Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has promised an official -- if vague -- recount, pushing off a conclusion to the Iranian election for at least several days. It's more time for the Obama administration to resolve the toughest question to come out of the drama: Can the U.S. engage Iran and its leaders in dialogue, especially on nuclear issues, after they have demonstrated their willingness to violently stifle the voices of the Iranian people?
President Obama, however, seems to have already made his decision. After a series of prudent remarks emphasizing Iranian sovereignty, condemning violence and human rights abuses, and expressing concern about the questionable outcome of the election, the president made his views on further engagement clear -- though not so clear they couldn't be backed out of later.
"As odious as I consider some of President Ahmadinejad's statements, as deep as the differences that exist between the United States and Iran on a range of core issues, that the use of tough, hard-headed diplomacy -- diplomacy with no illusions about Iran and the nature of the differences between our two countries -- is critical when it comes to pursuing a core set of our national security interests," Obama told reporters yesterday. "We will continue to pursue a tough, direct dialogue between our two countries, and we'll see where it takes us."
At first glance, it's easy to see why Obama would continue to push his strategy of engagement. The authoritarian aspects of the Iranian government have always been apparent, from the pre-election selection of candidates by the Guardian Council to the violence of paramilitary groups; this isn't even the first time that accusations of election fraud benefiting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have arisen. Moreover, the country's foreign policies and interests aren't liable to change as a result of this internal coup. The argument for engaging Iran has always been predicated on the idea that the country is too powerful to ignore and that the international community is too conflicted to mount an effective sanctions regime.
It seems clear that analysts who argued the election of opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi wouldn't significantly change the regime's policies were wrong -- otherwise, Khamenei would not have gone to such lengths to ensure Mousavi was not elected. Assuming Mousavi isn't awarded the presidency after the Iranian recount (and presumably no one would object to negotiations with him as president), how does a hardline victory change the situation in Iran?
Fred Kaplan argues that now is the time for Obama to disengage, suggesting the current squabble among senior leadership in the Islamic Republic has presented an opportune moment for democracy promotion through "smart sanctions" or " moral shaming." While the latter option seems like a waste of breath, the former might have more success -- especially if European and other leaders are willing to join the U.S. in punishing Iran until real elections are held. Kaplan's hope to deepen the American relationship with Syria and split it away from Iran certainly provides a tempting justification for pushing back against Ahmadinejad.
But sanctions don't always have their intended effect and often give populist dictators like Ahmadinejad an opportunity to paint an outside party -- in this case, the United States -- as a common enemy to unite against. Any U.S. action that would give Ahmadinejad's anti-American rhetoric traction would be unfortunate, just as publicly allying the United States with the Iranian protesters at this stage would be counterproductive -- any evidence that the U.S. government directly supports the opposition would hurt them in their struggle for authenticity.
And the debate in Iran is, ultimately, a struggle for authenticity -- who represents the real voice of the Iranian people? And, for many in Iran, the question is who represents the authentic path of the 1979 Islamic Revolution; both sides of the struggle are claiming this mantle. Making assumptions about the politics of the opposition is a mistake. Though the reformists appear to be more pro-Western than other Iranians, and their current protest is for democracy, but theirs doesn't seem to be an explicitly liberal movement. They share the slogans of the 1979 revolutionaries -- God is Great -- and they don't seem to oppose the theocratic apparatus of the state, merely its authoritarian aspects. That's enough to provide common ground with Western liberals now-- and we should be proud to express our solidarity with them -- but in government their policies might concern us.
Indeed, what is most surprising about the debate over engaging Iran are the similarities Iran shares with other authoritarian countries in the Middle East. Take America's ally, Egypt. Brutal repression by an autocratic leader? Opposition leaders thrown in jail and tortured? Moderate Islamists joining liberals and nationalists to demonstrate for their electoral rights? Electoral fraud? Check, check, check, check. I await the calls for ending our relationship with the Cairo regime. They won't come, because Egypt is not pursuing nuclear weapons or abetting terrorism and is at peace with Israel. But if it were pursuing the antithesis of these policies, would the United States be trying to convince Hosni Mubarak to change his ways, or refusing to speak with him out of solidarity with the Muslim Brothers?
If Ahmadinejad comes out of this confrontation feeling empowered to take an even harder line against the international community, the only significant reason to end the U.S. engagement strategy is if Ahmadinejad refuses to talk -- which would increase the legitimacy of stiffer measures. (Remember that negotiation is not a synonym for concession). In the meantime, the U.S. and international community have no government to engage, and should support the opposition by taking cues from them -- Americans and other foreigners shouldn't presume to know what's best. If violence against demonstrators increases, though, then diplomatic pressure should increase along with it.
It's clear, at least, that events are in the saddle in Iran. The administration will carefully weigh the eventual results, consult with the international community and heed the Iranian opposition before continuing its strategy. But the last six months of diplomatic policy towards Tehran helped the opposition more than eight years of "Axis of Evil" from Washington. How can Ahmadinejad use the Great Satan to distract people from economic troubles and human rights violations if the Great Satan isn't so satanic anymore?
Correction: Fred Kaplan was previously referred to as Robert Kaplan.
