As you've heard by now, the debt-ceiling deal includes an immediate round of cuts and then a second round of cuts recommended by a bipartisan commission. Unless the debt-slashing recommendations of the commission are approved through Congress, a series of across-the-board cuts go into effect, drawn equally from defense and non-defense discretionary spending, i.e. domestic programs. Matt Yglesias has the proper reaction:
To me, this just sounds like the next hostage fight. Full expiration of the Bush tax cuts was unacceptable to many Republicans and Democrats alike. So the GOP played its hand aggressively, and Democrats backed down. Failure to raise the debt ceiling was unacceptable to many Republicans and Democrats alike. So the GOP played its hand aggressive, and Democrats backed down. If pulling the sequestration trigger is unacceptable to many Republicans and Democrats alike, then why won’t Republicans simply play the same game of bluff and hardball that’s worked for them in the past? What new trick is up Obama’s sleeve to change the basic hostage dynamic?
Is this because Republicans are just more steely-eyed, tough negotiators? Maybe, but there's something more important going on. Some people have looked at this and said, wow, those are some serious defense cuts that would take effect -- Republicans really would hate that! But it's not true. In fact, those cuts ($500 billion over ten years) are something they'd be perfectly happy to risk.
First, these "huge" defense cuts aren't really that huge. According to the latest budget documents, we plan to spend an average of $686 billion per year over the next five years on defense (that could change, of course, but it's a starting point). If you're cutting $500 billion over ten years, you're taking out $50 billion a year, or 7 percent, out of the defense budget. Not peanuts, but not exactly cutting it to the bone.
But more important, while being "strong" on defense is still a core part of conservative identity, strength has changed its meaning in recent years. Twenty-five years ago, strength meant spending. In the heart of the Cold War, we had to keep up with the Soviet war machine and build more and more weapons. Today, the enemy that animates the right is scary Muslim people. And while Republicans do want to keep a large military, the absolute size is far less important than whether we're being appropriately belligerent with those scary Muslims. Some of the ways we can do so cost a lot, but others don't. The level of spending has become far less critical to the policy, and the way conservatives think about national security, than it was during the Cold War.
Furthermore, while defense is important to conservative identity, it has become more than clear that it's secondary to maintaining low tax rates for the wealthy. That is the top priority for Republicans, the one thing they absolutely will not compromise on. As long as those low tax rates remain safe, other potential threats just aren't that frightening. In fact, they might even be willing to take the $500 billion in defense cuts, in order to get the accompanying $500 billion in cuts to domestic programs. So initiating another hostage crisis looks like a great idea: moderate risk of a bad policy outcome, an opponent whom they've seen give in again and again, and the upside of yet more policy victories. Why shouldn't they?
