Following the dramatic failure of the proposed national missile defense system's recent test, the Senate rejected a proposal that would prohibit the Pentagon from deploying the system until it could prove it would work. Now that the Clinton Administration has the go-ahead, an impassioned debate has erupted over whether it should build the defense system or scrap the whole thing. The American Prospect asks the experts:
Taking into account the results of the recent test, should President Clinton ask the Pentagon to go ahead with the national missile defense system?
Noam Chomsky
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Baker Spring
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Lisbeth Gronlund
Stephen Young
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Jack Spencer
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David Nyhan
Noam Chomsky:
I would prefer to respond to a slight reformulation of the question. The most hopeful prospect for the NMD [National Missile Defense], I think, is that the tests fail; and very clearly, because in the domain of nuclear strategy, appearance is likely to be interpreted as reality, for familiar reasons. If a system is developed that seems feasible, China will respond by strengthening its deterrent, which will impel India to do the same, and Pakistan, and . . .
According to press reports, a new National Intelligence Estimate predicts that NMD deployment will trigger buildup of nuclear-armed missiles by China, India, and Pakistan, with a further spread into the Middle East. Russia will assume that such a system can be quickly upgraded and will therefore also regard it as a first-strike threat. As many have observed, Russia's "only rational response to the NMD system would be to maintain, and strengthen, the existing Russian nuclear force" (Michael Byers), undermining hopes for nuclear disarmament.
The president of the Stimson Center, Michael Krepon, comments that the difference between Russian and U.S. stockpiles is so great that "the Russians are looking at a U.S. breakout level" and will be likely to react accordingly. U.S. negotiators have encouraged Russia to adopt a launch-on-warning strategy to alleviate their concerns and to induce them to accept the NMD and revision of the ABM treaty, a proposal that is "pretty bizarre," one expert commented, because "we know their warning system is full of holes" (John Steinbruner). At the UN [United Nations] conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in May, there was broad condemnation of the NMD on the grounds that it would undermine decades of arms control agreements and provoke a new weapons race.
The threat to the United States, and the world, seems clear and intolerably high. Global concerns are not alleviated by other U.S. stands. Last November the United States blocked a UN General Assembly resolution opposing space-based weapons. It passed 138-0, with the United States and Israel alone abstaining. It was recently announced that the United States is renovating more than 6,000 nuclear warheads, almost double what it is allowed to deploy under Start II, rejecting Russian initiatives to reduce the number of warheads to 1,500 in future talks. Currently the United States maintains a launch-on-warning posture with the option of first-strike even against nonnuclear states that have signed the NPT.
Other recent decisions are also surely regarded as ominous in most of the world: for example, resumption of tritium production using civilian facilities for the first time, breaching the barrier between civilian and military use -- another blow to the NPT. Few, including allies, take seriously the alleged concern about "rogue states." Canadian military planners advised last November that the goal of the NMD is "arguably more in order to preserve U.S./NATO freedom of action than because U.S. really fears North Korean or Iranian threat," according to briefing documents obtained under Canada's Access to Information Act. The best hope for the world seems to me unambiguous test failure.
Noam Chomsky is a writer and a professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Baker Spring:
Many speak of President Clinton's impending decision regarding the fielding of a national missile defense (NMD) system as one of whether or not to deploy such a system. This depiction of the president's decision is erroneous. Approximately a year ago, President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 into law. The act established a policy to deploy an NMD system as soon as was technologically possible. Thus, the nation has already made a decision to deploy an NMD system. What remains is for the president to select what kind of NMD system to deploy and to establish a program for fielding the chosen system as soon as is technologically possible.
The results of the missile defense test of July 8 should have little impact upon deciding which system to select or upon determining the technological feasibility of an NMD system. The test did not demonstrate missile defense technology to be either positive or negative. The interceptor failed to intercept the target warhead because of a defect in rocket booster technology that has been used by the military on many occasions during the past 40 years. Further, the missile defense technology that was to have been demonstrated in the test has already been presented in earlier missile defense tests, including the Patriot PAC-3 anti-tactical missile defense system and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-theater missile defense system, as well as the test model NMD interceptor last October. These weapons would all destroy ballistic missiles in flight by ramming into them and are thus called kinetic energy weapons. The Department of Defense already knows that kinetic energy weapons work in principle, and that what is needed is further refinement of the technology.
President Clinton is under a legal obligation to continue the process for developing and deploying an NMD system. There is no going back. An NMD system must be developed and deployed, and the president must continue to proceed with the development program such that his chosen system can be deployed as soon as the refinement of the technology permits.
Baker Spring is a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
Lisbeth Gronlund:
No. Independent of the results of the recent intercept test, President Clinton should not ask the Pentagon to begin deployment of the planned NMD system. Even if the July 8 test had been a complete success, it would not have indicated whether the NMD system would work in the real world against a real ballistic missile attack.
The planned system is intended to defend against attacks of up to tens of long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons -- particularly against such attacks by emerging missile states that might acquire such weapons in the future. But if the United States were attacked by such long-range missiles, the unpleasant truth is that the planned NMD is unlikely to be effective.
The Union of Concerned Scientists and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Security Studies Program released a detailed study this April presenting technical evidence questioning the NMD's efficacy. The study found that any country able to deploy a long-range missile in the first place could also employ countermeasures to confuse or overwhelm the planned NMD, and that such countermeasures would render the NMD virtually useless. The study, which I co-authored along with 10 other independent scientists and engineers, considered not the first phase of the NMD system that might be deployed by 2005, but the fully deployed system with all its planned ground-based radars, space-based sensors, and interceptors. (The report is available at www.ucsusa.org/arms.)
For example, our report finds that an attacker could defeat the full NMD system by placing each nuclear warhead inside a mylar balloon to disguise it, and releasing it along with dozens of similar but empty balloons. Since none of the defense sensors would be able to determine which balloons contained warheads, the defense would have to shoot at all the balloons. But the attacker could deploy too many balloons for this to be possible.
However, none of the 19 intercept tests currently scheduled before the first phase of the system can be deployed include realistic countermeasures of the sort we describe. The three intercept tests conducted so far included one mock warhead and one balloon decoy with a very different physical appearance and infrared signature than that of an actual warhead. The Pentagon apparently assumes an attacker could deploy a nuclear warhead and a large balloon decoy, but either could not or would not take the relatively easy step of putting the warhead itself inside a balloon and releasing many empty balloons.
The Pentagon states that its first tests use less challenging threats because it is learning to "walk before it runs." Although the system has not yet demonstrated that it can walk reliably (i.e., intercept a target without countermeasures), doing so should be technically possible. But our study demonstrates that a system that can walk may never be able to run because an attacker could easily trip it.
The Pentagon should demonstrate that the NMD system can run before the United States seriously considers beginning deployment. Yet none of the planned tests will involve running: None will include warheads that are disguised, a minimum precaution any attacker using decoys would likely take. In essence, the Pentagon is asking the wrong question to get the answer they want.
If the planned NMD system were demonstrated to be effective against real-world threats, it would still make sense for the United States to begin deployment only if the potential security benefits outweighed the security costs. And the likely security costs of going ahead with deployment of this NMD system are high.
Lisbeth Gronlund is a senior staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, and a research fellow at the MIT Security Studies Program.
Stephen Young:
Clinton should not, under any circumstances, decide to deploy the proposed missile defense system. This system is a lemon and will never work effectively enough to make it worth the monetary and security costs it would entail.
Why do I write this? Missile defense would seem to be a no-brainer. Who could oppose defending the United States against an attack by ballistic missiles? In fact, in the present situation, building a national missile defense would make the United States less secure, not more.
This perhaps counterintuitive statement becomes apparent once one realizes that the current national missile defense proposal is architected for an unproven system that may never work and is designed against a threat that does not -- and may never -- exist. At the same time, deploying that defense may well undermine the entire nonproliferation regime, severely damaging relations with Russia and China -- the only two potential U.S. adversaries that already have the ability to attack the United States with long-range missiles.
According to Pentagon officials, a new threat justifying missile defenses already exists. This is not, however, the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community. In fact, the new "threat" may be fading. North Korea, oft cited as the primary new threat, has never tested a missile that could reach the United States with a nuclear warhead. Last year it froze its missile flight test program, and in June 2000, it held the first-ever summit meeting with South Korea. On the other hand, as it has for decades, Russia has 6,000 long-range nuclear warheads, a force so large that no defense against it is practical.
If North Korea does decide to attack the United States, it is likely to use a more reliable -- and anonymous -- method, for example, putting a bomb on a Ryder truck. Among long-range missiles' many disadvantages is their "return address," which ensures a devastating U.S. response. As every despot knows, a missile attack on the United States is national suicide.
The proposed national missile defense -- costing upward of $60 billion -- is one of the most complicated technical endeavors ever attempted by humankind, similar to the first trip to the moon. President Kennedy's "reach the moon" challenge to the United States, however, had a cooperative target; the moon did not take steps to counter Neil Armstrong's giant leap for mankind. Countries that would launch missiles against the United States are unlikely to be as accommodating.
Despite the difficult nature of the task, President Clinton's decision will take place after only three of 19 scheduled intercept tests. After 20 months of delay, the first test of the system succeeded last year. But the interceptor was for some time "lost in space," and it only found the mock warhead after first homing in on a much larger "decoy" balloon. The second and third tests failed completely. Even if the system does work as intended, it is not designed to handle simple countermeasures that the intelligence community tells us would be available to any country that can develop long-range missiles. This leaves the United States in the awkward position of preparing to deploy a national missile defense against a threat that may never emerge; and if the threat does emerge, it is likely to use countermeasures that can overcome the defense. In that case, deployment is a lose-lose strategy.
Stephen Young is deputy director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers.
Jack Spencer:
Yes, the president should ask the Department of Defense to go ahead with the national missile defense (NMD) system.
The test: The recent NMD test failure must be put into perspective. It wasthe test that failed, not the missile defense technology that it was testing.The problem was with booster separation on the rocket, which has been usedmany times before. The new technology -- the interceptor -- was not eventested. So to refer to that technology as having failed is misleading.More accurately, it was a quality control problem. But that should notreflect one way or the other on the president's decision to deploy.
The decision: The decision to deploy does not mean that the system will bebuilt as is. This was only the third in a series of 19 tests that will beconducted over the development of the system. The decision to deploy is amissile defense architecture decision that commits the United States to goahead with the development of the ground-based system. We should keep inmind that the decision to deploy a limited national missile defense was made in 1999 when the president signed the National MissileDefense Act into law, making it the policy of the United States to deploy anational missile defense as soon as "technologically possible."
The threat: The threat is real. Just last week, North Korea refused todenounce its right to build ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles]. According to the intelligence community, North Korea could have an ICBM in short order -- and just days ago, Iran tested the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. The intelligence community alsowarns that Iran could field an ICBM within just a few short years. And inMonday's Washington Post, Richard Butler, former head of UNSCOM ([United Nations Special Commission] the organization charged with disarming Iraq), warned that he has "seen evidence of Iraq's attempts to acquire missile-related tools and . . . of steps the Iraqis have taken to reassemble their nuclear weapons design team." Also, Russia maintains a potent nuclear arsenal -- which it is modernizing -- and China is building new, state of the art intercontinental-range nuclear missiles. Now I ask, why do these nations need ICBMs if not to threaten the United States?
What to do: The president should go ahead with the planned ground-basedsystem. In addition, the president should develop the Navy's Aegis airdefense system to be capable of intercepting medium- andintercontinental-range ballistic missiles. With streamlined management, thesea-based system could be initially deployed in about three years for approximately $3billion. This option is very affordable because it takes advantage of thesignificant investment already made in the Aegis architecture. Thecombination of the ground-based system in Alaska and the sea-based systemdeployed around the world on the Navy's 22 Aegis cruisers will defend theUnited States, its troops abroad, and it friends and allies from the manylimited threats posed by today's dangerous world.
Conclusion: The president should not only move ahead with the ground-basedoption, but should make defending the United States from ballistic missileattack a national priority. We must remember that missile defense is adaunting task, but not an impossible one. The American scientific andengineering communities can do this; we simply must allow them to.
Jack Spencer is a policy analyst for defense and national security at the Heritage Foundation.
David Nyhan:
No.The public doesn't understand the inherent impotence of a missile shield over the Lower 48. But voters do understand that it's not a good idea to have outgoing presidents commit their successors to something complicated, costly, and controversial. That's why we have elections. While I do applaud Bill Clinton's declaring huge swaths of the Sunbelt sacrosanct from Republican schemes to graze cattle, extract oil, and lift logs and minerals out of public land, going ahead with this missile scheme on his way out the door is a bad idea.
It looks like Bill is trying to have it both ways again -- convincing the rubes he's for some kind of maybe-it'll-really-work, middle-of-the-road missile shield while protecting Al Gore's right flank from election-year criticism that he's soft on defense. It's all tied up with the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty, the Russians, and the rest of the world's fears, too. Bill tried a six-cushion billiard shot, and his scheme was too complicated. Game over, Will-yum.
Voters are historically hysterical on the Red-under-the-bed, commie-missiles-overhead war cry. God knows (and the GAO [General Accounting Office], too) that we've overspent hugely on dozens of cockamamie schemes: missiles on flatcars, missiles in North Dakota silos that couldn't do what they were designed to do, and, most recently, the missile-that-can't-shoot-down-the-other-missile-over-the-Pacific.
''This is rocket science,'' shrugged the general shoved out to explain the latest test failure. Dave to general: ''This is politics, pal.'' Absent the election and Gore's need for a boost from Big Bill, this turkey would be grounded for long-term internment. The rest of the world does not want the United States to be the only nation with some kind of nuke umbrella. Can we blame them? No. Are we all in this together? Yes.
Pigging out at the defense contractors' truffle-laden trough is what drives the congressional proclivity for buying more pie in the sky. In this election cycle, it's not the Russians but North Korea, Iran, and Iraq who are the bogeymen. No one gets elected to the House or Senate by telling voters, Hey, sorry, but there's no way to really protect your condo from terrorist nuclear attack, if you want to know the truth. Voters don't want that truth, period. After the latest floperoo, Senate Republicans beat back a proposal that would stop the Pentagon from rigging the test and make it more realistic by using decoys and other countermeasures.
But there's big money already in the pipeline for the construction of a new radar network in Alaska. Some $1.9 billion is already tucked away in the defense authorization bill. Ultimately the tab is projected now at $60 billion, which means $100 billion by the time the Pork Chop Congress drops its knife and fork and eases back from the picnic table. Even if the system actually worked -- doubtful in the extreme -- it wouldn't be in place for five years at the earliest. And even if the United States goes ahead with this huge mistake, it would do nothing to prevent ninja-costume-clad terrorists from packing their nuke components into a suitcase, sailboat, pickup truck, or a Ryder rental van, coming in from Canada or Mexico or the 3,600 miles of unguarded Maine coastline, and setting up their firecracker in a broom closet under Grand Central Station. Bottom line: Dave to Bill, Al, and W.: Fahgetaboutit. Treaties, not technologies, are what we need.
David Nyhan is a columnist for The Boston Globe.
