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MISTAKES, REPEATED. Kingdaddy has a less rosy appreciation of U.S. theoretical counter-insurgency efforts than I:
A separate internal review this year by the military's Center for Army Lessons Learned, based on 152 interviews with soldiers involved in the training and advisory program, found that there was "no standardized guideline" for preparing advisers and that such instruction was needed because "a majority of advisors have little to no previous experience or training."Imagine if each tank platoon in the U.S. Army received a different set of training, with varying degrees of quality. Imagine if each SEAL team received recruited and trained for unconventional warfare differently. Now, imagine yourself as a divisional or theater commander, trying to figure out how well a particular war is going. Maybe the doctrine is wrong--but which doctrine, among many that various units under your command seem to be pursuing? Even more important is the perspective of Iraqi civilian and military leaders, trying to make sense of what the US government wants them to do.Read the whole thing, but I'd still argue that there are some substantial improvements, given the theoretical efforts that the Army has made on counter-insurgency that wasn't apparent during the Vietnam years. Nevertheless, Kingdaddy's position certainly supports an interpretation of U.S. counter-insurgency efforts closer to Matt's than my own. That different units are employing different tactics without any apparent manner of measuring effectiveness makes the situation even worse.
--Robert Farley
