For months those who care about the Middle East have been hoping for a deus ex machina -- an instant solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And since Saudi Arabia's Prince Abdullah proposed last week that Arab countries recognize Israel in return for a full withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, many have jumped to the optimistic conclusion that his proposal signals the beginning of a long-awaited endgame to the conflict.
But it probably doesn't, because its most attractive attribute -- simplicity -- is also its most dangerous. It is certainly understandable that people of good faith on both sides would be drawn to an offer that promises to end a bloody, complex conflict with one fell swoop. But the agreement that ends the Israeli-Palestinian impasse once and for all will be necessarily complex; otherwise it will fail. Prince Abdullah and other Arab leaders have never fully grasped that, and it seems they still don't.
Israel's pre-1967 borders are militarily indefensible. It is possible not to care about this particular fact (Israel's detractors in the Arab world seem not to) but it is not possible to deny it. No country that has been invaded three times in 50 years should -- or will -- accept indefensible borders. At the same time, most Israelis understand that their country must -- for reasons moral as well as practical -- allow the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Most Israelis know that, broadly speaking, this means an approximate return to pre-1967 borders.
The key word, though, is approximate. It has long been understood that the pre-1967 borders will provide the rough outlines of a final settlement. The key to resolving the entire conflict rests in how to tweak the pre-1967 borders to make them defensible. (Measures such as the creation of an Israeli security strip along the Jordan River, the setting up of Israeli listening posts in the West Bank, and Israeli control over Palestinian airspace could accomplish this -- without undue infringements on Palestinian sovereignty.) The moderate Israeli belief -- epitomized by the views of Yitzhak Rabin -- that Israel could be both reasonably secure and allow the creation of a Palestinian state for years sustained the faith of the crucial Israeli center in the peace process. And that is exactly what seven years of negotiations were supposed to deliver: a compromise that recognized the Palestinians' right to a state on the vast majority of the West Bank and Gaza while also accommodating Israel's legitimate need for security. By throwing down what sounds like an all-or-nothing proposal, Saudi Arabia demonstrates that it still doesn't understand why negotiations have always been necessary -- and still are.
The Saudi Arabian proposal also appears to dangerously conflate Israel's need for a Palestinian endgame with its need for a settlement with Syria. The two issues could not be more different: Settling with the Palestinians is both a moral and strategic imperative for Israel; settling with a Syrian dictator who has given every indication of being a dangerous anti-Semite is not. Unlike the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the occupation of the Golan Heights has never been a morally dubious enterprise, and it continues to be necessary. Here again, Prince Abdullah's proposal oversimplifies: He assumes that a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will also resolve the Israeli-Syrian conflict. Nothing could be further from the truth.
In short, the prince's proposal rests on the assumption that Israel may some day just up and leave the areas it conquered in 1967 -- either in exchange for recognition from Arab countries or because it would simply grow tired of ruling the territories. But that assumption, while perhaps appealingly simple to some, is neither realistic nor fair. Yes, Oslo was premised on the concept of land for peace, but it was also premised on the give-and-take of negotiation -- on the pragmatic notion that there are no cut-and-dried solutions to this conflict.
Thomas Friedman, who broke the prince's offer in his New York Times column, surely knows all this. He must therefore believe that the Saudi Arabian leader ultimately intends his proposal as a starting point for negotiation, rather than as a one-time offer. Israel's leaders -- including Ariel Sharon and Shimon Peres -- seem to be crossing their fingers and hoping that's the case. They are right to at least give the plan consideration, and if it does prove a starting point for more negotiations that would be an exciting step indeed. But for now, it sounds more like an ultimatum.
The Palestinians have the right to a state; Israel has the right to defensible borders. Pragmatists should continue to hold out hope that negotiations in which both sides are expected to make concessions may yet deliver a solution capable of reconciling those two needs. We must hope that such negotiations eventually lead to real peace -- because no deus ex machina will.