On May 4, the Pentagon announced that at least 135,000 troops would remain in Iraq through the end of 2005. Is this the right strategy? While the problems in George W. Bush's approach have become painfully apparent, Democrats remain split on the best way to correct for his mistakes. Congressman Dennis Kucinich, a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, discusses the subject with Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.
Dennis Kucinich:
It is time that the leaders of our nation recognize what the people of our nation are recognizing in greater and greater numbers every day: We need to end our occupation of Iraq and bring our troops home.
At least 724 American servicemen and women have died, and thousands more have been wounded or injured. Despite promises and hopes of progress in resolving the political, religious, and reconstruction issues in "post-war" Iraq, hostilities and general unrest have actually increased in recent weeks. April was the single bloodiest and deadliest month of the entire occupation. Why? Because as President Bush himself recently admitted, no nation likes to be occupied. The mere presence of U.S. troops and the control of Iraq by a U.S.-led provisional authority are the causes of the growing instability and violence. The only way we are going to create the conditions for peace in Iraq and prevent a quagmire that could entrap us for generations is to bring in the United Nations: peacekeepers, administrators, diplomats, humanitarian aid specialists, and reconstruction experts.
I led the effort in the House of Representatives to challenge the administration's march toward war, resulting in nearly two-thirds of House Democrats voting against the war resolution. Since then, we have seen that it was a trail of lies that led to our involvement in Iraq. It is clear now that Iraq had neither the intention nor the capability of attacking the United States. It was wrong to go in, and it is wrong to stay in.
In October, I presented an exit strategy that would bring the United Nations in and get the United States out in a period of 90 days. This is not "cut and run," an "immediate withdrawal," or "losing face." Those terms are designed to play on our fears, and Americans have heard those feeble and failed arguments before. We must recognize that taking a course of action that will bring peace, regain the respect of the world community, and save American and Iraqi lives is a plan of courage, not weakness.
We need to ask the U.N. to go beyond its current diplomatic mission of assisting in the development of a transitional government and ask them to assume responsibility and control of a peacekeeping mission. The United States must also transfer control of Iraqi assets, including oil, so that those assets can be administered on behalf of the Iraqi people until they have held fair and free elections and are self-governing. There should be no more privatization of Iraq. We also need to help rebuild Iraq to the extent that we destroyed it, pay reparations to the families of innocent civilians who lost their lives, and help to pay for the U.N. peacekeeping mission.
Right now, neither the leading Democrat nor the Republican Administration is willing to commit to a plan to bring our troops home. The administration has already extended the tour of duty for 20,000 soldiers and announced plans to send back troops on a second rotation. Forty percent of all those U.S. troops are either National Guard or Reserve. Leading Democrats are talking about the need to expand our military by another 40,000 troops. All of this is happening while other coalition countries are pulling out their forces in recognition of the risks, the futility, and the illegitimacy of being there at all. As the United States is stretched thinner and thinner, the likelihood of a military draft becomes greater and greater.
We have to take an entirely new direction. The current "plan" is not working; if anything, it is making the situation worse. Once we bring in the U.N. and prove to the Iraqis that we are truly working toward Iraqi self-rule, we can begin bringing our troops home. This is the best chance of creating a peaceful, secure Iraq.
Michael O'Hanlon:
Congressman Kucinich is to be commended for the clarity and consistency of his thinking, now and throughout the entire Iraq debate. He is also right not to be impressed by those who argue that saving national face requires us to continue a failing military mission. We are a strong enough country that we can absorb the occasional battlefield loss without gravely jeopardizing our global interests.
That said, near-term withdrawal would be a major mistake in Iraq. And while I acknowledge that invading Iraq to overthrow Saddam was a "war of choice," to use former State Department official Richard Haass's phrase, and also agree the Bush administration was not sufficiently honest with the American people about the case for war, the decision was not the huge strategic mistake or moral failure often alleged. Remember that Saddam was indeed in violation of more than a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions. He had consistently impeded inspections designed to ensure his disarmament and used chemical weapons against his own people and in war. He was close to a nuclear capability in 1991 and was responsible for the deaths of more than a million persons.
Containment was not the clean, easy, and successful strategy that some claim. Among other things, it required us to keep U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in a way that inspired terrorist attacks against our troops there and helped al-Qaeda grow in size and capability during the 1990s. Moreover, Saddam was not perfectly contained, as evidenced by his attempted assassination of former President George Bush in 1993 and his use of force in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1996.
So the indignant tone that critics of the Iraq invasion often invoke is overdone. True, the war was not needed to destroy any supposed Saddam-al-Qaeda axis or to prevent imminent Iraqi acquisition of nuclear arms. But nor was the invasion some chest-thumping war of aggression by a hypermilitaristic Bush administration. Had it been initiated in a more consultative and patient fashion, it could well have been a reasonableenforcement of international law, a humane means of eliminating one of the world's most brutal leaders, and a means of enhancing long-term Persian Gulf stability. Rep. Kucinich and I would surely agree that the war was initiated in a hasty and unilateralist way, and that planning for the post-Saddam period was poor. And we can certainlydebate whether the war was strategically smart. But whether or not it was smart -- I will concede that is an open question -- it was strategically and morally justifiable.
This is important because many who demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq base their argument on the view that the invasion of Iraq was illegitimate from the start. And if it was either illegitimate or entirely unnecessary, paying a cost of more than 700 American lives and perhaps $150 billion to $300 billion would indeed be excessive. But if it is seen as a reasonable (if debatable) response to the provocations and dangers of Saddam, the huge cost we are now paying as a country may be easier to endure.
And alas, endure we must. There is no good strategic case for withdrawal anytime soon. Iraq's army numbers only about 5,000 troops, and their loyalties to the idea of a unified Iraq cannot yet be fully vouched for. Its police force has only 20,000 fully or partially trained officers; other security institutions are also weak. No national government exists, and even when one is named for the June 30 transfer of sovereignty, it will not yet be a fully legitimate government with any demonstrated staying power.
Under these circumsances, the consequences of a U.S. decision to withdraw within months would most likely be the following:
- an attempt by Baathists to retake power by force;
- an inevitable response by Shia militias, including al-Sadr's, with the likelihood of substantial ethnic conflict in Baghdad and other areas;
- an attempt by the Kurds to break off from the rest of Iraq, while also moving to forcibly expel many Arabs who have settled in the area of Kirkuk;
- a subsequent response by Turkey, Iran, or both to suppress the Kurdish move, quite likely by invading northern Iraq, and in the case of Iran possibly an effort to cause trouble in southern Iraq as well;
- at best, a successful splintering of the country into three pieces, probably after a fair amount of warfare. In the worst case, ongoing civil and indeed international war, with the additional possibility of al-Qaeda establishing a foothold in parts of Iraq;
- a mockery of the U.S. pledge to leave the people of Iraq in better shape after Saddam than before;
- the possibility of another aggressive Iraqi leader coming to power and seeking weapons of mass destruction as well as Kuwait's or Saudi Arabia's oil.
Admittedly, most of the above risks would not lead to direct attacks against the United States. Most of them would not lead to a complete breakdown in the region's oil economy. Most would not lead to an Arab attack on Israel. But none of the above scenarios can be totally dismissed. And the consequences of a chaotic, warring, proliferating, terrorism-spawning post-Saddam Iraq would be quite serious for thePersian Gulf region and the United States.
Rep. Kucinich is surely right that things are bad enough today in Iraq to warrant fundamental rethinking of our approach. In particular, greater use of Arab armies in peacekeeping, much more ambitious efforts to bring in the United Nations and other countries as suggested by Senator Kerry, and a number of other creative ideas not yet publicly discussed merit our time and attention.
Dennis Kucinich:
It appears that we agree on much: that the administration hyped up the justification for war; that it could and should have taken a more multilateral approach; that it did not properly plan for "post-war" Iraq; and that it failed -- and continues to fail -- to place a high enough priority on involving the international community to improve the current situation and reverse the escalating violence.
But I do believe the decision to go to war was a moral failure. Even with the knowledge of the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime, there was no compelling national security interest to justify the rush to war or to implement a policy of preemption. Opening that door is a dangerous step in the direction of a global foreign policy of military preemption and intervention based more on subjective political and moral definitions of "good and evil" than on an objective assessment of clear and present dangers to our own national security or the security interests of our allies. That sort of righteous -- some might say self-righteous -- decision-making diminishes any U.S. moral authority in the eyes of other nations and poses a further threat to international peace.
Whatever the arguments, evidence, or lack of evidence to justify the invasion and argue in support of the occupation, the ultimate solution should not be rhetorical backfilling that can only lead to a deeper entrenchment. America must dramatically reverse its course and acknowledge that the continued U.S. military presence in Iraq is, in and of itself, counterproductive and destabilizing.
We have two choices: Either we change course and work to methodically withdraw our own troops and bring in a U.N. peacekeeping force; or we sink deeper into this occupation, with more U.S. casualties, ever higher financial costs, and diminished security for all Americans.
I want to reiterate that my plan is not for an immediate withdrawal. We are not abandoning Iraq. Many people who are opposed to withdrawal use historical examples such as the Soviets leaving Afghanistan and enabling the rise of the Taliban, but there is an important distinction here. I am advocating working with an international body, the United Nations, to assume responsibility for peacekeeping, development of a transitional government, administration of assets and reconstruction, and management of reparations. That is very different from pulling out and letting Iraq fall apart. I am talking about removing our country from a situation in which we appoint ourselves the policemen of the world and the ultimate arbiters of other nations' conduct. Instead of insisting on "the American way," we should allow others to serve as international "honest brokers."
This is not an unrealistic plan. I would argue that it is unrealistic to assume we can continue on the current course and make any progress.
Dr. O'Hanlon makes important points about the possibility of a power vacuum in Iraq, which is why the U.N. must be prepared to provide security in Iraq before the transfer is made. The U.N. peacekeeping force must be truly multinational, with a large contingent from Arab and Muslim nations. It seems we agree that the U.N. should be involved in some way, but disagree on the extent of its involvement. The Iraqis are resisting the U.S. occupation; until that changes, I don't believe the Iraqi people will accept "cosmetic" changes in the structure of governance and control.
An important question for Dr. O'Hanlon and our readers: Is the United States willing to relinquish its control -- in the interests of peace and stability -- and work with and within an international construct to achieve those objectives? The answer to this question may allow us to avoid similar foreign policy scenarios in the future.
Michael O'Hanlon:
I agree wholeheartedly with Rep. Kucinich that the United States should not want to run Iraq itself, like it was some prize in the imperial competitions of yesteryear. The June 30 date for a transfer of sovereignty is sensible, if it can be achieved -- as I think it can. But it comes after a year in which the United States built up resentment by running Iraq's affairs itself. This was a major mistake. We should have dissolved the Coalition Provisional Authority long ago and asked the international community to replace it with a U.N. high commissioner; going ahead, we should accord the U.N. the primary international consultative role in Iraq after June 30.
But on the security side, I do not believe we have as much room for maneuver as Rep. Kucinich alleges. While we should be able to secure greater commitments from nearby countries, Arab nations are not enthusiastic about sending large numbers of forces to Iraq, and Iraqis do not necessarily want lots of Syrians or Turks or Iranians or Saudis on their land. Rivalries, irredentist claims to land, and other jealousies and paranoias can be stoked by such deployments. Plus, most Arab militaries lack the specialized skills to conduct counterinsurgency operations with minimal loss of civilian life. As for our major allies, while I agree a greater U.N. political role in Iraq could lead to more military help from countries such as France, Germany, and India, I would not expect more than 20,000 troops from these and other distant countries under the best of circumstances, given the limited capacities of their armed forces for deploying troops abroad.
Admittedly, adding those 20,000 international troops, plus 10,000 to 20,000 Arab soldiers, could ease the burden on U.S. forces and improve the image of the foreign military presence in Iraqi eyes. It should be attempted. But even afterward, in all likelihood, we would have to retain 100,000 American troops for a substantial period of time, and tens of thousands of GIs for many years to come thereafter.
Dennis Kucinich:
With all due respect to Dr. O'Hanlon, maintaining upwards of 100,000 troops indefinitely -- a policy to which the Pentagon has just committed -- serves neither America nor Iraq. It is time to take an honest, dispassionate, and realistic look at where we are.
Fallujah: For reasons that clearly transcend military tactics and objectives, the United States has stepped back and allowed Iraqi nationals to take the lead in addressing the violent and potentially even-more volatile situation in Fallujah. Should this reversal of policy be characterized as abandonment of responsibility? Surrender to insurgency? Or just logic, reason, and political reality?
High-level dissent: Retired four-star U.S. Army Gen. William E. Odom, a former head of the National Security Agency General, and head of the conservative Hudson Institute, has criticized President Bush's Iraq policy and demanded U.S. forces return from Iraq as rapidly as possible for the sake of American security and economic power alike. Gen. Odom urged the United States remove its forces "from that shattered country as rapidly as possible." He has said, "We have failed." And, "The issue is how high a price we're going to pay -- less, by getting out sooner, or more, by getting out later."
America's growing disapproval and distrust: Public opinion polls should not determine public policy. But public sentiment must be a factor in the governmental decision-making process. Sentiment that was largely in favor of the Bush Administration policy a few months ago has dramatically shifted in the opposite direction. In other words, a large and growing segment -- depending on the specific question asked, even a majority -- of United States citizens no longer support the current policy.
These factors, combined with the resentment against U.S. policy in the Arab world, the growing disengagement of other coalition forces, and the continued expressions of skepticism and even opposition among other members of the world community, force us to ask: Why are we doing this?
And the follow-up question: Why don't we find a way to get out?
Continuing our policy, maintaining and even expanding our presence, insisting on a dominant and ongoing role in the future -- all this runs contrary to common sense, national interest, and international cooperation and harmony.
Michael O'Hanlon:
Again, I am not defending the Bush administration, or the fashion in which it invaded and then occupied Iraq, but rather the premise that we as a country must at this point do what it takes to stabilize Iraq. We do not need to create a perfect Mesopotamian democracy before leaving. But unfortunately, even achieving stability will take a good deal more time and work.
Like most Democrats, I support -- and have long encouraged -- the administration's recent moves toward a large role for the United Nations on the political side of things. That said, we as Democrats need to be careful about simply deferring all responsibility to the United Nations as if that body is guaranteed to solve the problem in Iraq; Senator Kerry's April speech on Iraq policy was a bit too categorical in its support for Mr. Brahimi at a time when we have not yet seen the details of what he will recommend for June 30. On the whole, however, Rep. Kucinich and I are in agreement on the need to emphasize the U.N. role in future dealings on Iraqi political matters.
As to Gen. Odom: He is indeed a smart man, but he is a rare analyst on this issue. Almost every scholar and regional expert whose views I know feels we have no choice but to stay a good long while in Iraq. Iraqis themselves, while increasingly resentful of the U.S. presence, also fear the consequences of a quick departure. And although we must work to internationalize the security effort, it is hard to see how we can add more than about 30,000 to 40,000 additional foreign troops (to the 25,000 in Iraq now) under the very best of circumstances. Larger foreign military contributions are almost surely beyond the capacities of other countries' armed forces.
The recent political compromise in Fallujah may work, but we cannot withdraw U.S. security forces at a time when Iraq's army numbers less than 5,000 and its police force is quite weak. The administration is reversing course on its policy of excluding former Baathists from the military, and this willingness to employ some Baathists strikes me as the right policy at this point. Perhaps putting some former Iraqi military in operational charge of the security situation in the Sunni triangle will ease the situation.
In any event, it would in my view be a miscarriage of American principles of justice to let a few thousand Baathists and jihadists cause us to withdraw from Iraq prematurely. That would allow Saddam's cronies or equally unsavory elements to retake power. Or it could lead to large-scale and sustained civil warfare in Iraq. We are better than that.
Yes, we have been too unilateralist and bullheaded in our national Iraq policy. But no, we cannot leave soon, even if we recruit the U.N. and a lot more international help.
Dennis Kucinich, four-term Ohio Congressman and former mayor of Cleveland, is co-chair of the House Progressive Caucus. He is a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.
Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and author or coauthor of 13 books, including Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration.
Jeffrey Dubner is a Prospect editorial intern.
