Close followers of developments in Iraq might recall that in late November President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki signed a statement of intent -- called a "Declaration of Principles" -- to "frame the future relationship between the two countries."
The declaration itself was vague and nonbinding, but it left open the possibility that future negotiations between Washington and Baghdad could result in an open-ended commitment for the United States to devote troops to defend Iraq from both internal and external threats for years to come.
Such a long-term commitment would undoubtedly run counter to popular opinion in the U.S., but it also raises an important constitutional question -- namely, does such an arrangement require the ratification of a treaty, and therefore the consent of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate?
The language in the declaration is fairly leading. Under it, the U.S. would agree to:
1. Providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.
2. Supporting the Republic of Iraq in its efforts to combat all terrorist groups, at the forefront of which is Al-Qaeda, Saddamists, and all other outlaw groups regardless of affiliation, and destroy their logistical networks and their sources of finance, and defeat and uproot them from Iraq. This support will be provided consistent with mechanisms and arrangements to be established in the bilateral cooperation agreements mentioned herein.
3. Supporting the Republic of Iraq in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces to enable them to protect Iraq and all its peoples, and completing the building of its administrative systems, in accordance with the request of the Iraqi government.
Though it doesn't necessarily spell out a specific commitment of U.S. troops, it strongly suggests one. Historically, and in the language of diplomacy, that's what the term "security commitment" means. So, what's the time-frame, then? For his part, Iraqi defense minister, Abdul Qadir has suggested that Iraq won't be prepared to defend itself until 2018.
Potentially, this means the president could be arranging a quasi-guarantee of 10 years of military protection (perhaps even from rebel factions within Iraq) during his last year in office. And that's where Congress steps in. On Wednesday, Rep. William Delahunt (D-Mass.) chaired a subcommittee hearing devoted to examining whether such a commitment would be constitutional without the ratification of a treaty by the Senate. (Such a treaty would almost surely be voted down in the Senate).
Among those testifying at the hearing, convened by two House Foreign Affairs subcommittees, were Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East analyst at the Congressional Research Service; Michael Matheson of George Washington University Law School; and Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute, the conservative think tank.
If covered within a treaty, Congress could block the president from making this sort of agreement with Maliki. But without one the president could provide similar assurances informally, leaving the future president -- Democrat or Republican -- in a tricky diplomatic position if he or she decides not to honor Bush's promise.
Testifying on Wednesday, Rubin noted that any guarantee that U.S. troops would defend Iraqi territory would demand a treaty. But the White House has signaled otherwise. "We don't anticipate now that these negotiations will lead to the status of a formal treaty which would then bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs from the Congress," General Douglas Lute, an adviser the president on Iraq and Afghanistan," said in November, after the declaration was signed.
As it stands, the Declaration lays out a framework for negotiations that will begin "as soon as possible" with the goal of hammering out an agreement of some sort by the end of July. In the meantime, however, Congress could consider legislation recently floated by Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) that would "require the Bush Administration to consult with Congress before moving forward with any agreement that could lead to long term security arrangements ... and makes clear that any such agreement must come in the form of a treaty."
Other constraints on a potential U.S. security commitment could come from within Iraq. Iraqi legislators who would like a long-term commitment from the United States may not sign on to anything that doesn't have the force of U.S. law behind it (a treaty, for instance). On the other, according to Kenneth Katzman, any agreement between the U.S. and Iraq would meet "tremendous difficulty passing the Iraqi parliament." So this is far from a done deal. But it's also a situation, which, if ignored, could make the Iraq problem even more complicated for the next president than it already promises to be.
