×
One of the odder wrinkles in the conversation over Israel's attack on Gaza is the incredible present-bias it exhibits. One day Israel was not dropping bombs on Gaza, and people seemed fine with that, and then the next day they were dropping bombs on Gaza, and people began asking how they could possibly do anything else. Not only have we always been at war with Eastasia, but there has never been any option besides being at war with Eastasia. Matt Yglesias put it well this weekend:
I think that if people want to be honest, they need to ask themselves how many of them were sitting around the day before Israel started this action not only feeling that it would be smart for Israel to start a massive military action in Gaza but feeling so strongly about it that one would question the Jewish credentials and basic intelligence of anyone who didn’t agree. Frankly, I didn’t hear a lot of Americans taking that position. Then the Israeli government changed its policy, and a lot of Americans decided to agree with the new Israeli policy. Which is fine as far as it goes. But people who didn’t regard the previous policy as unconscionable at the time have no business suddenly deciding that it’s unconscionable to disagree with the new policy.But suddenly you have a lot of posts like Sahil Mahtani's demanding "what is the alternative?" But no one imagines that if Israel had not unleashed Operation Cast Lead Mahtani would be writing posts entitled "Massive Air Strikes Followed by a Ground Invasion of Gaza: There Is No Alternative." The question is not whether there were alternatives. It's whether Operation Cast Lead was the best possible approach. Whether it was preferable to air strikes without a ground invasion, or a ground invasion without air strikes, or easing the economic blockade, or doing nothing. It seems undeniable that Operation Cast Lead has devastated Hamas's conventional weapons capabilities. Those capabilities were meaningless. Now they will be even more so. In the short-term, that may mean fewer rocket attacks. In the long-term, however, Hamas is likely to be less internationally isolated, more hardline, and more credible as a symbol of Palestinian resistance and suffering. And that may be the good outcome. The bad outcome would be Salafism taking root in Gaza. And for those who ask the question of alternatives, one thought experiment. The Israeli political class has been explicit in contrasting the ruthless efficiency of the Gaza operation with the ineptitude of the Lebanon War. To read the Israeli press, the Gaza incursion has the feel of a rebound relationship. Which begs the question: If Israel had not gone to war in Lebanon and suffered a humiliating stalemate, would it be at war in Gaza? And if not -- if there's even a chance of not -- what does that imply about the necessity of this mission?