A couple of weeks ago, I wrote in my story about Mohammed Jawad's return to Afghanistan -- and near return to prison -- that the incident highlighted the lack of a clear policy for the repatriation and reintegration of former Afghan terrorist detainees. I've also written before that the ultimate goal of many human-rights groups is to have the detainees be under Afghan control -- and in that leaked Afghanistan assessment, Gen. Stanley McChrystal says that local control and reintegration should be part of the new strategy:
Detainee Operations. Effective detainee operations are essential to success. The ability to remove insurgents from the battlefield is critical to effective protection of the population. Further, the precision demanded in effective counterinsurgency operations must be intelligence-driven; detainee operations are a critical part of this. Getting the right information and evidence from those detained in military operations is also necessary to support rule of law and reintegration programs and help ensure that only insurgents are detained and civilians are not unduly affected.
Detainee operations are both complex and politically sensitive. There are strategic vulnerabilities in a non-Afghan system. By contrast, an Afghan system reinforces their sense of sovereignty and responsibility. As always, the detention process must be effective in providing key intelligence and avoid 'catch and release' approaches that endanger coalition and ANSF forces. It is therefore imperative to evolve to a more holistic model centered on an Afghan-run system. This will require a comprehensive system that addresses the entire "life-cycle" and extends from point of capture to eventual reintegration or prosecution.
ISAF has completed a full review of current detainee pollcles and practices with recommendations for substantial revisions to complement ISAF's revised strategy. Key elements of a new detention policy should include transferring responsibility for longterm detention of insurgents to GIRoA, establishing procedures with GIRoA for ISAF access to detainees for interrogation within the bounds of national caveats, application of counter-radicalization and disengagement practices, and training of ISAF forces to better collect intelligence for continued operations and evidence for prosecution in the Afghan judicial system. Afghanistan must develop detention capabilities and operations that respect the Afghan people. A failure to address GIRoA incapacity in this area presents a serious risk to the mission.
Earlier, McChrystal emphasizes that, within the new strategy, insurgents will now have three choices instead of two: "fight, flee, or reintegrate." He adds that "ISAF requires a credible program to offer eligible insurgents reasonable incentives to stop fighting and return to normalcy, possibly including the provision of employment and protection. Such a program will require resources and focus, as appropriate, on people's future rather than past behavior."
Such an effort is likely to come under the auspices of Marine Gen. Doug Stone, who ran a similar program in Iraq that met with success. The problem is that Afghanistan has less infrastructure and fewer resources than Iraq, and it's not clear what an effective reintegration program would look like -- and whether it could be effective under such conditions.
-- A. Serwer
