This op-ed in the Times doesn't vary much from the tone we've been seeing among other forms of communication coming out of Iran, but two things strike me. One is this student's insistence on rebutting the idea that Ahmadinejad may have actually won, and his rejection of the stereotypes being applied to the Iranian opposition. The other is how he describes the underlying tension in the American approach to the incumbent and the opposition:The election does reveal a paradox. There is strong evidence that Iranians across the board want a better relationship with the United States. But if Mr. Moussavi were to become president and carry out his campaign promise of seeking improved relations with America, we would probably see a good 30 percent of the Iranian population protesting that he is “selling out” to the enemy.By contrast, support for Mr. Ahmadinejad’s campaign was rooted in part in his supposed defense of the homeland and national honor in the face of United States aggression. Americans too-long familiar with the boorish antics of the Iranian president will no doubt be surprised to learn that the best chance for improved relations with the United States perhaps lies with Mr. Ahmadinejad. But Mr. Ahmadinejad is perceived here as being uniquely able to play the part of an Iranian Nixon by “traveling to the United States” and bringing along with him his supporters — and they are not few.In other words, Iranians believe they face a daunting choice: a disastrous domestic political situation with Mr. Ahmadinejad but an improved foreign policy, or improved domestic leadership under Mr. Moussavi but near impossible challenges in making relations with the United States better.It certainly doesn't change who is on the right side of this conflict, but it is another factor for consideration. I also thought this piece by Michael Walzer provides a useful way of approaching the "What is to be done?" question -- oh, right, civil society! Which reminds me -- is anything coming of this?
-- Tim Fernholz
