NON-PROLIFERATION AND BRITISH NUKES. In the non-proliferation community there's some tension between the goals of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It's often argued, not wholly unreasonably, that convincing Iran, North Korea, etc. to eschew nuclear weapons is pretty difficult when the great powers refuse to give up their own nukes. The NPT includes a formal commitment to disarmament, which the recognized nuclear powers have largely ignored. Thus far, nuclear disarmament has occurred only in a few debatable and highly unusual cases, including the decision of Ukraine to give up Russian weapons on its soil, and the dismantling of South Africa's atomic weapons shortly prior to the end of apartheid. I've been pretty skeptical of disarmament both as a practical possibility (hard to put the genie back in the bottle), and as a policy focus for non-proliferation efforts. I find it almost impossible to imagine a situation in which the major nuclear powers would be willing to give up their weapons, both because nuclear weapons carry a significant amount of prestige and because deterrent concerns still matter. The sole exception to my skepticism is the United Kingdom, which I believe is the best candidate for disarmament. The UK's nuclear capability is built around four Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines, each carrying thirty-six warheads. Although Tony Blair has formally requested development of a new generation of missile submarines and eventually a new generation of missiles, the debate in the UK on the wisdom of the program is genuine. As the UK has close alliances with both France and the United States, the strategic rationale of the British program isn't completely clear. The prestige question (nukes proving that a country is a great power) is, for a host of reasons, less salient in the UK than in France. In spite of Blair's decision to continue the British nuclear program, I can imagine a day in which the United Kingdom leaves the nuclear club.
--Robert Farley
