President Bush delisted North Korea as a state sponsor of terror on Saturday. In response, North Korea has resumed disassembly of its nuclear infrastructure. The central U.S. concession was that surprise inspections of undeclared facilities suspected of housing nuclear infrastructure can only be performed with the consent of the North Koreans. The United States wanted these inspections because of enduring concern over a parallel uranium nuclear program, although the existence of such a program has never been demonstrated. This possibly mythical uranium program was the proximate cause of the collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002. Jeffrey Lewis has more discussion.
It seems clear that President Bush wants an enduring compromise on North Korean nuclear weapons before he leaves office. The agreement as it now stands isn't a noticeable improvement on the Agreed Framework, and the disruption of that accord pushed North Korea toward development of nuclear weapons and the nuclear test of 2006. In short, this agreement is about rescuing as much as possible from the disastrous foreign policy of Bush's first term.
Of course, the North Koreans are hardly innocent; they've acted erratically over the past few months, which is particularly troubling in the context of what may be a succession crisis. However, in thinking about whether the North Koreans were actually abandoning the nuclear accord or simply negotiating forcefully, it's worth noting that the threats they engaged in were very public. If they'd really been interested in firing up the program again, they would have attempted to conceal their efforts, rather than show them to the world.
If Obama wins the presidency, I don't expect him to treat North Korea any more lightly than second-term Bush. Indeed, if North Korea makes any trouble, Obama may be tempted use it as an opportunity to demonstrate "resolve." That's all fine and good; there are limits to what we should offer North Korea, and they need us more than we need them. Any display of resolve, however, should be careful to preserve the essence of the agreement, which is the dismantlement of plutonium facilities. The uranium program in particular shouldn't be a sticking point, in no small part because the surveillance capabilities of the United States on the Korean Peninsula are already immense.
--Robert Farley
