water. It is hard to see a major rift developing between the general public and policymakers on the one hand, and those who populate the armed forces on the other. The fact that so many of our reservists are going to Iraq -- while tough on them -- keeps the American public and many communities in touch with what is happening in this war. And the argument that policymakers have somehow become insensitive to casualties forgets that just half a decade ago our national concern was exactly the opposite: that our country had become so casualty-hypersensitive as to be incapable of properly defending its core national interests or fighting wars with any significant risk to its troops.
That said, the issue of the draft requires further attention and debate. As noted, there are scenarios that could require it; it is all too plausible that the current over-deployment of our all-volunteer force could worsen, leading to an exodus of volunteers and an unwillingness to enlist on the part of would-be recruits. It is not hard to imagine a set of developments in Iraq or elsewhere that could produce or exacerbate such a problem.
If we do reach that stage, we should construct a draft system that keeps the most demanding military jobs with the professionals. The United States could develop a system of mandatory national service in which military enlistment is only one option among such choices as homeland security tasks, community service, and jobs like those in AmeriCorps and the Peace Corps. But even in that case, care needs to be taken to preserve the strengths of our current military. And in the meantime, we need to focus on the policy that could forestall the need for a draft altogether: an increase in the size of America's active-duty ground forces.
Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He is the author, most recently, of Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention.
