This is an impressively not-bad summary of where-Iraq-is-at from Tom Friedman:
For two years, the Shiite center in Iraq put up with the barbaric Sunni violence directed against its mosques and markets — violence the U.S. couldn't stop because it didn't have enough troops, and because the Sunni center inside and outside Iraq tacitly supported it.
But eventually the Shiites snapped, formed their own death squads, turned to Iran for military aid, and focused more on communal survival than on making Iraq's democracy work. Today we have Shiite and Sunni parties in the cabinet, but with their own private militias — exactly like Lebanon during its civil war. So, where the Iraqi center stops and the violent fringes start is no longer clear.
That's the question withdrawal-opponents need to answer: What can actually be done that will substantially change the dynamic between Shiites and Sunnis? Even assuming the US could stabilize the country -- and, given the mounting death toll throughout our occupation, I'm skeptical -- what could we actually do that would ratchet down enmity and intransigence between these two groups? Those of us in favor of redeployment survey that question and see no answers. Those in favor of a sustained commitment survey that question, clap their hands over their ears, and make loud noises. Speaking of which, here's how Friedman ends his column:
Just staying the course will not contain it. But before we throw up our hands on Iraq, why not make one more big push to produce a more stable accord between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds over how to share power and oil revenues and demobilize militias. We still don't have such an understanding at the center of Iraqi politics. It may not be possible, but without it, neither is a self-sustaining, unified Iraqi democracy.
Why this push will be any different than any other push is beyond me. Indeed, the only stratagem I can imagine that would actually break the gridlock is an announce date for withdrawal combined with heavy pressure for negotiations. Knowing that our departure oculd precipitate a slaughter, the Sunnis may be willing to give far more than they've previously suggested. And knowing that civil war will destroy their lives and economy as surely as everyone else's, the Shiites may be willing to take the deal. Maybe.
